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Abstract	  	   This	  thesis	  will	  examine	  how	  the	  organization	  of	  creditors	  and	  debtors	  within	  an	  ad	  hoc	  sovereign	  debt	  framework	  affects	  the	  prospect	  of	  establishing	  a	  formal	  international	  mechanism	  for	  debt	  disputes.	  Since	  sovereign	  debtors	  are	  not	  bounded	  by	  the	  same	  constraints	  and	  guarantees	  as	  domestic	  actors,	  crisis-­‐driven	  political	  battles	  and	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  compromises	  between	  creditor	  interests	  and	  indebted	  countries	  are	  the	  ideal	  building	  blocks	  for	  constructing	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  contemporary	  debt	  regime.	  A	  review	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  disputes	  between	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  present	  day	  –	  corresponding	  to	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund’s	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism	  proposal,	  and	  Argentina’s	  2014	  default	  –	  indicates	  that	  a	  formal	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  is	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  current	  bond-­‐dominated	  atmosphere.	  In	  particular,	  the	  dominance	  of	  retail	  investors	  and	  other	  private	  bondholders,	  combined	  with	  stagnated	  or	  waning	  influence	  among	  public	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  relegates	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  formal,	  permanent	  debt	  arbiter	  to	  an	  aspirational	  status.	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I.	  	  	  Introduction	  On	  September	  10th,	  2015,	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  a	  draft	  resolution	  on	  “Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes.”	  Capping	  a	  whirlwind	  year	  of	  negotiations	  and	  diplomatic	  scuffles	  over	  existing	  sovereign	  debt	  arrangements,	  the	  Principles	  called	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  clear	  guidelines	  “for	  the	  management	  and	  resolution	  of	  financial	  crises”	  that	  ensure	  “a	  cooperative	  spirit	  to	  reach	  a	  consensual	  arrangement	  of	  the	  debt	  of	  sovereign	  States.”1	  In	  effect,	  the	  UN	  felt	  it	  necessary	  to	  attempt	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  underlying	  norms	  accompanying	  debt	  workouts	  –	  a	  step	  taken	  to	  challenge	  what	  Lex	  Rieffel	  calls	  the	  “ad	  hoc	  machinery”	  of	  current	  restructuring	  practices.2	  While	  provocative,	  the	  Principles	  affirm	  the	  cliché	  that	  history	  repeats	  itself.	  In	  1977	  and	  again	  in	  1980,	  the	  UN	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD)	  called	  for	  explicit	  principles	  for	  debt	  rescheduling;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  dialogue	  these	  inquiries	  had	  solidified	  into	  a	  proposal	  to	  create	  an	  internationally	  recognized	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  protocol	  based	  on	  Chapter	  11	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  Act.3	  Many	  scholars,	  including	  A.	  Mechele	  Dickerson,	  attribute	  the	  failure	  to	  implement	  UNCTAD’s	  work	  to	  concerns	  about	  a	  loss	  of	  country	  sovereignty	  to	  a	  third-­‐party	  debt	  mediator,4	  while	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  69/84,	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes,	  A/RES/69/84	  (Limited	  distribution	  29	  July	  2015),	  available	  from	  http://unctad.org/meetings/	  en/SessionalDocuments/a69L84_en.pdf.	  2	  Rieffel,	  Lex.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt:	  The	  Case	  for	  Ad	  Hoc	  Machinery.	  Washington:	  Brookings	  Institutions	  Press,	  2005.	  Print.	  pp.	  1-­‐3.	  	  3	  “United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  to	  vote	  on	  debt	  restructuring	  principles.”	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  9	  Sept.	  2015.	  Web.	  24	  Sept.	  2015.	  http://unctad.org/	  en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1072.	  4	  Dickerson,	  A.	  Mechele.	  “A	  Politically	  Viable	  Approach	  to	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring.”	  Faculty	  
Publications.	  The	  College	  of	  William	  and	  Mary	  Law	  School	  Scholarship	  Repository,	  2004.	  Print.	  
	   McConnell	  6	  
observers	  note	  that	  risk-­‐averse	  creditors	  fear	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  placing	  debt	  workouts	  under	  the	  agency	  of	  a	  formal	  institution.5	  Whatever	  the	  reason	  for	  past	  failures,	  contemporary	  scholarship	  and	  policy	  actors	  agree	  that	  resistance	  to	  a	  formal	  regime	  is	  strong	  and	  multifaceted.	  	  Given	  the	  odds,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  global	  sovereign	  debt	  system	  has	  surfaced	  repeatedly	  in	  policy	  debates.	  The	  history	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  in	  the	  postwar	  era	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  state-­‐centric	  governance	  network	  intended	  to	  minimize	  creditor	  risks	  through	  coordination	  and	  orderly,	  but	  case-­‐specific,	  restructurings.6	  This	  “ad	  hoc”	  approach	  offers	  little	  room	  for	  international	  statute,	  since	  it	  advocates	  for	  an	  evolution	  of	  creditor-­‐debtor	  relationships	  supported	  by	  national	  agreement,	  constraint,	  and	  finance	  mechanisms.	  Even	  multilateral	  forums	  for	  debt	  restructuring,	  such	  as	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  are	  ad	  hoc	  solutions	  –	  the	  Club	  was	  founded	  in	  1956	  by	  major	  European	  creditor	  countries	  looking	  to	  clear	  payment	  imbalances	  with	  Brazil	  and	  Argentina,	  and	  its	  monopoly	  over	  the	  process	  for	  restructuring	  developing	  country	  debt	  owed	  to	  bilateral	  donor	  agencies	  was	  not	  established	  until	  a	  decade	  later!7	  Nor	  is	  the	  preference	  for	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  architecture	  specific	  to	  official	  creditors:	  on	  the	  private	  sector	  side,	  the	  London	  Club	  of	  commercial	  bank	  creditors	  is	  another	  characteristic	  ad	  hoc	  solution,	  formed	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  a	  convenient	  mechanism	  for	  loan	  management	  but	  solidified	  by	  a	  series	  of	  trials	  and	  crises	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  “Revisiting	  Sovereign	  Bankruptcy.”	  Committee	  on	  International	  Economic	  Policy	  and	  Reform	  (CIEPR).	  The	  Brookings	  Institution,	  Oct.	  2013.	  Web.	  23	  Oct.	  2015.	  http://www.brookings.edu/	  research/reports/2013/10/sovereign-­‐debt.	  6	  Callaghy,	  Thomas.	  “Innovation	  in	  the	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Regime:	  From	  the	  Paris	  Club	  to	  Enhanced	  HIPC	  and	  Beyond.”	  The	  World	  Bank	  Operations	  Evaluation	  Department,	  9	  July	  2002.	  Print.	  pp.	  12.	  7	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  55-­‐58.	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It	  follows	  that	  the	  “treaty”	  approach,	  as	  embodied	  by	  the	  UN’s	  efforts,	  continues	  to	  have	  support	  due	  to	  lingering	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  established	  ad	  hoc	  model.	  In	  2015,	  Weidemaier	  noted	  that	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  empowers	  bond	  owners	  to	  use	  contracts	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  not	  enhance	  social	  welfare.8	  Another	  criticism,	  voiced	  by	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  and	  Martin	  Guzman,	  is	  that	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  loans	  is	  controlled	  by	  a	  creditor-­‐dominated	  framework	  consisting	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  and,	  most	  broadly,	  the	  close	  ties	  and	  policy	  preferences	  of	  OECD	  nations.9	  	  As	  the	  UN	  efforts	  demonstrate,	  the	  treaty	  approach	  thus	  retains	  some	  appeal	  as	  a	  system	  that	  promises	  greater	  leverage	  to	  debtors	  by	  reducing	  creditor	  influence	  in	  the	  restructuring	  process.	  	  The	  academic	  and	  policy	  treatments	  of	  these	  two	  systems	  reveal	  both	  common	  ground	  and	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  proponents	  of	  ad	  hoc	  machinery	  or	  treaty-­‐based	  governance.	  On	  one	  level,	  the	  debate	  is	  predominantly	  about	  institutions	  –	  how	  norms,	  rules,	  and	  governing	  bodies	  should	  be	  arranged	  to	  optimize	  sovereign	  debt	  workouts	  –	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  international	  law	  to	  facilitate	  new	  configurations	  of	  organizations,	  debtors,	  and	  creditors.	  On	  another	  plane,	  supporters	  of	  each	  approach	  distinguish	  themselves	  in	  their	  orientation	  toward	  the	  future	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  management.	  Ad	  hoc	  advocates	  such	  as	  Anna	  Gelpern,	  for	  example,	  depict	  existing	  sovereign	  debt	  workout	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Weidemaier,	  Mark.	  “Remarks	  made	  before	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Ad-­‐Hoc	  Committee	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring.”	  Reprinted	  by	  the	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  School	  of	  Law,	  5	  Feb.	  2015.	  Print.	  9	  Stiglitz,	  Joseph	  and	  Martin	  Guzman.	  “A	  Rule	  of	  Law	  for	  Sovereign	  Debt.”	  Project	  Syndicate,	  15	  June	  2015.	  Web.	  3	  Oct.	  2015.	  http://www.project-­‐syndicate.org/commentary/sovereign-­‐debt-­‐restructuring-­‐by-­‐joseph-­‐e-­‐stiglitz-­‐and-­‐martin-­‐guzman-­‐2015-­‐06.	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processes	  as	  accomplished	  facts	  that,	  while	  not	  perfect,	  do	  not	  require	  “a	  new	  batch	  of	  uniform	  rules”	  to	  be	  reformed	  in	  ideal	  ways.10	  Adherents	  to	  the	  treaty	  approach,	  meanwhile,	  do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  point	  to	  past	  experiences	  under	  a	  permanent	  regime	  and	  therefore	  discuss	  their	  proposals	  as	  aspirational	  reforms	  to	  a	  broken	  system.	  One	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  tug	  of	  war	  between	  the	  ad	  hoc	  and	  treaty	  approaches	  would	  eventually	  merit	  a	  change	  of	  policy.	  Instead,	  the	  UN’s	  Basic	  Principles	  demonstrate	  that	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  debate	  spanning	  nearly	  four	  decades	  has	  barely	  altered	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  addressing	  sovereign	  debt	  restructurings.	  This	  stagnation	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  important	  institution-­‐driven	  question:	  why	  have	  debtor	  countries,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  activist	  economists	  chosen	  the	  present	  moment	  to	  revisit	  a	  stalemated	  idea?	  In	  particular,	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  past	  clashes	  over	  the	  ad	  hoc	  and	  treaty	  approaches	  influencing	  the	  current	  push	  for	  a	  formal	  system?	  Taking	  a	  cue	  from	  these	  questions,	  this	  thesis	  inquiry	  seeks	  to	  analyze	  how	  the	  organization	  of	  creditors	  and	  debtors	  within	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system	  affects	  the	  development	  of	  proposals	  for	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime.	  The	  purpose	  of	  exploring	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  dynamics	  is	  twofold:	  by	  charting	  the	  mixed	  interactions,	  sentiments,	  and	  policy	  stances	  of	  creditor	  and	  sovereign	  interests	  over	  roughly	  forty	  years,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  construct	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  steady	  alliances	  and	  commitments	  dictating	  each	  debt	  battle.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  depicting	  long-­‐standing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Gelpern,	  Anna.	  “Remarks	  presented	  before	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Ad	  Hoc	  Committee	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes.”	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center	  and	  the	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  4	  Feb.	  2015.	  Web.	  24	  Jan.	  2016.	  http://www.piie.com/	  publications/testimony/gelpern20150204.pdf.	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institutional	  interests	  also	  helps	  draw	  out	  where	  policy	  deviations	  may	  have	  occurred,	  thus	  pinpointing	  which	  agents	  are	  particularly	  influential	  in	  the	  fight	  over	  debt	  machinery.	  	  	  
II.	  	  	  Methodology	  This	  thesis	  takes	  an	  approach	  in	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  relevant	  actors	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  making	  inferences	  about	  the	  actors’	  roles	  in	  shaping	  outcomes.	  Articles,	  transcripts,	  and	  primary	  documentation	  from	  a	  series	  of	  “episodes”	  revolving	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  debt	  workout	  process	  provide	  the	  background	  from	  which	  the	  interests	  and	  behaviors	  of	  various	  actors	  and	  institutions,	  including	  an	  epistemic	  community	  of	  economists,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  key	  drivers	  of	  the	  debt	  debate.	  Each	  episode	  –	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  and	  UNCTAD’s	  challenges	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Argentina	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  global	  crises	  of	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  IMF’s	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism	  (SDRM)	  failure	  in	  2003,	  and	  the	  2014	  Argentine	  default	  leading	  to	  the	  UN’s	  Basic	  Principles	  –	  is	  selected	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  vision	  for	  a	  formal	  debt	  regime,	  the	  availability	  of	  primary	  sources	  to	  review	  actors’	  timely	  interests,	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  influential	  players,	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  or	  the	  G77	  nations,	  as	  a	  common	  thread	  across	  all	  highlighted	  cases.11	  This	  system	  of	  case	  selection	  ensures	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  each	  proposal	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  actors	  and	  institutions	  while	  accounting	  for	  the	  variance	  in	  those	  same	  actors’	  and	  institutions’	  interests	  over	  time.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  credit	  Professor	  Thomas	  Callaghy	  and	  Dr.	  Eileen	  Doherty-­‐Sil	  with	  the	  consultation	  and	  advice	  that	  helped	  me	  formulate	  this	  thesis	  methodology.	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As	  all	  selected	  cases	  take	  place	  over	  an	  extended	  period,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  single	  “snapshot”	  image	  for	  comparison	  against	  other	  static	  interpretations.	  Instead,	  case	  analysis	  will	  prioritize	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  actor	  and	  institutional	  perspectives	  change	  in	  response	  to	  exogenous	  variables	  (such	  as	  a	  debt-­‐related	  court	  order)	  or	  endogenous	  shocks	  (such	  as	  a	  change	  of	  leadership	  within	  an	  international	  financial	  institution).	  The	  reactions	  to	  each	  proposal,	  event,	  or	  intermediate	  outcome	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interplay	  of	  these	  reactions	  to	  either	  forge	  compromises	  or	  erect	  policy	  barriers	  –	  are	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  episode	  contributed	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate.	  To	  this	  effect,	  each	  case	  study	  adopts	  a	  narrative	  format	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  one	  episode	  feeds	  into	  the	  next.	  	  
III.	  	  	  Literature	  Review	  and	  Current	  Scholarship	  	  	  Current	  scholarship	  on	  sovereign	  debt	  provides	  an	  adequate	  context	  for	  linking	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  interests	  to	  the	  development	  of	  formalized	  restructuring	  proposals.	  Most	  scholars	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  two	  camps:	  those	  who	  view	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  of	  debt	  management	  as	  the	  most	  viable	  structure	  for	  addressing	  various	  debt	  crises,	  and	  thus	  consider	  informal	  relationships	  a	  natural	  alternative	  to	  permanent,	  “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	  solutions;	  and	  those	  who	  believe	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  treaty	  approach	  is	  viable,	  given	  the	  continued	  pitfalls	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  despite	  sincere	  attempts	  at	  reform.	  Lex	  Rieffel,	  Anna	  Gelpern,	  and	  Brad	  Setser,	  among	  others,	  fall	  into	  the	  former	  category.	  In	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt:	  The	  
Case	  for	  Ad	  Hoc	  Machinery,	  Lex	  Rieffel	  writes	  that	  sovereign	  debt	  workouts	  evolve	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from	  political	  considerations	  that	  are	  remarkably	  different	  than	  the	  constraints	  found	  in	  national	  policymaking.12	  Since	  debtor	  countries’	  legitimate	  claims	  to	  sovereignty	  make	  them	  more	  powerful	  relative	  to	  private	  debtors,	  restructuring	  approaches	  “often	  turn	  on	  assessments	  of	  a	  country’s	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  meet	  its	  external	  payment	  obligations.”13	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  sovereign	  debt	  restructurings	  are,	  by	  definition,	  impermanent.	  A	  country’s	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  pay	  varies	  with	  time,	  economic	  cycles,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  unique	  political	  opportunities,	  as	  does	  creditor	  interest	  in	  renegotiating	  debt	  contracts.	  Rieffel	  extends	  this	  observation	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  noting	  that	  the	  Club’s	  procedures	  were	  loosely	  codified	  in	  response	  to	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  of	  the	  1970s,	  but	  broken	  and	  reformed	  in	  the	  1990s	  to	  differentiate	  its	  treatment	  of	  heavily	  indebted	  poor	  countries	  from	  other	  debtor	  sovereigns.14	  	  Brad	  Setser	  and	  Anna	  Gelpern	  take	  Rieffel’s	  argument	  a	  step	  further	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  even	  the	  debtor	  countries	  known	  for	  supporting	  a	  permanent	  debt	  regime	  have	  substantial	  incentives	  to	  act	  within	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system.15	  One	  such	  incentive	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  maneuver	  complex	  restructuring	  processes	  to	  a	  debtor	  country’s	  political	  advantage.	  When	  managing	  debts	  held	  in	  bonds,	  for	  example,	  “the	  government	  [of	  an	  indebted	  country]	  can	  deploy	  voluntary	  and	  involuntary	  debt	  exchanges	  to	  alter	  creditors’	  holding	  patterns,	  governing	  law,	  and	  even	  the	  currency	  of	  denomination	  of	  its	  debt.”16	  This	  enables	  outcomes	  such	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  46-­‐47.	  13	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  6-­‐7.	  14	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  56.	  15	  Setser,	  Brad	  and	  Anna	  Gelpern.	  “Domestic	  and	  External	  Debt:	  The	  Doomed	  Quest	  for	  Equal	  Treatment.”	  The	  Georgetown	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  2004.	  Print.	  pp.	  795-­‐796. 16	  Setser,	  Brad	  and	  Anna	  Gelpern.	  “Domestic	  and	  External	  Debt.”	  pp.	  798.	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Argentina’s	  unilateral	  restructuring	  process	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  in	  which	  the	  debtor	  sovereign	  was	  able	  to	  “more	  easily	  offer	  different	  restructuring	  terms	  to	  two	  sets	  of	  investors	  who	  once	  held	  the	  same	  instrument.”17	  Setser	  and	  Gelpern	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  the	  flexibility	  the	  ad	  hoc	  approach	  offers	  for	  debtor	  countries’	  bond	  dealings	  complicates	  international	  agreement	  on	  a	  permanent	  debt	  regime,	  since	  many	  regime	  advocates	  have	  used	  a	  “toolbox”	  of	  informal	  policy	  options	  to	  address	  their	  own	  debt	  burdens.	  Among	  the	  “ad	  hoc”	  scholars,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  around	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism	  (SDRM)	  –	  perhaps	  the	  strongest	  attempt	  to	  institute	  a	  permanent	  restructuring	  regime	  in	  recent	  memory.	  Susan	  Block-­‐Lieb	  writes	  that	  the	  IMF’s	  unusual	  support	  for	  an	  international	  workout	  process	  mirrored	  1970s-­‐era	  conceptions	  of	  a	  “Chapter	  11	  for	  country	  debt.”18	  According	  to	  this	  perception,	  the	  comparison	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  to	  a	  corporate	  reorganization	  plan	  was	  unconvincing	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  Board	  of	  Directors	  and,	  crucially,	  the	  United	  States	  government;	  the	  growth	  of	  private	  sector	  influence	  created	  a	  rift	  between	  creditor	  governments	  with	  large	  financial	  sectors	  and	  IMF	  leadership,	  while	  financiers	  and	  scholars	  comprising	  the	  Group	  of	  30	  successfully	  made	  the	  case	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  contractual	  measures	  such	  as	  collective	  action	  clauses	  in	  sovereign	  bond	  offerings	  rendered	  the	  SDRM	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Setser,	  Brad	  and	  Anna	  Gelpern.	  “Domestic	  and	  External	  Debt.”	  pp.	  800.	  18	  Block-­‐Lieb,	  Susan.	  “Austerity,	  Debt	  Overhang,	  and	  the	  Design	  of	  International	  Standards	  on	  Sovereign,	  Corporate,	  and	  Consumer	  Debt	  Restructuring.”	  Indiana	  Journal	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Studies.	  Indiana	  University,	  2005.	  Print.	  pp.	  487-­‐489.	  
	   McConnell	  13	  
redundant.19	  Brad	  Setser	  highlights	  another	  side	  of	  the	  SDRM	  collapse:	  creditors	  and	  debtors	  within	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  were	  unclear	  on	  what,	  if	  anything,	  they	  desired	  from	  a	  formalized	  process	  that	  could	  not	  already	  be	  obtained	  with	  contractual	  infrastructure.20	  Since	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  space	  is	  uniquely	  characterized	  by	  difficulties	  collecting	  on	  legal	  judgments	  against	  countries,	  creditors	  were	  uncertain	  how	  the	  IMF	  could	  establish	  a	  feasible	  legal	  mechanism	  to	  prioritize	  new	  financing	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  asset	  seizure.	  Debtor	  actors	  initially	  preferred	  a	  third	  party	  apparatus	  to	  oversee	  all	  debt	  renegotiations,	  although	  to	  what	  extent	  that	  entity	  would	  influence	  debt	  relief	  was	  never	  made	  transparent.	  As	  a	  result,	  Setser	  claims	  that	  the	  IMF’s	  final	  proposal,	  a	  system	  that	  allowed	  a	  sovereign	  to	  restructure	  its	  bonds	  via	  a	  single	  aggregated	  vote	  and	  the	  assent	  of	  a	  supermajority	  of	  creditors,	  did	  not	  provide	  debtors	  or	  creditors	  with	  any	  new	  advantages	  or	  protections.21	  This	  failure,	  hinging	  on	  the	  complex	  interplay	  of	  debt	  holders,	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  and	  institutions,	  constitutes	  an	  enlightening	  case	  study	  for	  how	  the	  battle	  scars	  of	  the	  early	  2000s	  affect	  today’s	  configuration	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  arena.	  Opposing	  the	  ad	  hoc	  viewpoint	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  scholars	  and	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  offering	  diverse	  explanations	  for	  why	  (and	  how)	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  is	  feasible.	  Charles	  Mooney	  argues	  that	  the	  volume	  and	  costs	  of	  litigation	  in	  connection	  to	  sovereign	  debt	  restructurings	  have	  vastly	  outpaced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  “Key	  Issues	  In	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring.”	  Working	  Group	  Report	  9.	  The	  Group	  of	  30,	  2002.	  Web.	  23	  Jan.	  2016.	  http://group30.org/images/uploads	  publications/G30_KeyIssues	  SoverignDebtRestructing.pdf.	  pp.	  13-­‐20.	  20	  Setser,	  Brad.	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  SDRM.”	  IPD	  Task	  Force	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt,	  2008.	  Print.	  pp.	  8.	  21	  Setser,	  Brad.	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  SDRM.”	  pp.	  13-­‐14.	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what	  was	  expected	  in	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  debt	  environment.22	  Indeed,	  he	  claims	  the	  recent	  success	  of	  court	  litigation	  in	  disrupting	  and	  reversing	  Argentina’s	  restructuring	  process	  represents	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  power	  of	  minority	  holdouts	  relative	  to	  a	  debtor	  sovereign	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  creditors.	  “Market	  participants	  with	  skin	  in	  the	  game,”	  Mooney	  writes,	  “will	  become	  convinced	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  on	  the	  need	  and	  wisdom	  of	  implementing	  an	  SDRM.”23	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  author	  posits	  that	  a	  revised	  SDRM,	  proposed	  outside	  the	  IMF’s	  jurisdiction	  and	  implemented	  via	  the	  court	  systems	  of	  debtor	  nations	  in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  administering	  supervisor,	  could	  receive	  the	  backing	  of	  most	  debtor	  states.	  It	  is	  telling,	  however,	  that	  the	  circumstances	  of	  past	  proposals	  lead	  Mooney	  to	  concede	  that	  “a	  strategy	  of	  proposing	  a	  potentially	  optimal	  and	  comprehensive	  regime	  –	  while	  hoping	  against	  hope	  that	  important	  stakeholders	  that	  oppose	  the	  formal	  mechanism	  approach	  will	  conclude	  that	  they	  have	  been	  misguided…	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  successful.”24	  	  A	  second	  treaty-­‐based	  formulation	  comes	  from	  the	  Brookings	  Institution’s	  Committee	  on	  International	  Economic	  Policy	  and	  Reform	  (CIEPR)	  report,	  which	  asserts	  that	  the	  post-­‐recession	  international	  political	  economy	  is	  more	  conducive	  to	  an	  “orderly	  sovereign	  bankruptcy	  regime”	  than	  in	  years	  past.25	  In	  particular,	  CIEPR	  observes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  for	  domestic	  policymakers	  to	  over-­‐borrow	  or	  pay	  little	  attention	  to	  private	  debt	  accumulation	  that	  might	  become	  a	  public	  liability,	  a	  problem	  that	  could	  be	  resolved	  through	  international	  statute	  limiting	  the	  ability	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Mooney,	  Charles	  W.	  “A	  Framework	  for	  a	  Formal	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism:	  The	  KISS	  Principles	  (Keep	  It	  Simple,	  Stupid)	  and	  Other	  Guiding	  Principles.”	  Faculty	  Scholarship.	  The	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  2	  July	  2015.	  Print.	  pp.	  6.	  	  23	  Mooney,	  Charles	  W.	  “A	  Framework	  for	  a	  Formal	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism.”	  pp.	  7.	  24	  Mooney,	  Charles	  W.	  “A	  Framework	  for	  a	  Formal	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism.”	  pp.	  8.	  25	  “Revisiting	  Sovereign	  Bankruptcy.”	  The	  Brookings	  Institution.	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borrow	  for	  countries	  with	  suboptimal	  policies.	  The	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  crises	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  makes	  it	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  countries	  with	  large	  private	  creditor	  networks	  will	  assent	  to	  an	  IMF-­‐mediated	  debt	  adjustment	  facility.	  Notably,	  even	  as	  CIEPR’s	  assessment	  reflects	  trends	  that	  have	  taken	  on	  additional	  salience	  in	  an	  unstable	  global	  economy,	  it	  echoes	  Charles	  Mooney’s	  approach	  by	  seeking	  to	  entrench	  new	  proposals	  in	  a	  similar	  framework	  as	  the	  2003	  SDRM	  fight.	  The	  UN’s	  reentry	  into	  sovereign	  debt	  policy	  indicates	  the	  growing	  power	  of	  another	  group	  of	  treaty	  proponents	  who	  desire	  a	  “fresh	  start”	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  IMF	  or	  similar	  institutions.	  In	  1995,	  Jeffrey	  Sachs	  argued	  that	  an	  international	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  combined	  with	  a	  sanctioned	  stay	  on	  payments	  could	  mitigate	  the	  inefficiencies	  created	  by	  bond	  selloffs.26	  More	  recently,	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  has	  expanded	  Sachs’	  analysis	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  treaty	  regime	  could	  resolve	  market	  inefficiencies	  arising	  from	  multiple	  and	  overlapping	  legal	  jurisdictions,	  the	  presence	  of	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  claimants	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  debt	  contracts,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  claimants	  to	  draw	  upon	  ill-­‐defined	  assets	  –	  all	  ostensible	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  Additionally,	  he	  proposes	  that	  sovereign	  debt	  bankruptcy	  regimes	  should	  be	  designed	  to	  ensure	  sustainable	  country	  debt	  after	  the	  restructuring	  process	  is	  completed.27	  While	  the	  definition	  of	  “sustainability”	  is	  itself	  contested,	  Stiglitz’s	  ideal	  process	  includes	  a	  widely	  accepted	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  merges	  debt	  relief	  with	  strict	  provisions	  on	  creditor	  litigation,	  strengthened	  incentives	  for	  lending	  into	  arrears,	  and	  safeguards	  against	  the	  renunciation	  of	  national	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  Setser,	  Brad.	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  SDRM.”	  pp.	  10.	  27	  Stiglitz,	  Joseph	  and	  Martin	  Guzman.	  “A	  Rule	  of	  Law	  for	  Sovereign	  Debt.”	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sovereignty.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  sovereign	  debt	  has	  come	  full	  circle	  to	  reconsider	  solutions	  and	  mechanisms	  first	  articulated	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  Current	  sovereign	  debt	  entanglements	  and	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  permanent	  debt	  regime	  highlight	  just	  how	  complex	  the	  evolving	  system	  of	  debt	  governance	  has	  become.	  In	  both	  the	  ad	  hoc	  and	  treaty	  approaches,	  scholars	  and	  policymakers	  alike	  have	  sought	  to	  affirm	  the	  underpinnings	  of	  an	  effective	  restructuring	  process,	  especially	  as	  seen	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  political	  viability	  or	  equitable	  treatment	  among	  creditors	  and	  debtors.	  Even	  so,	  the	  jury	  is	  still	  out	  on	  how	  past	  sovereign	  debt	  episodes	  impact	  present-­‐day	  attempts	  to	  create	  formal	  workout	  mechanisms.	  It	  is	  this	  uncertainty	  that	  the	  subsequent	  case	  studies	  seek	  to	  address.	  	  	  
IV.	  	  	  Case	  Studies	  
I.	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  In	  1971,	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  unveiled	  “The	  Declaration	  and	  Principles	  of	  the	  Action	  Programme	  of	  Lima”	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  upcoming	  UNCTAD	  III	  meeting	  in	  Santiago,	  Chile.	  The	  Declaration,	  itself	  a	  laundry	  list	  of	  reform	  demands,	  called	  for	  “the	  criteria	  and	  procedures	  of	  rescheduling”	  to	  be	  “reviewed	  and	  revised	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  rescheduling	  of	  debts	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  orderly	  process	  of	  development	  planning	  in	  debtor	  countries.”28	  The	  agent	  responsible	  for	  such	  review,	  according	  to	  the	  G-­‐77	  signatories,	  would	  be	  a	  formal	  body	  “created	  within	  the	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  136.	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machinery	  of	  UNCTAD”	  that	  was	  capable	  of	  hosting	  consultations	  between	  creditors	  and	  debtors.29	  	  	   The	  redundancy	  of	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  approach	  –	  creating	  a	  consultation	  mechanism	  within	  the	  UN	  seemed,	  as	  far	  as	  creditors	  were	  concerned,	  like	  an	  attempt	  to	  erase	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  secretariat	  and	  the	  IMF’s	  structural	  adjustment	  programs	  –	  alarmed	  creditor	  interests.	  While	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  disillusionment	  with	  a	  “sporadic,	  piecemeal	  and	  inadequate”	  status	  quo	  that	  enabled	  “an	  increasing	  substantial	  transfer	  of	  resources	  from	  developing	  to	  developed	  countries”	  had	  been	  evident	  since	  the	  first	  UNCTAD	  meeting,	  the	  Declaration	  constituted	  for	  the	  first	  time	  an	  articulated	  plan	  for	  creating	  permanent	  machinery	  in	  the	  post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	  era.30	  Additionally,	  the	  proposal	  was	  considered	  extremely	  friendly	  to	  debtors,	  as	  it	  was	  attached	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  mandated	  an	  analysis	  of	  development	  financing	  requirements	  as	  well	  as	  resolutions	  to	  debt-­‐servicing	  crises.31	  For	  this	  reason,	  such	  a	  plan	  was	  a	  philosophical	  challenge	  on	  top	  of	  an	  economic	  call	  to	  arms:	  rather	  than	  applying	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  approach	  to	  individual	  countries’	  restructurings,	  the	  Declaration	  called	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  a	  “durable	  solution	  of	  the	  external	  debt	  problem”	  to	  “all	  indebted	  developing	  countries”	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  stable	  economic	  growth.32	  The	  G-­‐77	  thus	  saw	  sovereign	  debt	  management	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  “development”	  debate,	  with	  debt	  write-­‐offs	  and	  lenient	  restructuring	  terms	  ensuring	  that	  emerging	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  136-­‐137.	  30	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  137.	  31	  Harvey	  Shapiro,	  “The	  Search	  for	  Solutions	  to	  the	  LDC’s	  Problems,”	  Institutional	  Investor,	  Oct.	  1976.	  Print.	  pp.	  42.	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  137.	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economies	  could	  allocate	  their	  budgets	  to	  meeting	  growth	  and	  human	  capital	  benchmarks	  rather	  than	  paying	  off	  large	  financial	  obligations.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  creditor	  countries,	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  and	  investors	  resolutely	  supported	  the	  Paris	  Club.	  Insisting	  that	  debt	  negotiations	  should	  continue	  through	  ad	  hoc	  forums,	  many	  Western	  countries	  feared	  that	  the	  ideas	  embodied	  in	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  Declaration	  would	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  repudiate	  or	  stall	  all	  debt	  payments,	  thereby	  disrupting	  international	  lending.33	  Indeed,	  by	  1973,	  advocates	  of	  generalized	  debt	  relief	  were	  pushing	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  collectively	  declare	  a	  unilateral	  payment	  moratorium	  on	  their	  external	  debts	  until	  economic	  growth	  or	  foreign	  aid	  targets	  had	  been	  attained.	  Such	  “extremism,”	  as	  one	  delegate	  from	  the	  UN’s	  Group	  B	  bloc	  of	  developed	  nations	  put	  it,	  boiled	  over	  into	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Declaration	  and	  Program	  of	  Action	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  at	  the	  Sixth	  Special	  Session	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  May	  1974.34	  Reinforced	  by	  the	  Charter	  of	  Economic	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  States,	  NIEO	  formalized	  a	  consensus	  for	  “giving	  developing	  countries	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  system,”	  a	  policy	  configuration	  that	  eventually	  included	  canceling	  the	  debts	  owed	  by	  the	  “least	  developed,	  land-­‐locked	  and	  island	  developing	  countries”	  to	  bilateral	  donor	  agencies.35	  	  	   Threats	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  also	  came	  from	  UNCTAD’s	  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts,	  convened	  in	  1973	  to	  review	  the	  prospects	  for	  developing	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  135-­‐137.	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  137.	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	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country	  debt	  alleviation.	  The	  experts’	  March	  1975	  report	  reiterated	  that	  debt	  reorganizations	  should	  account	  for	  “the	  development	  prospects	  of	  the	  debtor	  country,”	  establish	  “equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  among	  creditors,”	  and	  include	  terms	  of	  debt	  relief	  that	  incorporated	  the	  “long	  term	  debt	  servicing	  capacity	  of	  the	  debtor	  country	  and	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  creditors.”36	  Interestingly,	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  on	  quite	  the	  same	  page	  as	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  nations:	  the	  experts	  presumed	  an	  ad	  hoc	  approach	  for	  debt	  management	  and	  acknowledged	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club	  in	  conducting	  negotiations.	  Rather	  than	  creating	  debtor-­‐friendly	  permanent	  machinery,	  the	  proposal	  suggested	  that	  UNCTAD	  could	  create	  separate	  meetings,	  chaired	  by	  a	  developing	  country,	  with	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  producing	  a	  report	  to	  augment	  Paris	  Club	  discussions.	  The	  report	  also	  prescribed	  that	  UNCTAD	  participate	  in	  Paris	  Club	  meetings	  alongside	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  thus	  introducing	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries	  as	  a	  unified	  whole	  into	  the	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  debt	  restructurings.	  37	  	   As	  Lex	  Rieffel	  observes,	  developed	  countries	  made	  exceptional	  efforts	  to	  balance	  the	  generalized	  debt	  relief	  demands	  of	  developing	  countries	  with	  a	  desire	  for	  gradual	  reform	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  system.	  To	  this	  effect,	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  initiated	  via	  the	  Conference	  on	  International	  Economic	  Cooperation,	  served	  as	  a	  détente	  between	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  interests	  in	  order	  to	  deflect	  a	  looming	  movement	  for	  generalized	  debt	  relief.	  A	  major	  win	  for	  developed	  countries	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  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development.	  Debt	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  Developing	  Countries.	  
Report	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  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts	  on	  Its	  Third	  Session.	  TD/B/545/Rev.	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  Print.	  pp.	  9.	  37	  United	  Nations	  Conference	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and	  creditors	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  acquiescence	  to	  a	  resolution	  considering	  possible	  improvements	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  in	  exchange	  for	  creditors	  accepting	  the	  notion	  that	  certain	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  difficulties	  for	  developing	  countries	  required	  immediate	  attention.38	  One	  result	  of	  this	  agreement	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  retroactive	  terms	  adjustment	  (RTA)	  procedures,	  designed	  to	  allow	  developed	  countries	  to	  convert	  loans	  to	  grants	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  developing	  countries’	  older	  debt	  obligations.	  Stephen	  Cohen	  is	  quick	  to	  note	  that	  “no	  standardized	  operational	  procedure	  was	  adopted	  and	  no	  standardized	  country	  eligibility	  list	  was	  created”	  to	  assist	  the	  implementation	  of	  RTA,	  giving	  donor	  countries	  considerable	  leeway	  when	  deciding	  how	  to	  transform	  loans	  into	  grants	  and	  when	  determining	  which	  developing	  countries	  were	  eligible	  for	  assistance.39	  RTA	  consequently	  preserved	  the	  ad	  hoc	  machinery	  preferences	  of	  developed	  countries	  while	  pushing	  the	  G-­‐77	  to	  “press	  for	  a	  progression	  of	  separate	  concessions	  that	  would	  affect	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  procedures	  for	  approving	  debt	  rescheduling.”40	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ninth	  special	  session	  of	  the	  UNCTAD	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Board	  in	  March	  1978,	  developed	  countries	  had	  largely	  fended	  off	  the	  accusation	  that	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  creditor	  interests	  were	  unresponsive	  to	  debtor	  needs,	  with	  G-­‐77	  interests	  instead	  turning	  to	  expanding	  RTA	  eligibility	  and	  modifying	  Paris	  Club	  procedures	  for	  RTA	  aid	  recipients.	  41	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  Rieffel,	  L.	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  Sovereign	  Debt.	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  Print.	  pp.	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   While	  generalized	  debt	  relief	  was	  palatable	  to	  the	  governments	  of	  developed	  countries,	  creditors	  and	  debtor	  sovereigns	  found	  very	  little	  common	  ground	  over	  proposals	  to	  directly	  restructure	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  debt	  machinery.	  At	  an	  October	  1978	  meeting	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  Intergovernmental	  Group	  of	  Experts	  on	  Debt	  and	  Development	  Problems	  of	  Developing	  Countries,	  the	  Group	  B	  developed	  countries	  insisted	  that	  the	  Paris	  Club	  could	  be	  improved	  iteratively	  without	  the	  need	  for	  further	  UN	  negotiations.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  G-­‐77	  countered	  with	  a	  campaign	  for	  new,	  permanent	  fixtures,	  including	  “an	  independent	  forum—which	  does	  not	  consist	  only	  of	  creditors—[that]	  could	  be	  given	  responsibility	  for	  supervising	  the	  negotiations	  concerning	  the	  debt	  reorganization.”42	  The	  developing	  countries	  envisioned	  existing	  machinery,	  including	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  as	  attachments	  to	  a	  new	  implementing	  institution	  cemented	  in	  international	  law.	  Such	  creditor	  clubs	  would	  provide	  technical	  expertise	  and	  institutional	  memory	  for	  the	  executing	  organization,	  although	  their	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  debt	  rescheduling	  and	  economic	  readjustment	  preferences	  would	  be	  severely	  curtailed.43	  	  	   The	  G-­‐77’s	  conception	  of	  permanent	  machinery,	  culminating	  in	  the	  International	  Debt	  Commission	  (IDC)	  proposal	  and	  the	  Arusha	  Programme	  for	  Collective	  Self-­‐Reliance	  and	  Framework	  for	  Negotiations,	  represented	  a	  return	  to	  the	  1971	  Lima	  Declaration’s	  emphasis	  on	  an	  economically	  sensitive,	  UNCTAD-­‐driven	  debt	  workout	  regime.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  (and	  largely	  contested)	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  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development.	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Board.	  Elaboration	  
of	  Detailed	  Features	  for	  Future	  Operations	  Relating	  to	  Debt	  Problems	  of	  Interested	  Developing	  
Countries:	  Note	  by	  the	  UNCTAD	  Secretariat.	  TD/B.AC.28/2.	  Geneva.	  1978.	  Print.	  pp.	  3-­‐5.	  43	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	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features	  of	  this	  model	  included	  a	  “comprehensive	  treatment”	  that	  required	  problems	  with	  both	  official	  and	  private	  debt	  to	  be	  addressed	  so	  that	  it	  would	  “no	  longer	  be	  necessary	  for	  a	  debtor	  country	  to	  go	  to	  a	  succession	  of	  meetings	  each	  dealing	  with	  individual	  aspects	  of	  its	  debt	  problem.”44	  Other	  elements	  demanded	  that	  all	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  debt	  negotiations	  occur	  outside	  the	  agency	  of	  a	  country	  or	  particular	  group	  of	  countries,	  effectively	  relegating	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  the	  IMF,	  and	  other	  creditor	  forums	  to	  observer	  status.	  Furthermore,	  the	  G-­‐77	  asserted	  that	  any	  adjustment	  package	  constructed	  by	  a	  new	  permanent	  institution	  would	  have	  to	  be	  “carefully	  designed	  so	  that	  within	  a	  given	  time	  the	  package	  of	  measures	  properly	  implemented	  would	  lead	  the	  debtor	  developing	  countries	  back	  to	  a	  development	  path	  consistent	  with	  the	  minimum	  rates	  of	  growth	  endorsed	  by	  the	  international	  community.”45	  This	  last	  stance	  alarmed	  creditors	  who	  feared	  that	  economic	  crises	  could	  be	  used	  as	  excuses	  to	  repudiate	  developing	  country	  debts	  altogether.	  	   At	  the	  1979	  UNCTAD	  V	  meeting	  in	  Manila,	  the	  International	  Debt	  Commission	  suffered	  a	  failure	  to	  launch.	  Led	  by	  Michel	  Camdessus,	  then	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  the	  developed	  countries	  compiled	  a	  paper	  on	  “features	  to	  guide	  negotiations”	  that	  explicitly	  ruled	  out	  the	  need	  for	  a	  permanent	  debt	  restructuring	  forum.	  With	  G-­‐77	  and	  creditor	  interests	  solidified	  around	  two	  incompatible	  proposals,	  both	  the	  developed	  countries’	  policy	  preferences	  and	  the	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  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development.	  Trade	  and	  Development	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  Report	  of	  
the	  Intergovernmental	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  Experts	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  Problems	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  Developing	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  Geneva.	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  Print.	  pp.	  3-­‐5.	  	  45	  United	  Nations	  Conference	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IDC	  were	  submitted	  without	  comment	  to	  the	  UNCTAD	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Board.46	  The	  effective	  stonewalling	  of	  the	  G-­‐77	  terminated	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  bringing	  a	  lengthy	  negotiation	  process	  to	  a	  quick	  conclusion	  and	  ending	  the	  immediate	  possibility	  of	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  of	  debt	  management.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  seeming	  victory	  of	  creditor	  interests	  over	  debtor	  sovereigns	  in	  the	  UNCTAD	  battle,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  sustained	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  developed	  countries	  was	  the	  only	  significant	  reason	  for	  disrupting	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  momentum.	  By	  the	  late	  1970s,	  support	  for	  both	  enhanced	  debt	  relief	  and	  an	  IDC-­‐like	  regime	  had	  begun	  to	  dry	  up	  within	  the	  G-­‐77.	  Cohen	  writes	  that	  Mexico	  and	  Brazil,	  developing	  countries	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  American	  and	  European	  creditors,	  “made	  no	  effort	  to	  disguise	  their	  disdain	  for	  generalized	  debt	  relief”	  and	  sat	  on	  the	  sidelines	  when	  the	  IDC	  was	  first	  formulated.47	  Eric	  Helleiner	  contends	  that	  a	  larger	  cohort	  of	  wealthier	  G-­‐77	  members	  “expressed	  concerns	  that	  the	  endorsement	  of	  debt	  restructuring	  and	  debt	  relief	  might	  discourage	  future	  capital	  flows	  to	  the	  developing	  world.”48	  Such	  concerns	  resulted	  in	  the	  G-­‐77	  withdrawing	  its	  support	  for	  the	  IDC	  in	  1980	  and	  foreshadowed	  the	  prevalence	  of	  capital	  flight	  concerns	  up	  to	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund’s	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism	  (SDRM)	  proposal.	  The	  G-­‐77’s	  internal	  breakdown	  also	  revealed	  that	  debtor	  countries,	  while	  generally	  united	  in	  opposition	  to	  less	  efficient	  aspects	  of	  ad	  hoc	  debt	  management,	  constituted	  a	  wide	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	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  Debt.	  pp.	  145-­‐146.	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  Cohen,	  Stephen.	  “Forgiving	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  pp.	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  Helleiner,	  Eric.	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  Mystery	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  Missing	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  Restructuring	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Contributions	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  Print.	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variety	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  systems	  with	  very	  different	  policy	  perspectives.49	  This	  made	  a	  post-­‐IDC	  challenge	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  an	  increasingly	  remote	  possibility	  as	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  global	  shift	  from	  loans	  to	  bonds	  altered	  international	  financial	  practices.	  	  	   The	  legacy	  of	  the	  UNCTAD	  debt	  debate	  outpaces	  its	  substantive	  accomplishments.	  Rieffel	  writes	  that	  “the	  experience	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  debate	  suggests	  that	  the	  proponents	  of	  creating	  permanent	  machinery	  are	  unlikely	  to	  prevail,”	  although	  challenges	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  creditor	  institutions	  remain	  dominant	  political	  goals	  for	  indebted	  sovereigns	  to	  this	  day.50	  What	  changes	  came	  out	  of	  the	  1970s	  amounted	  to	  cosmetic	  effects:	  developed	  countries	  agreed	  to	  allow	  an	  UNCTAD	  observer	  to	  attend	  all	  Paris	  Club	  negotiations	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  increase	  the	  transparency	  of	  debt	  restructurings,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  secretariat	  agreed	  to	  provide	  more	  up-­‐front	  expectations	  and	  guidelines	  to	  potential	  clients,	  and	  the	  negotiations	  venue	  was	  moved	  from	  the	  French	  Treasury	  to	  a	  more	  politically	  neutral	  site.51	  Ironically,	  UNCTAD’s	  lasting	  impact	  was	  to	  begin	  a	  process	  of	  codifying	  already	  established	  ad	  hoc	  assumptions,	  effectively	  acceding	  to	  the	  “principles	  and	  procedures	  that	  had	  guided	  the	  Paris	  Club	  negotiations	  during	  its	  first	  twenty	  years	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	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  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	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  51	  As	  fate	  would	  have	  it,	  the	  “neutral	  site”	  the	  secretariat	  had	  in	  mind	  was	  none	  other	  than	  the	  French	  International	  Conference	  Center	  near	  the	  Arc	  de	  Triomphe	  –	  the	  former	  headquarters	  of	  the	  Gestapo	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  the	  Nazi	  occupation	  of	  France.	  This	  diplomatic	  faux	  pas	  was	  “rectified”	  when	  the	  negotiations	  were	  again	  relocated	  to	  the	  new	  French	  Treasury	  in	  the	  Bercy	  district	  of	  Paris,	  a	  decision	  that	  nullified	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  original	  intentions.	  See	  “Paris	  Club.”	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  n.d.	  Web.	  25	  Jan.	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in	  a	  UN	  resolution.”52	  The	  result	  was	  a	  downplaying	  of	  debt	  issues	  in	  the	  UN’s	  subsequent	  development	  programs,	  with	  emphases	  placed	  on	  increasing	  new	  aid	  flows	  and	  establishing	  IMF	  special	  drawing	  rights	  for	  developing	  countries	  rather	  than	  giving	  the	  green	  light	  for	  international	  sovereign	  debt	  reforms.53	  	  
	  
II.	  Argentina	  I:	  The	  Road	  to	  Meltdown	  
	   Even	  as	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  faded	  away,	  with	  debtor	  countries	  grudgingly	  accepting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  efficient	  –	  if	  not	  always	  long-­‐lasting	  –	  debt	  rescheduling,	  a	  different	  type	  of	  threat	  to	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  started	  to	  emerge:	  bank	  lending	  to	  developing	  countries,	  driven	  by	  optimism	  over	  the	  relatively	  advanced	  economies	  of	  the	  heaviest	  borrowers,	  was	  rapidly	  becoming	  less	  sustainable.	  The	  oil	  shock	  of	  1979-­‐1980	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  increase	  the	  Federal	  Funds	  rate	  resulted	  in	  a	  commodities	  price	  collapse	  and	  severely	  curtailed	  exports	  from	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  Asia.54	  	  Such	  economic	  stagnation	  not	  only	  confirmed	  that	  debt	  repayments	  would	  be	  unlikely,	  but	  also	  revealed	  the	  overexposure	  of	  major	  banks	  to	  regions	  that,	  until	  recently,	  were	  considered	  to	  possess	  only	  moderate	  risk.	  Michael	  Bowe	  and	  James	  Dean	  observe,	  for	  example,	  that	  by	  the	  Mexican	  crisis	  of	  1982,	  U.S.	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  Stephen.	  “Forgiving	  Poverty,”	  pp.	  76.	  54	  Rieffel,	  L.	  Restructuring	  Sovereign	  Debt.	  pp.	  154.	  
	   McConnell	  26	  
banks	  would	  have	  deprived	  themselves	  of	  essentially	  all	  available	  capital	  by	  writing	  off	  just	  30%	  of	  their	  outstanding	  developing	  country	  loans.55	  	  	   One	  previously	  “safe”	  loan	  recipient	  was	  Argentina,	  which,	  like	  most	  South	  American	  countries,	  had	  used	  external	  borrowing	  to	  help	  finance	  high	  aggregate	  demand.	  However,	  compared	  to	  its	  Southern	  Cone	  neighbors	  such	  as	  Chile	  and	  Uruguay,	  Argentina	  continued	  to	  suffer	  from	  an	  import	  substitution	  legacy	  that	  left	  it	  with	  sizeable	  government	  spending	  and	  crowded-­‐out	  private	  investment.	  In	  the	  past,	  particularly	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  first	  oil	  squeeze	  of	  the	  early	  1970s,	  Argentina’s	  structural	  weaknesses	  had	  been	  mitigated	  by	  lending	  from	  American	  and	  British	  banking	  institutions;	  by	  the	  1980s,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  ongoing	  public	  sector	  expenditure,	  combined	  with	  inflationary	  pressure	  from	  borrowing,	  meant	  that	  the	  Argentine	  state	  would	  face	  default	  unless	  creditor	  governments	  provided	  interim	  help	  with	  new	  debt	  servicing	  arrangements.	  	   The	  international	  response	  to	  Mexico’s	  crisis	  hinted	  at	  a	  way	  out	  for	  Argentina.	  Taking	  the	  lead	  along	  with	  the	  IMF,	  the	  G-­‐7	  creditor	  countries	  realized	  that	  Mexico’s	  economic	  condition	  required	  both	  emergency	  liquidity	  and	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  with	  the	  IMF	  to	  initiate	  a	  recovery	  program.	  Rieffel	  notes	  that	  the	  cash	  gap	  was	  compensated	  via	  bridge	  financing,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  the	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements	  agreeing	  to	  provide	  $1.85	  billion	  in	  parallel	  bridge	  loans.56	  Concurrently,	  the	  IMF	  developed	  a	  $3.7	  billion	  three-­‐year	  extended	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arrangement	  with	  Mexican	  finance	  minister	  Jesus	  Silva	  Herzog.57	  Unlike	  previous	  restructuring	  arrangements,	  in	  which	  commercial	  banks	  had	  been	  free	  to	  conclude	  workouts	  bilaterally,	  the	  IMF	  used	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Mexican	  stabilization	  program	  to	  establish	  a	  baseline	  for	  banks’	  involvement	  in	  any	  restructuring	  deal.	  Creditor	  institutions	  holding	  nearly	  $32	  billion	  in	  Mexican	  debts	  were	  required	  to	  restructure	  $20	  billion	  in	  principal	  payments	  while	  simultaneously	  extending	  $5	  billion	  in	  new	  loans	  in	  order	  for	  the	  IMF	  plan	  to	  go	  into	  effect.58	  The	  early	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  thus	  witnessed	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  with	  lending	  to	  restructuring	  countries	  becoming	  effectively	  involuntary	  for	  a	  temporary	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  compromise	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reason	  such	  IMF	  strong-­‐arming	  was	  palatable	  to	  private	  actors	  –	  was	  that	  the	  banks	  could	  iterate	  within	  defined	  parameters	  to	  achieve	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  outcome	  for	  creditors	  and	  debtors.	  	  	   By	  fashioning	  a	  network	  of	  creditor	  governments,	  banks,	  and	  debtors	  into	  a	  stepwise	  pattern	  of	  financing	  and	  restructuring,	  the	  IMF	  set	  off	  a	  flurry	  of	  renegotiations	  between	  1982	  and	  1984.	  Bank	  Advisory	  Committees	  (synonymous	  with	  the	  London	  Club),	  usually	  chaired	  by	  U.S.	  fixtures	  such	  as	  Citibank	  and	  Bank	  of	  America,	  ensured	  that	  creditors	  could	  enforce	  any	  collective	  decisions,	  and	  “virtually	  all	  of	  the	  deals	  concluded	  after	  the	  Mexican	  crisis	  were	  closely	  linked	  to	  IMF-­‐supported	  adjustment	  programs”	  that	  gave	  a	  “green	  light”	  for	  private	  arrangements.59	  Argentina’s	  case	  was	  no	  exception.	  In	  addition	  to	  spiraling	  inflation,	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the	  country	  was	  faced	  in	  1983	  with	  the	  overthrow	  of	  its	  military	  junta	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  international	  capital	  markets	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  unsuccessful	  war	  in	  the	  Falkland	  Islands.	  Furthermore,	  most	  of	  its	  outstanding	  obligations	  were	  couched	  in	  extended	  single-­‐bank	  loans,	  meaning	  that	  without	  a	  strong	  negotiation	  mechanism	  there	  was	  significant	  potential	  for	  a	  creditor	  holdout	  scenario.60	  Just	  as	  with	  Mexico,	  Argentina’s	  creditors	  were	  informed	  by	  IMF	  Managing	  Director	  Jacques	  de	  Larosiere	  that	  the	  Fund	  “would	  not	  commit	  its	  resources	  under	  an	  adjustment	  program	  until	  the	  banks	  had	  increased	  their	  exposure”	  to	  the	  beleaguered	  country.61	  	   Argentina’s	  eventual	  deal,	  a	  lengthy	  three-­‐year	  process,	  made	  extensive	  use	  of	  the	  London	  Club	  to	  ensure	  that	  multilateral	  reschedulings	  and	  debt	  relief	  efforts	  were	  compliant	  with	  the	  new	  ad	  hoc	  framework	  for	  Latin	  American	  debt	  management.	  In	  January	  and	  August	  of	  1983,	  Argentina	  secured	  $1.8	  billion	  in	  direct	  assistance	  from	  debt-­‐holding	  banks	  and	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  a	  multiyear	  rescheduling	  agreement,	  or	  MYRA,	  that	  included	  on-­‐lending	  and	  trade	  facility	  options	  for	  further	  commitments	  of	  new	  money.62	  Along	  with	  Mexico,	  Argentina’s	  case	  differed	  from	  the	  London	  Club	  norms	  that	  had	  been	  established	  following	  Zaire’s	  1976	  restructuring.	  Rather	  than	  having	  creditor	  banks	  devise	  a	  single	  (and	  often	  complex)	  contract	  representative	  of	  collective	  creditor	  interests,	  the	  Argentine	  negotiations	  gave	  London	  Club	  members	  enough	  leeway	  to	  come	  to	  several	  separate	  contractual	  agreements	  with	  the	  debtor	  country.	  Additionally,	  whereas	  past	  London	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Club	  arrangements	  had	  only	  informally	  operated	  in	  tandem	  with	  Paris	  Club	  decisions,	  the	  creditor	  banks	  looked	  to	  public	  lenders	  to	  gauge	  private	  liabilities	  and	  even	  shared	  ideas	  (such	  as	  MYRAs)	  for	  the	  Paris	  Club	  to	  experiment	  with	  “in	  a	  more	  restrictive	  form.”63	  	  	   While	  the	  initial	  fixes	  up	  until	  1984	  managed	  to	  reduce	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis,	  Christine	  Bogdanowicz-­‐Bindert	  writes	  that	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  “restructuring	  market”	  for	  private	  creditors	  and	  debtor	  sovereigns	  “concealed	  some	  troubling	  underlying	  trends	  for	  the	  world	  economy.”64	  Argentina	  exemplified	  the	  ongoing	  struggles	  of	  debtors:	  commodity	  prices	  remained	  at	  an	  “unprecedented	  low	  level,”	  while	  an	  IMF-­‐inspired	  austerity	  program	  to	  convert	  public	  assets	  to	  private	  ownership,	  phase	  out	  subsidies,	  and	  slow	  the	  country’s	  credit	  growth	  rate	  had	  failed	  to	  improve	  debt	  servicing	  despite	  an	  anticipated	  boost	  in	  exports	  via	  currency	  devaluation.65	  The	  1985	  Baker	  Plan,	  or	  the	  Program	  for	  Sustained	  Economic	  Growth,	  identified	  Argentina	  as	  a	  recipient	  for	  new	  financing	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  country’s	  economic	  growth	  prospects,	  although	  the	  growing	  practice	  of	  “concerted	  lending”	  forged	  by	  the	  IMF	  rendered	  the	  Baker	  Plan’s	  more	  ambitious	  goals	  difficult	  to	  implement.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Plan’s	  objective	  of	  providing	  $20	  billion	  in	  private	  financing	  over	  a	  three-­‐year	  period,	  possibly	  augmented	  by	  a	  U.S.	  trust	  capable	  of	  concessionary	  lending,	  split	  creditor	  banks	  into	  a	  European	  group	  that	  favored	  interest	  capitalization	  and	  an	  American	  group	  that	  feared	  the	  U.S.	  regulatory	  system	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would	  make	  the	  capitalization	  of	  interest	  quite	  costly.66	  With	  regulatory	  and	  tax	  treatment	  variations	  preventing	  the	  same	  type	  of	  cohesion	  witnessed	  from	  1982-­‐1984,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  Baker	  Plan	  achieved	  its	  objectives.	  Instead,	  Rieffel	  argues	  that	  “the	  main	  contribution	  of	  the	  plan	  may	  have	  been	  to	  buy	  time	  for	  countries	  to	  introduce	  essential	  policy	  reforms	  and	  for	  banks	  to	  build	  up	  their	  reserves	  against	  eventual	  losses.”67	  	   Argentina	  did	  not	  sign	  a	  Baker	  Plan	  deal	  until	  August	  1987.	  At	  that	  point,	  creditor	  banks	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  move	  on	  from	  the	  Baker	  Plan	  and	  were	  experimenting	  with	  different	  forms	  of	  debt	  restructuring	  that	  incorporated	  debt	  reduction.	  Argentina’s	  restructuring	  package	  previewed	  a	  set	  of	  “menu	  options”	  that	  reflected	  creditor	  banks’	  newfound	  flexibility,	  including	  cofinancing	  with	  the	  World	  Bank,	  new-­‐money	  bonds,	  and	  an	  ultimately	  unsuccessful	  exit	  bond	  that	  featured	  a	  below-­‐market	  interest	  rate.68	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  Argentine	  agreement	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  a	  creditor	  country	  with	  strong	  political	  capital	  to	  spearhead	  broader	  debt	  reduction	  efforts	  if	  developing	  country	  growth	  remained	  arrested	  under	  menu	  option-­‐based	  ad	  hoc	  contracts.	  	  	  	   The	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Baker	  Plan	  also	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  “exit	  strategy”	  for	  developing	  countries,	  as	  articulated	  by	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Nicholas	  Brady	  in	  1989.69	  Unlike	  previous	  debt	  management	  attempts,	  the	  Brady	  Plan	  prioritized	  the	  political	  commitment	  of	  the	  United	  States	  over	  innovations	  in	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existing	  debt	  contracts	  and	  allowed	  for	  relatively	  large	  debt	  reductions	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Plan’s	  implementation.	  Argentina’s	  Brady	  Plan	  deal,	  completed	  in	  April	  1993,	  was	  midwifed	  by	  the	  London	  Club	  and	  granted	  the	  country	  a	  35%	  reduction	  in	  its	  debts	  (a	  sum	  of	  roughly	  $10	  billion).70	  Like	  many	  other	  Brady	  contracts,	  Argentina’s	  agreement	  encapsulated	  input	  from	  a	  Bank	  Advisory	  Committee	  that	  focused	  on	  reconciling	  the	  different	  regulatory	  regimes	  of	  participating	  creditor	  banks	  while	  maintaining	  financial	  equivalence	  for	  any	  debt	  reduction	  strategy.	  Also	  similar	  to	  other	  middle-­‐income	  developing	  countries,	  Argentina’s	  case	  marked	  a	  transition	  from	  bank	  loans	  to	  bonds.	  Having	  declared	  a	  general	  moratorium	  on	  bank	  debt,	  and	  still	  recovering	  from	  a	  default	  on	  internal	  debts	  in	  1989,	  the	  Argentine	  government	  was	  able	  to	  issue	  Brady	  Bonds	  as	  part	  of	  a	  restructuring	  deal	  that	  saw	  the	  country’s	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  converted	  into	  par	  bonds,	  discount	  bonds,	  and	  cash	  payments.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  switch	  was	  a	  workout	  process	  that	  “left	  relatively	  few	  scars	  to	  interfere	  with	  new	  borrowing	  from	  market	  sources”	  by	  pairing	  debt	  reduction	  with	  Argentina’s	  unique	  economic	  circumstances.71	  Ideally,	  the	  success	  of	  this	  scheme	  meant	  that	  creditors	  could	  better	  judge	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  Argentine	  state	  and	  economy	  –	  benchmarked	  by	  the	  gradual	  abandonment	  of	  inward-­‐looking,	  government-­‐driven	  growth	  models	  –	  by	  observing	  the	  interest	  rate	  spreads	  on	  Brady	  Bonds.	  	   The	  Brady	  Plan	  established	  bonds	  as	  the	  dominant	  mechanisms	  for	  Argentina’s	  debt	  management	  practices	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  Nevertheless,	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  Brady	  Plan’s	  success,	  including	  a	  cooperative	  approach	  among	  debtor	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countries,	  multilateral	  agencies	  and	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  bilateral	  donor	  agencies,	  and	  private	  lenders	  to	  construct	  and	  enforce	  debtor-­‐specific	  workouts,	  did	  not	  persist	  in	  the	  new	  status	  quo.	  A	  portfolio	  investment	  boom	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  coming	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  renewed	  confidence	  in	  Latin	  American	  markets,	  contributed	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  provided	  incentives	  for	  the	  Argentine	  government	  to	  increase	  public	  debt	  without	  demonstrating	  that	  it	  could	  service	  its	  increasing	  obligations.72	  Such	  behavior	  was	  amplified	  by	  the	  IMF’s	  willingness	  to	  lend	  to	  Argentina	  and	  elongate	  payment	  schedules	  in	  exchange	  for,	  as	  Arthur	  MacEwan	  later	  asserted	  in	  a	  2002	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Focus	  article,	  “leverage	  to	  guide	  Argentine	  policymakers	  as	  they	  adopted	  the	  IMF’s	  conservative	  economic	  agenda.”73	  The	  IMF’s	  increased	  “escalation	  of	  commitment”	  to	  Argentina’s	  financial	  affairs	  corresponded	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  technical	  oversight	  in	  Argentina’s	  domestic	  policies	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  informal	  debtor-­‐creditor	  consortiums	  arranged	  during	  the	  1980s.	  Argentina’s	  convertibility	  regime,	  in	  which	  the	  peso	  was	  pegged	  to	  the	  dollar	  at	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio,	  was	  a	  sore	  point	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Fund	  and	  creditor	  banks:	  the	  Fund	  grudgingly	  accepted	  the	  regime	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  policy	  package,	  while	  many	  private	  creditors	  feared	  (correctly)	  that	  Argentina’s	  inability	  to	  allow	  for	  real	  exchange	  rate	  adjustment	  would	  create	  misaligned	  monetary	  policy	  and	  suppress	  growth	  as	  the	  U.S.	  dollar	  strengthened.74	  The	  IMF’s	  treatment	  of	  creditor	  commitments	  was	  also	  unusual	  given	  recent	  precedent.	  Even	  as	  the	  organization	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increased	  its	  financial	  support	  through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  when	  Argentina	  began	  to	  face	  concurrent	  banking	  and	  currency	  crises,	  the	  Fund	  “opted…	  for	  a	  relatively	  confrontational	  approach	  to	  burden	  sharing	  by	  private	  creditors,”	  attempting	  to	  corral	  bondholders	  into	  absorbing	  losses	  rather	  than	  selling	  their	  holdings.75	  	  	   By	  2000,	  the	  strains	  among	  the	  Argentine	  government,	  the	  IMF,	  and	  private	  creditors	  reached	  a	  breaking	  point.	  A	  $40	  billion	  readjustment	  package,	  of	  which	  the	  IMF	  contributed	  $14	  billion,	  was	  too	  late	  to	  hold	  back	  the	  tide	  of	  spooked	  bondholders;	  a	  weakening	  U.S.	  economy,	  combined	  with	  unstable	  domestic	  support	  for	  the	  economic	  programs	  proposed	  by	  Argentine	  economics	  minister	  Domingo	  Cavallo,	  catalyzed	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  country’s	  bond	  spreads	  from	  junk	  status	  to	  default	  territory.76	  Now	  fully	  at	  odds	  with	  private	  creditors,	  the	  IMF,	  spurred	  on	  by	  the	  G-­‐7	  governments,	  continued	  to	  commit	  resources	  to	  Argentina	  until	  the	  end	  of	  2001.	  At	  that	  point,	  a	  Brookings	  study	  notes,	  the	  Fund	  “refused	  to	  disburse	  a	  $1.24	  billion	  tranche”	  of	  an	  already-­‐instituted	  financing	  program	  “when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  agreed	  program	  was	  no	  longer	  sustainable.”77	  	  	   Argentina’s	  December	  2001	  default	  on	  its	  public	  debt,	  at	  roughly	  $132	  billion,	  went	  down	  in	  history	  as	  the	  biggest	  sovereign	  default	  on	  record.	  The	  severity	  of	  Argentina’s	  external	  obligations	  –	  representing	  almost	  one	  seventh	  of	  all	  money	  borrowed	  by	  developing	  countries	  at	  the	  time	  –	  was	  compounded	  by	  a	  domestic	  financial	  crisis	  brought	  on	  by	  a	  November	  2001	  bank	  run	  and	  the	  over-­‐
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borrowing	  of	  “quasi-­‐currencies,”	  or	  complementary	  currencies	  issued	  by	  regional	  governments	  to	  account	  for	  cash	  shortages.78	  What	  had	  once	  looked	  like	  a	  promising	  turnaround	  following	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s	  now	  revealed	  the	  inability	  of	  national	  leaders	  and	  international	  financial	  institutions	  to	  diagnose	  Argentina’s	  underlying	  economic	  trends	  and	  account	  for	  its	  deep	  indebtedness.	  	   The	  two	  decades	  between	  the	  very	  beginnings	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  and	  Argentina’s	  spectacular	  2001	  default	  are	  notable	  as	  a	  period	  in	  which	  ad	  hoc	  mechanisms	  reigned	  without	  significant	  political	  challenges.	  Whether	  through	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  among	  various	  developing	  country	  governments,	  many	  of	  which	  viewed	  creditor	  inflows	  as	  the	  chief	  drivers	  of	  domestic	  growth,	  or	  the	  dominance	  of	  bank	  loans	  rather	  than	  public	  sector	  instruments	  (the	  domain	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club),	  most	  debtor	  countries	  seemed	  content	  to	  incorporate	  themselves	  into	  a	  series	  of	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  negotiations.	  This	  fact	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  proposal	  of	  new	  mechanisms,	  some	  with	  direct	  linkages	  to	  the	  earlier	  UNCTAD	  battle:	  Princeton	  University’s	  Peter	  Kenen	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  International	  Debt	  Discount	  Corporation	  in	  1983	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  “reduc[ing]	  the	  developing	  countries’	  debt	  burdens	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  pursue	  domestic	  policies	  that	  jeopardize	  internal	  stability	  and	  interfere	  with	  worldwide	  recovery.”79	  Kenen’s	  Corporation	  straddled	  the	  line	  between	  private	  sector	  realities	  and	  earlier	  demands	  for	  an	  international	  debt	  arbiter,	  culminating	  in	  a	  workout	  process	  that	  issued	  long-­‐term	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  Crisis.”	  The	  Guardian,	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  2001.	  Web.	  14	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  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/20/argentina1.	  79	  Kenen,	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bonds	  to	  banks	  at	  a	  discount	  while	  serving	  as	  a	  G-­‐7	  “successor	  claimant”	  to	  creditor	  banks.80	  In	  1988,	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  directed	  the	  executive	  branch	  to	  take	  steps	  toward	  establishing	  an	  “International	  Debt	  Management	  Authority”	  that	  would	  make	  debt	  reduction	  palatable	  for	  American	  creditors.81	  While	  these	  ideas	  never	  made	  much	  of	  a	  policy	  impact,	  they	  represented	  a	  change	  in	  the	  disposition	  of	  creditor	  interests	  toward	  countries	  suffering	  from	  debt	  overhangs.	  	  	   One	  institution	  that	  did	  emerge	  from	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  was	  the	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  (IIF),	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  monitoring	  and	  evaluating	  bank	  exposure	  in	  individual	  developing	  countries.	  Essentially	  acting	  as	  a	  “private	  IMF,”	  the	  IIF	  aspired	  to	  supply	  member	  banks	  with	  collective	  analyses	  of	  private	  capital	  flows	  and	  act	  as	  an	  accessible	  risk	  management	  tool	  for	  regional	  financial	  centers	  that	  lacked	  the	  skill	  sets	  or	  institutional	  history	  to	  make	  accurate	  risk	  assessments.82	  While	  somewhat	  tangential	  to	  bank	  loan	  debt	  management	  –	  the	  IIF	  later	  accepted	  insurance	  companies,	  mutual	  funds,	  and	  other	  nonbank	  financial	  firms	  as	  members	  focusing	  on	  broader	  policy	  issues	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  –	  the	  organization	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  IMF	  as	  a	  way	  to	  establish	  “private	  sector	  involvement	  in	  crisis	  prevention	  and	  resolution”	  that	  ensured	  coherent	  responses	  in	  future	  debt	  deals.83	  	   Argentina’s	  descent	  into	  financial	  oblivion	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  cohesive	  strategy	  for	  debt	  management	  did	  not	  hold	  up	  in	  the	  post-­‐Brady	  international	  financial	  system.	  A	  return	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  bonds	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  that	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manner	  of	  collaboration	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  country’s	  creditors	  changed	  almost	  overnight:	  as	  Argentina’s	  financial	  situation	  worsened,	  European	  and	  Asian	  retail	  investors	  took	  the	  place	  of	  institutions,	  while	  speculators	  dove	  into	  defaulted	  foreign	  bonds.	  These	  new	  actors	  were	  less	  aware	  of	  developing	  country	  risks	  than	  their	  predecessors	  and	  had	  less	  reason	  than	  commercial	  banks	  to	  collaborate	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  evident	  crisis.84	  The	  IMF	  was	  consequently	  troubled	  by	  its	  inability	  to	  rope	  Argentina’s	  new	  investors	  into	  a	  rescue	  strategy,	  especially	  since	  newcomer	  creditors	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  abandon	  their	  investments	  than	  see	  them	  through	  a	  Fund-­‐directed	  economic	  program.	  Additionally,	  the	  IMF’s	  conditions	  had	  come	  under	  heavy	  fire	  from	  economists	  and	  policy	  leaders	  who	  interpreted	  the	  Fund’s	  actions	  as	  encouraging	  too	  much	  “moral	  hazard.”	  This	  view	  was	  especially	  popular	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Congress,	  which	  argued	  that	  the	  IMF’s	  emergency	  loans	  “undermine[d]	  market	  discipline	  and	  encourage[d]	  imprudent	  lending	  since	  private	  creditors	  are	  not	  made	  to	  bear	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  risks	  they	  take.”85	  The	  Meltzer	  Report,	  a	  scathing	  indictment	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  place	  in	  existing	  international	  financial	  architecture,	  called	  for	  “severely	  downsizing	  and	  limiting	  the	  IMF’s	  role”	  in	  future	  solvency	  and	  liquidity	  crises,	  especially	  for	  countries	  like	  Argentina	  that	  had	  significant	  ties	  to	  American	  lenders.86	  	  	   Seemingly	  besieged	  by	  the	  circumstances,	  and	  facing	  pressure	  from	  the	  political	  establishment	  of	  creditor	  nations	  rather	  than	  developing	  country	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  5.	  	  86	  Hornbeck,	  J.F.	  “IMF	  Reform	  and	  the	  International	  Financial	  Institutions	  Advisory	  Commission.”	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governments,	  the	  IMF	  began	  to	  seriously	  consider	  and	  present	  its	  own	  proposals	  for	  internationalized	  insolvency	  procedures	  and	  global	  debt	  reform.	  In	  this	  respect,	  while	  traditional	  creditor-­‐debtor	  fault	  lines	  did	  not	  emerge	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  Argentina’s	  collapse,	  the	  sum	  total	  of	  institutional	  and	  epistemic	  concerns	  drove	  the	  IMF	  to	  conjure	  up	  its	  own	  variation	  of	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism.	  	  
	  
III.	  The	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism,	  2001	  -­‐	  2003	  The	  early	  2000s	  faced	  a	  different	  sovereign	  debt	  challenge	  than	  the	  political	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  private	  bank	  overexposure	  of	  the	  1980s.	  While	  the	  players	  remained	  largely	  the	  same	  –	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  and	  its	  allies	  continued	  to	  eye	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  warily,	  while	  OECD	  nations	  and	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Paris	  Club	  persisted	  as	  dominant	  fixtures	  in	  debt	  rescheduling	  agreements	  –	  other	  familiar	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  found	  themselves	  advocating	  for	  a	  different	  set	  of	  rules.	  In	  2001	  and	  2002,	  IMF	  Deputy	  Managing	  Director	  Anne	  Krueger	  proposed	  the	  drafting	  of	  an	  international	  treaty	  to	  amend	  the	  Fund’s	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  create	  an	  international	  sovereign	  bankruptcy	  court	  “outside	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  IMF.”87	  While	  Krueger’s	  initial	  plan	  called	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  issued	  under	  domestic	  law	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  new	  court’s	  jurisdiction	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  she	  acknowledged	  the	  capacity	  of	  her	  proposal	  to	  override	  national	  laws	  in	  crisis	  scenarios.	  In	  an	  almost	  immediate	  response,	  the	  United	  States’	  Undersecretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  for	  International	  Affairs,	  John	  Taylor,	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issued	  another	  proposal	  for	  a	  “soft”	  international	  regime,	  advocating	  for	  the	  “widespread,	  semi-­‐voluntary	  inclusion	  of	  a	  set	  of	  workout	  clauses	  in	  cross-­‐border	  financial	  contracts.”88	  Even	  though	  Taylor	  appeared	  to	  distance	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  from	  Krueger’s	  ideas,	  his	  goal	  of	  couching	  common	  international	  principles	  in	  contractual	  terms	  appeared	  to	  signal	  growing	  interest	  among	  the	  major	  creditor	  countries	  in	  making	  alterations	  to	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  approach	  (in	  fact,	  Treasury	  leadership	  was	  split	  on	  the	  issue).89	  Aspects	  of	  Krueger’s	  and	  Taylor’s	  work	  would	  find	  their	  way	  into	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  (SDRM)	  framework	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  2003.	  As	  Brookings’s	  Edwin	  M.	  Truman	  remarked	  the	  week	  after	  the	  Krueger	  proposal’s	  public	  debut,	  the	  implementation	  of	  an	  “SDRM-­‐lite,”	  while	  not	  revolutionary,	  was	  a	  significant	  evolution	  toward	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime.90	  What	  made	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  treaty-­‐based	  system	  so	  unique	  in	  this	  case	  was	  not	  the	  rise	  of	  exogenous	  political	  pressures	  from	  developing	  countries,	  as	  in	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.	  Nor	  was	  it	  the	  perceived	  need	  for	  debt	  forgiveness	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  poorest	  countries,	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  again	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Heavily	  Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  Initiative	  (HIPC);91	  indeed,	  Taylor	  responded	  to	  market	  criticism	  of	  his	  proposal	  by	  asserting	  “the	  aim	  of	  reforming	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  process	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  the	  incentives	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  Truman,	  Edwin.	  “Debt	  Restructuring:	  Evolution	  or	  Revolution?”	  Brookings	  Papers	   	  on	  Economic	  
Activity.	  The	  Brookings	  Institution,	  2002.	  Print.	  pp.	  342-­‐343.	  89	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paul	  O’Neill	  was,	  for	  a	  time,	  an	  open	  advocate	  for	  a	  “sovereign	  bankruptcy”	  system,	  while	  other	  Treasury	  officials	  had	  indicated	  in	  nonofficial	  forums	  that	  they	  would	  be	  amenable	  to	  a	  mild	  set	  of	  principles	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  restructurings	  (see	  Aram	  Ziai’s	  discussion	  of	  pre-­‐proposal	  policy	  stances).	  	  90	  Truman,	  Edwin.	  “Debt	  Restructuring:	  Evolution	  or	  Revolution?,”	  pp.	  342.	  91	  Callaghy,	  Thomas.	  “Innovation	  in	  the	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Regime:	  From	  the	  Paris	  Club	  to	  Enhanced	  HIPC	  and	  Beyond,”	  pp.	  26.	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that	  sovereign	  governments	  have	  to	  pay	  their	  debts	  in	  full	  and	  on	  time.”92	  Instead,	  a	  combination	  of	  market	  conditions	  and	  changing	  perspectives	  among	  a	  handful	  of	  policy	  officials	  enabled	  the	  SDRM	  to	  come	  to	  fruition	  as	  a	  serious	  alternative	  proposal	  to	  the	  ad	  hoc	  method	  of	  debt	  restructuring.	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Fund’s	  SDRM	  concept	  had	  been	  introduced,	  the	  IMF’s	  economic	  prescriptions	  and	  loan	  assistance	  programs	  had	  already	  been	  severely	  tested	  by	  successive	  Asian,	  Latin	  American,	  and	  Russian	  debt	  crises.	  While	  rejecting	  Jeffrey	  Sach’s	  argument	  that	  many	  of	  the	  debtor	  nations	  required	  a	  “fresh	  start,”	  the	  IMF	  feared	  that	  countries	  in	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐crisis	  atmosphere	  were	  poorly	  prepared	  to	  promptly	  address	  their	  external	  financial	  situations,	  especially	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  or	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  national	  governments’	  policy	  responses	  and	  the	  expectations	  of	  private	  creditors.93	  The	  official	  sector	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  complications	  and	  moral	  hazard	  involved	  in	  workouts	  that	  were	  unaccompanied	  by	  defaults,	  since	  creditors	  in	  those	  scenarios	  often	  turned	  to	  the	  IMF	  itself	  to	  ensure	  a	  sovereign’s	  ability	  to	  meet	  its	  obligations.	  Meanwhile,	  developing	  and	  “emerging	  market”	  countries	  –	  particularly	  those	  that	  had	  recently	  adopted	  an	  IMF	  program	  or	  accepted	  restructuring	  terms	  –	  put	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  Fund	  and	  creditor	  nations	  to	  discourage	  debt	  holders	  from	  demanding	  a	  higher	  risk	  premium	  after	  a	  workout	  process	  had	  been	  completed.	  These	  countries,	  notably	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  and	  Turkey,	  looked	  to	  the	  argument	  put	  forth	  by	  Anna	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  Truman,	  Edwin.	  “Debt	  Restructuring:	  Evolution	  or	  Revolution?,”	  pp.	  344-­‐345.	  93	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  “Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  –	  Recent	  Development	  and	  Implications	  for	  the	  Fund’s	  Legal	  and	  Policy	  Framework.”	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  Inter-­‐Departmental	  Report,	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  2013.	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Gelpern	  and	  Robert	  Gray,	  among	  others,	  that	  steps	  made	  to	  regularize	  payment	  expectations	  would	  benefit	  both	  capital-­‐deprived	  economies	  and	  their	  skittish	  creditors.	  The	  same	  sovereigns,	  however,	  broke	  ranks	  with	  Gelpern	  and	  Gray	  on	  the	  question	  of	  a	  structured	  regime,	  preferring	  an	  alternative	  structured	  approach	  to	  the	  current	  state	  of	  “IMF	  dominance.”94	  The	  Fund	  thus	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  unusual	  confluence	  of	  forces,	  one	  emanating	  from	  its	  own	  musings	  that	  the	  current	  ad	  hoc	  regime	  was	  flawed	  and	  the	  other	  emerging	  from	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  creditors,	  and	  economists	  who	  desired	  a	  streamlined	  approach	  to	  workouts	  –	  even	  if	  they	  differed	  in	  what	  a	  “streamlined”	  system	  was	  supposed	  to	  look	  like.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  an	  SDRM	  proposal,	  lacking	  the	  appropriate	  leaders	  to	  will	  it	  into	  existence,	  would	  never	  have	  surfaced	  even	  in	  a	  turbulent	  market	  atmosphere.	  Remarkably,	  the	  emergence	  and	  relative	  longevity	  of	  the	  2003	  SDRM	  proposal	  appears	  to	  be	  almost	  entirely	  attributable	  to	  two	  individuals:	  the	  IMF’s	  Anne	  Krueger	  and	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paul	  O’Neill.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  SDRM	  was	  Krueger’s	  initiative	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  strong	  response	  it	  elicited	  among	  the	  IMF’s	  traditional	  cohort	  of	  supporters,	  including	  the	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance,	  the	  Emerging	  Markets	  Traders	  Association,	  and	  several	  large	  banks	  and	  institutional	  investors.95	  An	  intense	  lobbying	  campaign	  on	  behalf	  of	  banks	  and	  bondholder	  associations	  succeeded	  in	  walking	  back	  Krueger’s	  proposal,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2002	  the	  IMF	  had	  agreed	  to	  adopt	  John	  Taylor’s	  emphasis	  on	  collective	  action	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  Anna	  and	  Robert	  Gray.	  “Beyond	  Balancing	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  Interests	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  Creditors	  and	   Developing	  States.”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	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  Society	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  International	  Law,	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  April	  2003.	  Print.	  pp.	  222-­‐223.	  95	  Dizard,	  John.	  “Bankruptcy	  and	  the	  business	  approach.”	  The	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  Times,	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  Web.	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  http://search.proquest.com/docview/249256854?pq-­‐origsite=summon.	  
	   McConnell	  41	  
clauses	  even	  as	  it	  maintained	  such	  clauses	  were	  insufficient	  to	  resolve	  sovereign	  debt	  crises.	  A	  review	  of	  previous	  discussions	  about	  reforming	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  demonstrates	  just	  how	  easily	  Anne	  Krueger	  was	  able	  to	  rock	  the	  boat:	  while	  the	  response	  of	  the	  G-­‐7	  nations	  to	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis,	  encapsulated	  by	  the	  1999	  Cologne	  summit’s	  Report	  of	  the	  Finance	  Ministers,	  included	  consideration	  of	  “a	  framework	  for	  private	  sector	  involvement	  in	  crisis	  resolution,”	  the	  official	  sector	  had	  been	  extremely	  careful	  to	  excise	  mentions	  of	  uniform	  international	  principles	  or	  treaty-­‐mediated	  resolution	  mechanisms.96	  Now,	  Krueger	  had	  not	  only	  articulated	  an	  international	  insolvency	  procedure	  either	  within	  or	  midwifed	  by	  the	  IMF,	  she	  had	  hit	  on	  themes	  such	  as	  stays	  on	  litigation,	  equal	  treatment	  of	  creditors,	  preferred	  creditor	  status	  to	  encourage	  private	  lending,	  and	  even	  temporary	  exchange	  controls	  to	  discourage	  capital	  flight	  as	  ways	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  would	  not	  “require	  the	  international	  community	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  private	  creditors.”97	  Even	  IMF	  critic	  Kunibert	  Raffer,	  commenting	  on	  a	  position	  that	  seemed	  closer	  to	  UNCTAD’s	  past	  stances	  than	  the	  IMF’s	  own	  behavior,	  had	  to	  admit	  that	  Krueger’s	  proposal	  represented	  a	  “sudden	  and	  unexpected	  U-­‐turn”	  for	  the	  international	  financial	  system.98	  Krueger	  may	  have	  had	  a	  kindred	  spirit	  in	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paul	  O’Neill,	  whose	  September	  2001	  hearing	  before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  surprised	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  and	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O’Neill’s	  own	  staff	  when	  the	  Secretary	  called	  for	  “an	  agreement	  on	  an	  international	  bankruptcy	  law,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  work	  with	  governments	  that,	  in	  effect,	  need	  to	  go	  through	  a	  Chapter	  11	  reorganization	  instead	  of	  socializing	  the	  costs	  of	  bad	  decisions.”99	  Like	  Krueger,	  O’Neill	  was	  troubled	  by	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  bailouts	  to	  private	  creditors	  rather	  than	  sustainable	  restructuring	  practices;	  he	  was	  further	  motivated	  by	  his	  moral	  opposition	  to	  “giving	  money	  to	  government	  ministers	  with	  six	  limousines”	  and	  may	  have	  seen	  the	  IMF’s	  existing	  assistance	  as	  wasteful.100	  His	  two	  biggest	  contributions	  to	  the	  SDRM’s	  development	  were	  the	  partial	  formulation	  of	  a	  formal	  bankruptcy	  procedure,	  adopted	  and	  later	  dropped	  by	  the	  IMF	  under	  pressure	  from	  both	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  governments,	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  previously	  nonexistent	  political	  space	  for	  the	  SDRM’s	  genesis	  via	  his	  temporary	  suspension	  of	  the	  U.S.	  veto	  on	  work	  toward	  a	  permanent	  debt	  regime.101	  But	  O’Neill	  was	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Treasury	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  writ	  large.	  Taylor’s	  proposal	  for	  a	  series	  of	  cross-­‐border	  collective	  action	  clauses,	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  O’Neill’s	  advocacy	  for	  a	  Chapter	  11	  bankruptcy	  procedure	  for	  sovereigns,	  reveals	  as	  much;	  additionally,	  a	  2010	  report	  by	  former	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Randall	  Quarles	  hints	  that	  O’Neill	  was	  not	  clear,	  at	  least	  publicly,	  on	  whether	  he	  truly	  supported	  a	  bankruptcy	  regime	  or	  simply	  wanted	  to	  expand	  restructuring	  options	  for	  bond	  covenants	  while	  reducing	  the	  need	  for	  loan	  assistance	  from	  international	  financial	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institutions.102	  His	  seeming	  willingness	  to	  charge	  ahead	  with	  the	  SDRM	  proposal	  meant	  that	  by	  April	  2003,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  was	  entirely	  dislodged	  from	  the	  IMF’s	  plan.	  	  One	  would	  assume,	  given	  developing	  countries’	  past	  preferences	  for	  a	  treaty-­‐based	  or	  statutory	  regime,	  that	  Krueger	  and	  O’Neill	  would	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  the	  G-­‐77	  nations	  or	  the	  newly	  industrializing	  countries	  (NICs).	  Instead,	  by	  the	  fall	  of	  2002,	  the	  emerging	  markets	  were	  decidedly	  against	  the	  SDRM.	  Mexico’s	  Deputy	  Finance	  Minister,	  for	  example,	  fretted	  that	  “perception	  is	  substance…	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  SDRM	  for	  the	  private	  sector,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  issuer.”103	  Disturbed	  by	  the	  reaction	  of	  creditor	  associations,	  banks,	  and	  institutional	  investors	  to	  the	  SDRM,	  even	  in	  a	  watered-­‐down	  form,	  the	  developing	  countries	  were	  predisposed	  to	  take	  their	  cues	  from	  debt	  holders.	  The	  same	  trepidation	  about	  a	  post-­‐restructuring	  capital	  squeeze	  that	  once	  motivated	  the	  NICs	  to	  seek	  a	  “streamlined”	  workout	  process	  now	  clashed	  with	  the	  IMF’s	  proposal,	  leading	  Brad	  Setser	  to	  observe	  that	  “the	  concerns	  of	  private	  creditors	  were	  expressed	  by	  emerging	  markets	  active	  in	  the	  international	  market.	  Emerging	  economies	  warned	  against	  any	  steps	  –	  including	  granting	  sovereign	  debtors	  bankruptcy	  protection	  –	  that	  might	  upset	  the	  international	  bond	  market.”104	  In	  this	  environment,	  even	  Taylor’s	  collective	  action	  clause	  project	  was	  deemed	  too	  destabilizing.	  Such	  an	  aversion	  to	  stirring	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  international	  financial	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system	  marks	  a	  complete	  reversal	  from	  developing	  countries’	  20th	  century	  pushes	  for	  a	  statutory	  regime.	  In	  one	  sense,	  however,	  the	  emerging	  market	  countries’	  opposition	  to	  the	  SDRM	  resembled	  a	  traditional	  complaint	  of	  debtor	  nations.	  Supported	  by	  an	  activist	  community	  that	  perceived	  the	  IMF	  as	  a	  creditor-­‐biased	  organization,	  debtor	  nations	  feared	  that	  the	  SDRM	  could	  sacrifice	  national	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  Fund,	  and,	  by	  extension,	  a	  country’s	  debt	  holders.105	  Despite	  Krueger’s	  reassurances	  that	  the	  SDRM	  would	  not	  subject	  domestic	  debts	  to	  the	  same	  treatments	  as	  external	  obligations,	  and	  despite	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Forum	  (DRF)	  that	  placed	  restructuring	  contentions	  under	  a	  different	  third	  party	  mediator,	  developing	  countries	  were	  skeptical	  of	  a	  formal	  mechanism	  that	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  minted	  by	  political	  foes.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  of	  Argentina,	  which	  had	  been	  weighing	  the	  possibility	  of	  swapping	  its	  international	  sovereign	  bonds	  for	  domestic	  law	  instruments	  and	  desired	  to	  avoid	  blurring	  the	  international-­‐domestic	  distinction.106	  	  By	  April	  2003,	  the	  SDRM	  was	  effectively	  dead	  in	  the	  water.	  A	  persistent	  campaign	  from	  private	  financial	  actors	  had	  succeeded	  in	  eliminating	  an	  automatic	  stay	  of	  litigation	  from	  the	  final	  proposal,	  while	  decisions	  such	  as	  a	  temporary	  stay	  or	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  restructuring	  were	  allocated	  to	  a	  75%-­‐majority	  of	  represented	  creditors.107	  This	  iteration	  ensured	  that	  creditors	  would	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  accept	  any	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changes	  to	  the	  current	  ad	  hoc	  system,	  rendering	  the	  SDRM	  toothless.108	  Wall	  Street	  and	  debtor	  pressures	  alike	  confirmed	  the	  proposal’s	  death	  when	  it	  failed	  to	  attain	  a	  required	  majority	  of	  85%	  in	  the	  IMF’s	  Executive	  Board	  vote.109	  The	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  saga	  serves	  as	  a	  pivot	  point	  in	  the	  fight	  between	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system	  and	  proponents	  of	  a	  treaty	  approach.	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  battle	  lines	  were	  not	  as	  clear	  as	  previously	  believed;	  the	  IMF’s	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  structured	  regime	  revealed	  that	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  could	  represent	  an	  “evolution”	  from	  established	  ad	  hoc	  machinery	  rather	  than	  a	  “revolution”	  in	  international	  financial	  relations	  led	  by	  debtor	  countries	  and	  their	  allies.110	  More	  importantly,	  the	  SDRM’s	  collapse	  meant	  that	  most	  concerns	  about	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system	  were	  left	  unaddressed.	  One	  of	  Anne	  Krueger’s	  motivations	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  SDRM	  had	  been	  her	  concern	  over	  a	  potential	  creditor	  holdout	  problem,	  witnessed	  in	  a	  2000	  dispute	  between	  Peru	  and	  the	  hedge	  fund	  Elliott	  Management.	  Without	  provisions	  to	  “prevent	  creditors	  from	  disrupting	  negotiations	  leading	  to	  a	  restructuring	  agreement	  by	  seeking	  repayment	  through	  national	  courts,”	  Krueger	  worried	  that	  even	  contracts	  with	  enhanced	  collective	  action	  clauses	  would	  be	  susceptible	  to	  a	  holdout	  threat.111	  While	  dismissed	  at	  the	  time,	  since	  holdout	  litigation	  had	  yet	  to	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restructuring	  process,	  Krueger’s	  observation	  would	  have	  strong	  implications	  for	  the	  ongoing	  Argentine	  debt	  workout.	  The	  most	  profound	  result	  of	  the	  SDRM	  failure	  was	  the	  IMF’s	  loss	  of	  face	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  community.	  Despite	  what	  seemed	  like	  widespread	  need	  for	  a	  reformed	  sovereign	  debt	  regime,	  the	  Fund	  –	  and	  specifically	  Anne	  Krueger	  -­‐	  had	  interpreted	  broad	  disequilibrium	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  deeper	  political	  commitment	  to	  changing	  the	  system	  itself.	  Its	  commitment	  to	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  an	  SDRM	  when,	  as	  Brad	  Setser	  observes,	  it	  “need[ed]	  to	  communicate	  with	  national	  capitals,”	  made	  it	  seem	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  nuances	  of	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  relations.112	  Furthermore,	  the	  sudden	  emergence	  of	  a	  formal	  proposal,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  nearly	  every	  actor	  in	  the	  ad	  hoc	  regime	  was	  caught	  off	  guard,	  highlighted	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  multilateral	  institution	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  was	  considered	  necessary	  by	  all	  but	  a	  select	  group	  of	  institutional	  and	  epistemic	  activists.	  The	  arrival	  of	  John	  Snow	  as	  O’Neill’s	  replacement	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  was	  a	  humbling	  reminder	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  weakened	  status:	  Secretary	  Snow	  took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  declare	  that	  “it	  is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  feasible	  to	  continue	  working	  on	  an	  SDRM”	  in	  a	  statement	  that	  revealed	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  unilaterally	  rein	  in	  the	  Fund.113	  The	  IMF’s	  subsequent	  reticence	  to	  take	  another	  sincere	  look	  at	  a	  permanent	  debt	  regime	  appears	  to	  have	  further	  extended	  the	  lifespan	  of	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system.	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IV.	  Argentina	  II:	  From	  Default	  to	  the	  UN’s	  Basic	  Principles	  Argentina’s	  most	  recent	  sovereign	  debt	  struggles	  began	  in	  2001,	  when	  a	  high	  external	  debt	  burden,	  an	  overvalued	  currency	  pegged	  to	  the	  U.S.	  dollar,	  and	  decreasing	  export	  competitiveness	  forced	  the	  Republic	  into	  the	  first	  of	  its	  two	  21st	  century	  defaults.	  On	  Christmas	  Eve	  of	  that	  year,	  the	  interim	  Saá	  administration	  declared	  a	  payment	  suspension	  on	  foreign	  debt,	  triggering	  the	  first	  lawsuits	  by	  American	  investors	  in	  March	  2002.	  When	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  present	  value	  loss	  to	  investors	  in	  Argentine	  debt	  could	  exceed	  90	  percent,	  however,	  creditors	  switched	  from	  court	  rulings	  to	  creditor	  committees	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  resolving	  coordination	  obstacles	  and	  minimizing	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  looming	  haircut.114	  This	  approach,	  as	  Setser	  notes,	  made	  for	  interesting	  bedfellows:	  American,	  German,	  Italian,	  and	  Japanese	  interests	  sat	  at	  the	  same	  table	  as	  international	  institutional	  investors	  and	  Argentine	  pension	  funds.	  Particularly	  troubling	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  debt	  renegotiation	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  creditor	  groups,	  cobbled	  together	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  months,	  included	  an	  unusually	  large	  number	  of	  retail	  investors	  and	  represented	  connections	  to	  over	  90	  outstanding	  debt	  instruments.115	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  period	  from	  2003	  to	  2012	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  unusual	  lack	  of	  alignment	  between	  Argentina,	  its	  creditors,	  and	  the	  institutions	  responsible	  for	  facilitating	  the	  ad	  hoc	  restructuring	  process.	  The	  IMF	  is	  notable	  for	  its	  sidelined	  role:	  although	  the	  Fund	  had	  recently	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  medium	  term	  economic	  program	  to	  complement	  debt	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restructurings	  in	  Pakistan,	  Ukraine,	  Ecuador,	  Russia,	  and	  Uruguay,	  it	  established	  only	  minimum	  targets	  for	  Argentina	  to	  repay	  major	  international	  financial	  institutions	  and	  domestic	  debts.116	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  economic	  program	  for	  Argentina	  was	  left	  to	  whatever	  bargains	  could	  be	  attained	  between	  creditors	  and	  the	  debtor	  sovereign.	  In	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  world,	  the	  IMF’s	  influence	  was	  further	  limited	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury’s	  stance	  that	  creditor-­‐debtor	  negotiations	  could	  be	  hindered	  by	  the	  Fund’s	  concurrent	  attempts	  to	  create	  new	  macroeconomic	  parameters.	  An	  April	  12th,	  2003	  statement	  from	  Treasury	  Secretary	  John	  Snow	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  International	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Committee	  made	  it	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  no	  longer	  saw	  the	  IMF’s	  mission	  in	  Argentina	  and	  other	  indebted	  countries	  as	  a	  primary	  avenue	  for	  successful	  debt	  workouts;	  instead,	  Secretary	  Snow	  advocated	  for	  “broad	  voluntary	  approaches”	  that	  included	  the	  implementation	  of	  collective	  action	  clauses	  for	  contracts	  covering	  external	  debts.	  Since,	  under	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  source	  of	  collective	  action	  problems	  “lies	  in	  the	  relationships	  and	  agreements	  of	  debtors	  and	  their	  creditors,”	  the	  IMF	  would	  be	  relegated	  to	  helping	  negotiating	  parties	  “assume	  responsibility	  for	  the	  solution.”117	  In	  effect,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  established	  “market	  system	  with	  IMF	  assistance”	  approach	  quickly	  evolved	  into	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  Argentine	  Republic	  and	  its	  creditors	  would	  iron	  out	  the	  details	  among	  themselves.118	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Nevertheless,	  even	  a	  soft-­‐pedaled	  approach	  to	  IMF	  involvement	  in	  Argentina	  proved	  too	  odious	  for	  the	  debtor.	  By	  August	  2004,	  less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  the	  Argentine	  government	  agreed	  to	  a	  three-­‐year	  stand-­‐by	  commitment	  from	  the	  IMF,	  the	  Republic	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  “suspend”	  its	  agreement	  with	  the	  Fund,	  forfeiting	  future	  temporary	  lending	  assistance.119	  This	  decision	  led	  to	  the	  evaporation	  of	  IMF	  influence	  over	  the	  workout	  process	  for	  much	  of	  the	  next	  decade:	  Argentina’s	  2005	  and	  2010	  debt	  exchanges	  were	  conducted	  without	  IMF	  advice	  or	  involvement,	  and	  by	  2013,	  when	  “holdout”	  creditors	  began	  to	  gain	  an	  upper	  hand	  in	  U.S.	  courts,	  the	  Fund’s	  role	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  monitoring	  judicial	  opinions	  and	  warning	  against	  the	  empowerment	  of	  minority	  credit	  holders	  over	  national	  governments.	  When	  the	  Argentine	  government	  secured	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Paris	  Club	  to	  resume	  debt	  payments	  and	  clear	  nearly	  $9.7	  billion	  in	  arrears,	  then-­‐President	  Cristina	  Fernandez	  de	  Kirchner	  was	  able	  to	  gloat	  (with	  questionable	  accuracy)	  that	  it	  was	  “the	  first	  time	  that	  a	  country	  negotiates	  without	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.”120	  	  The	  Paris	  Club,	  for	  its	  part,	  appears	  to	  have	  played	  an	  indirect	  role	  in	  the	  disequilibrium	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  prior	  to	  its	  arrangement	  with	  Argentina.	  As	  late	  as	  2009,	  Paris	  Club	  member	  nations	  continued	  to	  insist	  that	  Argentina	  participate	  in	  an	  IMF	  program	  in	  exchange	  for	  debt	  restructuring.121	  This	  did	  not,	  however,	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prevent	  Argentina	  from	  normalizing	  relations	  with	  the	  Club,	  raising	  fears	  that	  the	  country	  would	  opt	  to	  negotiate	  its	  late	  arrears	  in	  Paris	  and	  further	  postpone	  an	  IMF	  intervention.	  Institutional	  investors	  specifically	  worried	  that	  Argentina	  could	  use	  a	  successful	  negotiation	  with	  the	  Paris	  Club	  to	  improve	  market	  sentiment	  for	  a	  new	  debt	  placement,	  allowing	  the	  country	  to	  “kick	  the	  can	  down	  the	  road”	  for	  any	  potential	  settlements	  with	  holdout	  creditors	  from	  the	  2005	  and	  2010	  restructurings.122	  	  Despite	  this	  concern,	  there	  was	  not	  universal	  consensus	  that	  Argentina	  viewed	  a	  Paris	  Club	  agreement	  as	  a	  valuable	  bargaining	  chip.	  By	  the	  2010	  debt	  exchange,	  J.F.	  Hornbeck,	  writing	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  noted	  that	  for	  Argentina’s	  restructuring	  process,	  “the	  Paris	  Club	  so	  far…	  has	  been	  a	  loser	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  Argentine	  case	  demonstrates	  that	  national	  governments	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  influence	  a	  sovereign	  nation	  that	  is	  determined	  to	  delay	  or	  deny	  debt	  repayment.	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  fiscal	  necessity	  and	  the	  international	  markets	  that	  appeared	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  leverage	  on	  Argentine	  decision	  making.”123	  The	  Club	  members’	  inability	  to	  compel	  the	  Argentine	  government	  to	  address	  its	  debts	  through	  the	  usual	  means,	  including	  sanctions,	  legislative	  proposals,	  and	  separate	  bilateral	  agreements,	  may	  have	  actually	  reinforced	  the	  debtor	  country’s	  feet-­‐dragging.	  Such	  conditions	  contrast	  with	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  May	  2014	  announcement	  that	  a	  compromise	  on	  principal,	  interest,	  and	  arrears	  payments	  had	  been	  reached	  with	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  minister.	  While	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the	  Club’s	  announcement	  became	  a	  sideshow	  to	  a	  looming	  technical	  default	  and	  last	  minute	  wrangling	  with	  the	  U.S.	  judiciary,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  negotiation	  enabled	  Argentina	  to	  score	  a	  political	  win	  by	  appearing	  to	  come	  to	  Paris	  on	  its	  own	  terms.124	  The	  country’s	  posturing	  prompted	  the	  American	  Task	  Force	  Argentina	  (AFTA),	  an	  association	  of	  creditors,	  to	  openly	  suggest	  that	  the	  “Paris	  Club’s	  legitimacy	  and	  authority…	  will	  be	  at	  serious	  risk	  if	  it	  entertains	  the	  self-­‐serving	  proposals	  by	  the	  current	  Argentine	  government.”125	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  Argentina’s	  challenges	  to	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  machinery,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  few	  strong	  proponents	  of	  the	  treaty	  approach	  to	  sovereign	  debt	  emerged	  between	  2003	  and	  2012.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime,	  despite	  the	  SDRM’s	  failure,	  was	  not	  passé:	  in	  2004,	  Hornbeck	  and	  Gelpern	  observed	  that	  “should	  the	  Argentine	  case	  fail	  to	  be	  resolved	  to	  the	  mutual	  satisfaction	  of	  all	  parties,	  it	  could	  reinvigorate	  interest	  in	  a	  systemic	  and	  internationally	  recognized	  debt	  restructuring	  system.”126	  With	  the	  SDRM’s	  collapse	  casting	  such	  a	  long	  shadow,	  it	  took	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  holdout	  creditor	  and	  a	  series	  of	  controversial	  decisions	  in	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York	  to	  “reinvigorate”	  advocates	  of	  treaty-­‐based	  formulations.	  	  Argentina’s	  holdouts	  –	  those	  creditors	  who	  refused	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  value	  of	  their	  bonds	  in	  2005	  and	  2010	  –	  scored	  a	  major	  victory	  on	  November	  21st,	  2012,	  when	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  Judge	  Thomas	  Griesa	  ruled	  that	  Argentina’s	  debts,	  held	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  “Creditor	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  Paris	  Club	  and	  Argentina	  will	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  debt	  discussions	  in	  May.”	  MercoPress,	  15	  March	  2014.	  Web.	  11	  Dec.	  2015.	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  “ATFA:	  Argentina	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  to	  Defy	  Paris	  Club’s	  Rules	  and	  Requirements.”	  PR	  Newswire,	  28	  May	  2014.	  Web.	  5	  Dec.	  2015.	  www.prnewswire.co.uk/newsreleases/atfa-­‐argentina-­‐continues-­‐to-­‐defy-­‐paris-­‐clubs-­‐rules-­‐and-­‐requirements-­‐260878361.html.	  126	  Hornbeck,	  J.F.	  “Argentina’s	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring.”	  CRS	  Report	  for	  Congress.	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  19	  Oct.	  2004.	  Print.	  pp.	  1.	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under	  U.S.	  law,	  would	  have	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  all	  creditors	  simultaneously	  under	  a	  contractual	  pari	  passu,	  or	  inter-­‐creditor	  equity,	  clause.127	  This	  meant	  that	  Argentina	  was	  barred	  from	  servicing	  the	  debt	  held	  by	  non-­‐holdout	  creditors	  without	  compensating	  its	  holdouts	  as	  well.	  Griesa’s	  interpretation	  of	  pari	  passu	  elicited	  strong	  condemnation	  from	  the	  “epistemic	  community”	  of	  economists	  and	  NGOs	  and	  sparked	  a	  review	  of	  the	  “market-­‐based	  system”	  of	  restructuring;	  Benu	  Schneider	  encapsulated	  this	  group’s	  central	  contentions	  by	  suggesting	  Argentina’s	  case	  revealed	  the	  current	  system’s	  lack	  of	  a	  “centralized	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanism,	  enforceable	  priority	  rules	  for	  creditors	  and	  an	  organized	  representation	  of	  all	  stakeholders.”128	  The	  ruling	  also	  rekindled	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue-­‐era	  rhetoric,	  especially	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty:	  in	  an	  address	  before	  the	  United	  Nations’	  Group	  of	  77	  countries,	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  minister	  declared	  that	  the	  U.S.	  court	  ruling,	  coupled	  with	  the	  District	  Court’s	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  a	  payment	  deadline	  extension,	  was	  creating	  odious	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  that	  rendered	  his	  government	  incapable	  of	  settings	  its	  own	  domestic	  policies.129	  By	  Argentina’s	  July	  2014	  default,	  the	  debtor	  country	  had	  further	  integrated	  its	  message	  within	  the	  political	  environment	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  revisiting	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  legal	  framework	  adopted	  by	  the	  international	  community.	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The	  United	  Nations,	  particularly	  UNCTAD,	  had	  largely	  been	  a	  bystander	  to	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate	  since	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.	  While	  another	  proposal	  for	  a	  permanent	  regime,	  centered	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  extending	  Chapter	  11	  reorganizations	  from	  private	  entities	  to	  sovereign	  countries,	  was	  considered	  by	  UNCTAD	  in	  1986,	  it	  received	  little	  attention	  from	  creditor	  interests	  due	  to	  the	  ongoing	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  and	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  Brady	  Plan.130	  The	  holdout	  problem,	  however,	  presented	  a	  catalyst	  for	  reorienting	  the	  debate	  back	  toward	  the	  UN.	  In	  a	  June	  24th,	  2014	  online	  essay,	  UNCTAD	  wrote	  that	  the	  U.S.	  court	  injunctions	  against	  Argentina	  paying	  its	  debts	  “create	  a	  precedent	  for	  awarding	  holdout	  creditors	  and	  penalizing	  creditors	  who	  participated	  in	  a	  debt	  restructuring,”	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  pari	  passu	  clause	  and	  “boilerplate”	  collective	  action	  clauses	  had	  been	  converted	  into	  a	  “strong	  weapon”	  for	  bond	  holders.131	  Additionally,	  UNCTAD	  declared	  that	  the	  U.S.	  judiciary	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act,	  a	  rallying	  cry	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  1970s	  refrain	  that	  developing	  countries’	  domestic	  economic	  policies	  were	  being	  undermined	  by	  foreign	  creditors.	  Finally,	  the	  UNCTAD	  essay	  set	  its	  sights	  on	  the	  IMF,	  noting	  that	  “one	  wonders	  whether	  the	  IMF	  is	  best	  positioned	  to	  give	  timely	  and	  fair	  judgments”	  when	  the	  IMF’s	  post-­‐SDRM	  proposals	  for	  resolving	  sovereign	  debt	  difficulties	  appeared	  to	  advocate	  for	  maintaining	  a	  market-­‐based	  course.132	  Such	  strongly	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worded	  language,	  written	  prior	  to	  Argentina’s	  technical	  default,	  highlighted	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  developing	  countries	  had	  already	  achieved	  a	  consensus	  on	  litigation	  in	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  This	  consensus	  emerged	  as	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Not	  unlike	  the	  recommendations	  put	  forward	  by	  UNCTAD’s	  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts	  in	  1975,	  the	  new	  resolution	  on	  “Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes”	  called	  for	  alterations	  to	  existing	  debt	  management	  protocol	  but	  did	  not	  directly	  challenge	  the	  centrality	  of	  ad	  hoc	  machinery	  such	  as	  the	  Paris	  Club.	  Instead,	  the	  document	  embedded	  its	  directives	  in	  concepts	  such	  as	  legitimacy,	  transparency,	  impartiality,	  and	  “good	  faith	  by	  both	  the	  sovereign	  debtor	  and	  all	  its	  creditors”	  to	  ensure	  “constructive	  sovereign	  debt	  workout	  negotiations.”133	  The	  Principles	  had	  the	  ostensible	  goal	  of	  establishing	  a	  basic	  framework	  for	  later	  “international	  rules	  and	  mechanisms	  to	  better	  manage	  sovereign	  debt	  problems,”	  with	  Argentine	  Secretary	  of	  International	  Economic	  Relations	  Carlos	  Bianco	  stating	  that	  he	  envisaged	  the	  Principles	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  regulating	  holdout	  creditors	  and	  “vulture	  funds”	  during	  future	  litigation	  battles.134	  Predictably,	  the	  response	  to	  this	  new	  movement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  creditors	  and	  developed	  countries	  was	  to	  toe	  the	  line	  at	  market-­‐based	  solutions.	  As	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  United	  States	  registered	  the	  most	  opposition,	  taking	  issue	  with	  the	  Principles’	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affirmation	  that	  countries	  have	  a	  “right”	  to	  restructure	  their	  debts.135	  The	  European	  Union	  common	  position,	  meanwhile,	  asserted	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  “should	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  elaboration	  of	  a	  non-­‐binding	  ‘set	  of	  principles’	  which	  builds	  upon	  a	  market-­‐based	  voluntary	  contractual	  approach	  to	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  and	  aims	  at	  furthering	  its	  implementation	  and	  use.”136	  For	  the	  plight	  of	  countries	  like	  Argentina,	  in	  particular,	  the	  United	  States,	  Germany,	  and	  France	  suggested	  that	  improved	  sovereign	  bond	  contracts,	  infused	  with	  enhanced	  collective	  action	  clauses,	  could	  be	  sufficient	  ad	  hoc	  solutions	  to	  reduce	  the	  threat	  of	  future	  holdouts.	  Importantly,	  the	  developed	  countries	  reaffirmed	  that	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Paris	  Club	  were	  the	  appropriate	  venues	  for	  conducting	  debt	  restructurings	  and	  considering	  alternative	  proposals,	  with	  the	  EU	  even	  suggesting	  that	  UNCTAD	  utilize	  the	  “recent	  and	  ongoing	  work	  on	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  undertaken	  in	  the	  IMF…	  [and]	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  which	  has	  a	  history	  of	  discussing	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  issues.”137	  In	  an	  effective	  replay	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  ran	  into	  a	  brick	  wall	  as	  creditor	  interests	  held	  their	  ground.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  Principles,	  while	  officially	  endorsed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations,	  were	  capable	  of	  creating	  very	  little	  political	  room	  for	  more	  detailed	  conversations	  about	  improvements	  to	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system,	  much	  less	  the	  development	  of	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime.	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International	  Law	  Journal	  Online,	  20	  Sept.	  2015.	  Web.	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  of	  the	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  “EU	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   Argentina’s	  debt	  crisis	  reveals	  two	  trends	  in	  the	  ongoing	  restructuring	  debate.	  First,	  fallout	  from	  the	  IMF’s	  SDRM	  debacle	  may	  have	  disrupted	  the	  well-­‐oiled	  linkages	  between	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  machinery.	  This	  is	  most	  apparent	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  the	  IMF	  for	  handling	  an	  Argentine	  restructuring;	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  decision	  to	  receive	  Argentina’s	  demands	  left	  it	  open	  to	  criticism	  from	  the	  bond	  market,	  which	  viewed	  the	  Club’s	  actions	  as	  ill-­‐advised	  attempts	  to	  appease	  a	  recalcitrant	  sovereign.138	  Even	  academic	  observers	  have	  noted	  weakness	  among	  the	  central	  players	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  Nouriel	  Roubini	  and	  Brad	  Setser,	  for	  instance,	  write	  that	  “in	  Argentina,	  the	  official	  sector	  has	  come	  close	  to	  abdicating	  its	  traditional	  role	  of	  negotiating	  an	  economic	  program	  with	  the	  debtor	  that	  outlines,	  in	  broad	  terms,	  the	  official	  sector’s	  assessment	  of	  what	  the	  country	  and	  its	  creditors	  need	  to	  do	  to	  restore	  debt	  sustainability.”139	  This	  indictment,	  falling	  squarely	  on	  the	  IMF’s	  shoulders,	  suggests	  that	  the	  suboptimal	  performance	  of	  critical	  institutions	  in	  the	  Argentine	  episode	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  resurgent	  popularity	  of	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  among	  developing	  countries.	  	   Second,	  the	  UN’s	  Basic	  Principles	  demonstrate	  the	  increased	  political	  willpower	  of	  older	  debt	  debate	  veterans,	  such	  as	  the	  Group	  of	  77,	  to	  reconsider	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  The	  fate	  of	  the	  Principles,	  however,	  hints	  that	  creditors	  –	  even	  those	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  holdout	  litigation	  –	  seem	  just	  as	  committed	  to	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  Roubini,	  Nouriel	  and	  Brad	  Setser.	  “The	  Reform	  of	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  Sovereign	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  Episode.”	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics	  
Conference,	  9	  March	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market-­‐driven	  restructurings	  as	  they	  were	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.	  From	  this	  vantage	  point,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  greatest	  success	  of	  the	  UN’s	  recent	  efforts	  was	  the	  simple	  definition,	  “in	  a	  clear	  and	  systemic	  manner,	  [of]	  the	  existing	  and	  well-­‐rooted	  principles	  which	  apply	  to	  the	  field	  of	  sovereign	  debt.”140	  	  	  
V.	  Case	  Comparisons	  
I.	  The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  	   The	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  is	  often	  described	  as	  an	  arc,	  with	  its	  influence	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  restructuring	  process	  growing	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  peaking	  during	  the	  “neoliberal”	  era	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  and	  declining	  or	  moderating	  thereafter.141	  While	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  previous	  four	  cases	  confirm	  this	  trend,	  the	  IMF’s	  role	  is	  better	  described	  as	  an	  oscillation	  between	  a	  strongly	  pro-­‐creditor,	  pro-­‐ad	  hoc	  position	  and	  support	  for	  a	  consociational	  creditor-­‐debtor	  negotiating	  process	  with	  room	  for	  a	  permanent	  workout	  mechanism.	  Critically,	  the	  IMF’s	  relative	  weight	  in	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  its	  perceived	  policy	  competence;	  for	  example,	  the	  Fund	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  Bank	  Advisory	  Committees	  at	  a	  time	  when	  its	  liberalization	  programs	  were	  held	  in	  high	  regard	  by	  most	  private	  creditors,	  but	  failed	  to	  construct	  similar	  foundations	  for	  SDRM	  approval	  precisely	  because	  its	  recommendations	  were	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  expectations	  that	  the	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Fund	  would	  scale	  down	  its	  involvement	  in	  debt	  workouts.142	  Regardless	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  faith	  placed	  in	  the	  IMF	  by	  institutional	  and	  private	  actors,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  the	  Fund	  played	  an	  outsized	  part	  in	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate	  over	  the	  last	  forty	  years.	  	   The	  IMF’s	  role	  is	  especially	  intriguing	  given	  its	  occasional	  support	  for	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism,	  an	  anomaly	  among	  Bretton	  Woods	  legacy	  institutions.	  Prior	  to	  the	  reemergence	  of	  bonds	  as	  the	  financial	  world’s	  dominant	  debt	  instruments,	  there	  was	  little	  concern	  among	  top	  leadership	  that	  “financial	  chaos”	  would	  result	  from	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  practices.	  Instead,	  the	  Fund	  adopted	  a	  narrow	  view	  of	  its	  activities,	  adhering	  to	  the	  language	  in	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  that	  placed	  it	  at	  the	  center	  of	  an	  “international	  monetary	  system”	  consisting	  of	  oversight	  over	  the	  monetary	  and	  exchange	  rate	  regimes	  of	  currency	  zones,	  the	  “stock	  of	  international	  liquidity	  and	  the	  arrangements	  for	  its	  management,”	  and	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  Fund	  member	  countries.143	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  activities	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis,	  this	  viewpoint	  meant	  that	  the	  organization	  did	  not	  have	  the	  analogous	  authority	  to	  oversee	  international	  capital	  flows	  or	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  collective	  action	  problems	  and	  debt	  workout	  procedures	  among	  a	  multitude	  of	  creditors.	  	  	   While	  Anne	  Krueger’s	  concept	  of	  an	  SDRM	  that	  precluded	  holdout	  threats	  seems	  prescient	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Argentina’s	  2014	  default	  and	  ongoing	  debt	  battle,	  the	  narrow	  view	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  place	  in	  international	  finance	  is	  still	  the	  most	  resonant	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narrative	  among	  creditors	  and	  developed	  country	  governments.	  Smitha	  Francis	  notes	  that	  the	  SDRM	  debate	  did	  not	  change	  the	  commonly-­‐held	  views	  among	  private	  actors,	  G-­‐7	  nations,	  and	  debtor	  sovereigns	  that	  the	  IMF	  is	  also	  a	  creditor,	  and	  often	  the	  biggest	  lender	  for	  countries	  otherwise	  isolated	  from	  international	  capital	  markets.144	  Therefore,	  while	  creditor	  banks	  generally	  embraced	  the	  Fund’s	  1982-­‐1984	  position	  as	  an	  informal	  collective	  action	  enforcer	  (the	  IMF	  used	  its	  status	  as	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  to	  convince	  private	  creditors	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  restructuring	  deals),	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  SDRM	  created	  through	  “an	  amendment	  of	  [the	  Fund’s]	  article	  of	  agreement”	  struck	  both	  detractors	  and	  allies	  as	  a	  fundamental	  conflict	  of	  interest.145	  This	  perspective	  remains	  pervasive	  in	  the	  present	  day:	  even	  Brookings’	  CIEPR	  report	  clarifies	  that,	  in	  the	  years	  since	  the	  IMF’s	  shareholders	  rejected	  the	  SDRM,	  a	  sovereign	  bankruptcy	  regime	  is	  largely	  understood	  to	  be	  “a	  mix	  of	  national	  and	  international	  institutions	  that	  would,	  in	  some	  conditions,	  sanction	  a	  comprehensive	  modification	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  contracts,”	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  entity	  with	  legally	  defined	  arbitration	  and	  enforcement	  authority.146	  CIEPR’s	  soft-­‐pedaled	  suggestions	  hint	  that	  most	  creditor	  institutions	  and	  interests	  have	  a	  continued	  aversion	  to	  any	  proposal	  mimicking	  the	  Fund’s	  ill-­‐fated	  attempt	  to	  centralize	  a	  restructuring	  process	  while	  expanding	  organizational	  mandates.	  	   It	  follows	  that	  the	  IMF	  continues	  to	  toe	  the	  line	  with	  creditor	  governments	  by	  advocating	  for	  collective	  action	  clauses	  in	  place	  of	  a	  fully	  developed	  SDRM.	  Taking	  “great	  pains,”	  as	  Anna	  Gelpern	  presumes,	  to	  “establish	  that	  the	  core	  political	  reality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Francis,	  Smitha.	  “IMF’s	  SDRM	  Proposals:	  An	  Updated	  Critique	  of	  Conceptual	  Issues.”	  International	  Development	  Economics	  Associates,	  9	  May	  2003.	  Print.	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  145	  Setser,	  B.	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  SDRM.”	  pp.	  17.	  146	  “Revisiting	  Sovereign	  Bankruptcy,”	  pp.	  1.	  
	   McConnell	  60	  
has	  not	  changed,”147	  a	  2013	  IMF	  report	  observes	  that	  CACs	  can	  adequately	  “shift	  decision	  making	  on	  a	  debt	  restructuring	  to	  creditors	  as	  a	  group	  to	  reflect	  their	  collective	  will,”	  thereby	  preventing	  holdout	  litigation	  from	  occurring	  among	  bondholders	  within	  the	  same	  issue.148	  Echoing	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Snow’s	  preferences	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2003,	  the	  document	  also	  contends	  that	  a	  third	  party-­‐mediated	  “aggregated	  voting”	  process	  is	  politically	  unpalatable,	  since	  such	  a	  procedure	  would	  bind	  all	  creditors	  regardless	  of	  their	  holdings.149	  Instead,	  the	  Fund	  has	  placed	  itself	  on	  standby	  to	  observe,	  although	  not	  interfere	  with,	  the	  implementation	  of	  collective	  action	  clauses	  via	  case-­‐specific	  inter-­‐creditor	  negotiations.	  	   A	  more	  entrenched	  form	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  IMF	  comes	  from	  the	  investor	  community,	  the	  most	  outspoken	  opponents	  of	  the	  SDRM	  and	  the	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Forum.	  Unlike	  the	  institutional	  creditors	  that	  worked	  with	  the	  IMF	  to	  resolve	  Latin	  American	  loan	  obligations,	  contemporary	  private	  investors	  are	  much	  less	  disposed	  to	  heed	  the	  IMF’s	  advice	  and	  are	  much	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  SDRM-­‐like	  program	  disrupting	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market	  altogether.	  Proponents	  of	  an	  SDRM	  within	  the	  Fund	  now	  have	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  growing	  chorus	  of	  voices	  that	  claims	  a	  mechanism	  designed	  to	  make	  restructuring	  less	  costly	  “would	  undermine	  the	  incentives	  to	  pay	  back,	  inducing	  debtor	  moral	  hazard,	  encouraging	  default,	  [and]	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making	  sovereign	  debt	  more	  expensive.”150	  While	  Krueger	  and	  O’Neill	  have	  gone	  on	  the	  record	  to	  clarify	  that	  any	  IMF-­‐mediated	  system	  is	  intended	  to	  merely	  reduce	  the	  transaction	  costs	  that	  crop	  up	  via	  a	  reliance	  on	  bond	  financing,	  the	  IMF	  and	  its	  supporters	  have	  only	  weakly	  argued	  that	  a	  permanent	  regime	  would	  necessarily	  strengthen	  creditor	  rights	  and	  bolster	  the	  sovereign	  bond	  market.151	  	  	  	   Debtor	  dispositions	  also	  remain	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  concept	  of	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime.	  Distrust	  of	  the	  Fund	  as	  a	  pro-­‐creditor	  institution	  has	  been	  a	  constant	  theme	  of	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  G-­‐77	  since	  at	  least	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  especially	  in	  controversies	  over	  national	  sovereignty.	  However,	  the	  IMF’s	  policy	  struggles	  in	  the	  1990s,	  combined	  with	  the	  methods	  by	  which	  it	  tried	  to	  implement	  the	  SDRM,	  have	  converted	  this	  wariness	  into	  outright	  belligerence,	  as	  witnessed	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  2004	  expulsion	  from	  Argentina’s	  recovery	  program.	  Revealingly,	  the	  IMF	  has	  identified	  what	  it	  considers	  to	  be	  its	  counterproductive	  activities	  in	  the	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  Argentina’s	  2001	  collapse,	  claiming	  that	  the	  organization’s	  policies	  were	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  the	  existing	  Argentine	  economy	  and	  “overestimate[d]	  its	  growth	  potential”	  while	  “underestimating	  its	  vulnerabilities.”152	  These	  “insufficiently	  ambitious	  and	  excessively	  accommodative”	  directives	  included	  “slippages	  of	  debt	  and	  deficit	  targets,”	  which	  the	  Fund	  considered	  highly	  damaging	  to	  balanced-­‐budget	  efforts,	  insufficient	  structural	  content	  and	  conditionality,	  and	  the	  continued	  financing	  of	  the	  Argentine	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government	  even	  when	  an	  early	  restructuring	  would	  have	  stabilized	  the	  country’s	  debt	  dynamics.153	  These	  admissions	  of	  failure	  –	  significantly,	  the	  IMF’s	  belief	  that	  stronger	  conditionality	  and	  enforcement	  could	  have	  prevented	  a	  crisis	  –	  are	  the	  exact	  opposite	  of	  the	  conclusions	  many	  debtor	  sovereigns	  have	  drawn	  from	  an	  autopsy	  of	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Instead,	  Argentina	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  buyer’s	  regret	  felt	  by	  many	  IMF-­‐assisted	  developing	  countries:	  J.F.	  Hornbeck	  writes	  that	  the	  Fund’s	  emphasis	  on	  social	  spending	  reduction	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  country’s	  failure	  to	  meet	  consensus	  expectations	  for	  growth	  between	  2000	  and	  2001,	  while	  Arthur	  MacEwan	  asserts	  that	  the	  IMF’s	  fixation	  on	  balanced	  spending	  prevented	  the	  debtor	  from	  engaging	  in	  “desirable	  counter-­‐cyclical	  policy.”154	  Such	  a	  wide	  paradigm	  gap	  between	  the	  Fund	  and	  developing	  countries	  signals	  that	  the	  IMF	  is	  less	  likely	  than	  ever	  to	  convince	  debtor	  sovereigns	  to	  sign	  on	  to	  another	  scheme	  for	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime.	  	   In	  keeping	  with	  this	  divide,	  the	  IMF’s	  2001	  –	  2003	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Mechanism	  debacle	  alarmed	  and	  alienated	  debtor	  countries	  in	  its	  immediate	  aftermath.	  The	  SDRM’s	  (alleged)	  basis	  in	  corporate	  debt	  restructuring	  gave	  rise	  to	  fears	  that	  sovereignty	  would	  be	  sacrificed	  to	  prioritize	  bondholder	  compensation,	  while	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “neutral”	  debt	  resolution	  forum	  established	  by	  the	  IMF	  continues	  to	  reinforce	  the	  shared	  conviction	  among	  debtor	  sovereigns	  that	  international	  creditors	  hold	  most	  of	  the	  cards.155	  One	  particularly	  lasting	  legacy	  of	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the	  SDRM	  fight	  is	  a	  desire	  among	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  to	  avoid	  entrapment	  between	  escalating	  obligations	  and	  post-­‐restructuring	  financing	  difficulties;	  since	  the	  IMF	  is	  uniquely	  disposed	  to	  lend	  in	  crisis	  circumstances,	  its	  involvement	  through	  a	  debt	  resolution	  forum	  suggests	  that	  any	  Fund-­‐constructed	  permanent	  machinery	  would	  carry	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  last-­‐resort	  option	  and	  scare	  off	  nervous	  creditors.	  Furthermore,	  fears	  that	  an	  SDRM	  will	  replace	  guaranteed	  IMF	  lending	  remain	  as	  potent	  as	  ever.	  As	  Lucio	  Simpson	  declares	  in	  a	  2006	  UNCTAD	  paper,	  the	  “weak	  legal	  protections	  of	  debtors’	  rights	  [can]	  not	  make	  up	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  emergency	  access	  to	  multilateral	  financing.”156	  	   There	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Fund	  will	  regain	  the	  political	  clout	  it	  possessed	  in	  the	  debt	  debate	  prior	  to	  the	  unraveling	  of	  its	  liberalization	  programs	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  SDRM	  failure	  in	  2003,	  and	  the	  organization’s	  virtual	  exile	  from	  debt	  reform	  discussions	  post-­‐SDRM.	  While	  Argentina’s	  holdout	  problem	  presents	  a	  new	  platform	  to	  reexamine	  the	  “best	  practices”	  of	  ad	  hoc	  debt	  management	  –	  IMF	  chief	  economist	  Olivier	  Blanchard	  argued	  in	  July	  2014	  that	  the	  case	  “tells	  us	  we	  need	  to	  work	  on	  improving	  resolution	  mechanisms,”157	  with	  reference	  to	  existing	  collective	  action	  clauses	  for	  bond	  contracts	  –	  the	  Fund	  lacks	  the	  impetus	  to	  challenge	  the	  ad	  hoc	  status	  quo	  without	  OECD,	  or	  at	  least	  G-­‐7,	  backing.	  A	  confluence	  of	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  pressures	  therefore	  means	  that	  the	  IMF	  is	  likely	  to	  give	  on	  the	  issue,	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relegating	  itself	  to	  support	  for	  incremental	  adjustments	  to	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  in	  the	  meantime.	  	  	  
II.	  The	  Paris	  Club	  	   From	  the	  1970s	  onward,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  has	  been	  less	  active	  than	  the	  IMF	  in	  shaping	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate,	  precisely	  because	  it	  acts	  as	  the	  intergovernmental	  locus	  of	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system	  and	  stands	  to	  benefit	  from	  a	  pro-­‐status	  quo	  policy	  stance.	  Although	  the	  Paris	  Club	  was	  bandied	  about	  as	  a	  political	  football	  during	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  and	  again	  during	  Argentina’s	  holdout	  debacle,	  the	  Club’s	  lasting	  success	  has	  been	  its	  ability	  to	  accommodate	  prominent	  ad	  hoc	  skeptics	  while	  gradually	  gaining	  approval	  from	  developing	  country	  interests.	  This	  tactic	  is	  most	  recognizable	  in	  the	  Club’s	  response	  to	  the	  UNCTAD	  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts’	  1975	  recommendation	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  “be	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  multilateral	  debt	  negotiations	  on	  the	  same	  basis	  as	  the	  representatives	  of	  other	  international	  organizations;”	  since	  1978,	  and	  without	  much	  controversy,	  UNCTAD	  has	  been	  an	  acknowledged	  observer	  and	  unofficial	  debtors’	  representative	  in	  the	  Paris	  Club	  restructuring	  process.158	  The	  emerging	  coordination	  between	  the	  Club’s	  objectives	  and	  UNCTAD	  insights	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  push	  for	  an	  “independent	  forum”	  partially	  explains	  why	  the	  Paris	  Club	  enjoyed	  significant	  legitimacy	  during	  the	  debt	  crises	  of	  the	  1980s.159	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   More	  evident	  than	  the	  eventual	  co-­‐optation	  of	  developing	  country	  actors	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  interregnum	  between	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  and	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  world,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  cemented	  its	  position	  as	  a	  debt	  resolution	  mechanism	  even	  as	  the	  IMF	  slid	  from	  a	  prominent	  economic	  linchpin	  to	  an	  organization	  mired	  in	  debtor	  distrust.	  Enrique	  Cosio-­‐Pascal	  observes	  that	  while	  most	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  “mainly	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  international	  banks	  that	  had	  over-­‐lent,”	  debt	  woes	  affiliated	  with	  banks	  and	  private	  individuals	  also	  drove	  middle	  and	  low-­‐income	  countries	  to	  consult	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  “[seek]	  relief	  from	  their	  official	  creditors.”160	  Whereas	  the	  Club	  had	  previously	  consisted	  of	  occasional	  meetings	  inspired	  by	  IMF-­‐directed	  restructuring	  targets,	  this	  unusual	  period	  of	  cooperation	  between	  public	  creditors	  and	  debtor	  sovereigns	  appears	  to	  have	  produced	  a	  forum	  that	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  experiment	  (as	  in	  the	  restricted	  implementation	  of	  MYRAs),	  more	  likely	  to	  sacrifice	  “short	  leash”	  restructurings	  in	  exchange	  for	  longer-­‐term	  targets	  and	  debt	  forgiveness	  initiatives,	  and	  more	  accepting	  of	  “exceptional	  treatment”	  for	  countries	  struggling	  to	  make	  up	  for	  their	  odious	  arrears.161	  Seen	  from	  another	  angle,	  the	  Club’s	  response	  to	  UNCTAD’s	  1989	  musings	  that	  “the	  pervasiveness	  of	  debt	  problems	  is	  such	  that	  debt	  rescheduling…	  has	  now	  become	  an	  established	  feature	  of	  the	  financial	  system”	  was	  to	  delve	  deeper	  into	  ad	  hoc	  solutions,	  violating	  some	  of	  its	  own	  established	  norms	  along	  the	  way.162	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   As	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  and	  private	  creditor	  support	  for	  the	  SDRM	  suggests,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  dovetailed	  with	  the	  IMF	  sometime	  during	  the	  1990s.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  institutional	  biases:	  while	  the	  Fund	  fretted	  about	  the	  rise	  of	  retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds	  in	  a	  bond-­‐based	  debt	  marketplace,	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  focus	  on	  official	  debt	  treatments	  –	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  London	  Club	  to	  address	  most	  private	  bank	  concerns	  –	  kept	  its	  members	  from	  expanding	  their	  purviews	  to	  encompass	  private	  bond	  contract	  mechanisms.163	  Additionally,	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  activities	  remain	  fundamentally	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  preferences	  of	  G-­‐7	  countries,	  since	  its	  core	  membership	  is	  comprised	  of	  OECD	  financial	  leadership.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  join	  the	  Fund	  in	  its	  SDRM	  experiment,	  especially	  since	  the	  IMF	  was	  motivated	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  messy	  private	  sector	  agreements	  and	  not	  the	  externalities	  imposed	  on	  creditors	  or	  debtors	  by	  the	  Club’s	  informal	  workout	  process.	  In	  fact,	  Patrick	  Bolton	  and	  David	  Skeel	  write	  that	  the	  IMF	  took	  special	  care	  to	  “implicitly	  recognize	  a	  higher	  priority	  to	  Paris	  Club	  debt	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli,”	  effectively	  excluding	  official	  debts	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  absolute	  priority	  within	  the	  SDRM.164	  With	  G-­‐7	  interests	  wanting	  little	  to	  do	  with	  a	  sovereign	  bankruptcy	  regime,	  and	  unable	  to	  see	  any	  justified	  reason	  for	  official	  debts	  to	  fall	  under	  the	  IMF’s	  umbrella,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  was	  unmoved	  by	  the	  Fund’s	  entreaties	  to	  support	  a	  permanent	  workout	  process.	  	  	   An	  important	  component	  of	  IMF-­‐Paris	  Club	  relations	  that	  has	  only	  recently	  come	  into	  question	  is	  the	  Club’s	  insistence	  that	  all	  debtor	  sovereigns	  undergo	  an	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IMF	  evaluation	  and	  adopt	  a	  corresponding	  economic	  plan	  prior	  to	  reaching	  a	  restructuring	  arrangement.165	  This	  practice,	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Club’s	  emphasis	  on	  debt	  sustainability,	  made	  official	  debt	  restructuring	  synonymous	  with	  economic	  liberalization	  (or,	  alternately,	  austerity)	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  debtor	  governments;	  this	  explains,	  then,	  why	  Argentina’s	  agreement	  with	  the	  Paris	  Club	  sans	  IMF	  approval	  served	  as	  a	  minor	  political	  win	  for	  the	  Kirchner	  government	  and	  constituted	  another	  poke	  in	  the	  eye	  for	  the	  Fund’s	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  reestablish	  a	  rapport	  with	  Latin	  American	  debtors.	  The	  2014	  deal	  hints	  that	  the	  Club,	  and	  by	  extension	  many	  creditor	  governments,	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  seek	  IMF	  consultation	  in	  future	  holdout	  situations,	  even	  if	  most	  developed	  countries	  are	  unwilling	  to	  replace	  the	  Fund’s	  surveillance	  and	  auditing	  capacities	  with	  another	  institution’s	  oversight.	  Instead,	  in	  true	  ad	  hoc	  form,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  official	  lenders	  will	  work	  around	  the	  IMF’s	  prescriptions	  in	  the	  event	  that	  protracted	  ideological	  battles	  threaten	  the	  possibility	  of	  repayment.	  	  	  	   At	  first	  glance,	  the	  Argentine	  saga,	  and,	  particularly,	  J.F.	  Hornbeck’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Paris	  Club	  was	  a	  “loser”	  in	  the	  2014	  debt	  restructuring	  deal,	  implies	  that	  the	  Club	  is	  once	  again	  threatened	  by	  developing	  country	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  This	  observation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  correct.	  Argentina’s	  attempts	  to	  revive	  old	  G-­‐77	  and	  UNCTAD	  alliances,	  while	  successful	  in	  generating	  political	  passions	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  were	  less	  capable	  of	  provoking	  a	  reaction	  not	  only	  among	  developed	  countries,	  but	  also,	  as	  in	  the	  SDRM	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battle,	  among	  developing	  economies	  with	  significant	  exposure	  to	  the	  international	  financial	  market.166	  The	  UN’s	  “Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes”	  consequently	  make	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  or	  any	  other	  established	  creditor	  forums,	  preferring	  to	  “consider	  improved	  approaches	  to	  restructuring	  sovereign	  debt,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  Basic	  Principles…	  and	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  respective	  mandates.”167	  If	  these	  statements	  are	  to	  be	  believed,	  not	  only	  is	  the	  Paris	  Club	  free	  from	  G-­‐77	  challenges,	  but	  the	  Principles	  themselves	  represent	  a	  partial	  capitulation	  to	  the	  developed	  country	  ideals	  of	  collective	  action	  clauses,	  equal	  treatment,	  and	  the	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  evolution	  of	  bilateral	  contract	  norms!	  	   Ironically,	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  goals	  comes	  from	  the	  judicial	  systems	  of	  the	  G-­‐7	  countries	  themselves.	  Thomas	  Griesa’s	  2012	  pari	  passu	  ruling	  represented	  a	  fairly	  radical	  departure	  from	  previous	  holdout	  scenarios	  by	  effectively	  forcing	  all	  private	  creditors	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  minority	  seeking	  bond	  repayment	  at	  face	  value;	  under	  this	  interpretation,	  private	  bondholders	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  view	  bilateral	  contracts	  with	  CAC	  enhancements	  as	  ironclad	  safeguards	  against	  an	  uncompromising	  subset	  of	  creditors.168	  Yet	  the	  Paris	  Club	  considers	  its	  role	  in	  preserving	  debt	  sustainability	  to	  be	  the	  facilitation	  of	  improved	  bilateral	  arrangements	  through	  “increase[d]	  transparency	  and	  predictability	  on	  features	  of	  debt	  treatment”	  and	  “regular	  contracts	  and	  transparency	  efforts	  from	  the	  debtor	  to	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  for	  example,	  abstained	  from	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  vote	  despite	  its	  historical	  affiliations	  with	  other	  pro-­‐Principles	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all	  its	  creditors.”169	  Irregular	  court	  rulings	  from	  domestic	  judiciaries	  –	  with	  corresponding	  confusion	  over	  whether	  such	  rulings	  and	  injunctions	  apply	  to	  debts	  held	  in	  other	  currencies	  and	  under	  other	  national	  laws	  –	  render	  moot	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  stabilization	  efforts	  and	  contribute	  to	  official	  creditors’	  worries	  that	  crises	  involving	  private	  debt	  holders	  may	  impact	  public	  debt	  servicing.170	  Fortunately,	  since	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  ruling	  on	  Argentine	  bonds	  remains	  a	  new	  phenomenon,	  the	  Club	  and	  its	  developed	  country	  affiliates	  are	  not	  currently	  faced	  with	  a	  systemic	  legal	  breakdown	  of	  the	  market	  for	  bond-­‐denominated	  debts.	  Unless	  holdout	  private	  creditors	  are	  repeatedly	  validated	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  powerful	  financial	  centers,	  the	  Paris	  Club	  has	  little	  reason	  to	  give	  up	  its	  backing	  for	  an	  ad	  hoc	  system	  dominated	  by	  incremental	  contractual	  improvements.	  	   The	  vagaries	  of	  the	  contemporary	  bond	  market	  also	  reveal	  that	  the	  Paris	  Club	  is	  less	  central	  to	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  “when	  flows	  of	  official	  capital	  to	  the	  emerging	  market	  countries	  stagnated,	  but	  flows	  of	  private	  capital	  surged,”	  the	  Club	  began	  to	  switch	  its	  role	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  from	  that	  of	  a	  direct	  lender	  to	  a	  more	  nebulous	  influencer,	  using	  its	  status	  as	  a	  central	  forum	  for	  official	  creditors	  to	  issue	  signals	  to	  the	  market	  and	  make	  recommendations	  for	  private	  contract	  enforcement.171	  This	  new	  position,	  reflected	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph’s	  discussion	  of	  debt	  sustainability	  and	  court	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interference,	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  the	  Club’s	  replacement	  foundation,	  since	  Rieffel	  observes	  that	  “the	  dominance	  of	  private	  flows	  is	  expected	  to	  prevail	  indefinitely.”172	  The	  result	  is	  a	  creditor’s	  forum	  that	  increasingly	  relies	  on	  market	  solutions	  to	  prevent	  future	  debt	  crises,	  even	  as	  the	  frequency	  of	  those	  very	  scenarios,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  for	  debt	  reduction	  among	  certain	  middle	  and	  low-­‐income	  countries,	  remains	  high.	  	  	  
III.	  Creditor	  Governments	  and	  Their	  Courts	  	   With	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  O’Neill’s	  push	  for	  an	  SDRM	  –	  and	  even	  then,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Treasury	  took	  significant	  measures	  to	  counteract	  his	  public	  statements	  –	  representatives	  of	  the	  G-­‐7	  have	  rarely	  expressed	  support	  for	  a	  coherent,	  permanent	  alternative	  to	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  machinery.173	  A	  veteran	  of	  the	  1970s	  UNCTAD	  debt	  showdowns	  would	  observe	  that	  the	  position	  of	  developed	  countries	  on	  sovereign	  debt	  workouts	  has	  barely	  budged	  over	  the	  past	  forty	  years,	  although	  “market	  solutions”	  are	  now	  qualified	  with	  collective	  action	  recommendations	  and	  increasingly	  consist	  of	  retail	  investor	  involvement	  in	  place	  of	  official	  lending.	  The	  response	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  Germany,	  and	  Japan	  to	  the	  UN’S	  “Basic	  Principles”	  is	  a	  textbook	  example	  of	  the	  stonewalling	  that	  derailed	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  proposals	  during	  their	  original	  UNCTAD-­‐mediated	  campaign	  against	  ad	  hoc	  restructuring:	  despite	  developing	  country	  concerns	  that	  existing	  forums	  for	  debt	  workouts	  allow	  creditor	  governments	  to	  “control	  the	  arbitration,”	  developed	  countries	  continue	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Paris	  Club	  are	  the	  most	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  Rieffel,	  L.	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  pp.	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  Snow,	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appropriate	  debt	  management	  venues.174	  Additionally,	  the	  United	  States	  remains	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  any	  document	  –	  including	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  –	  that	  suggests	  “countries	  have	  the	  unilateral	  right	  to	  restructure	  their	  debt,”	  considering	  debt	  reduction	  has	  attained	  a	  level	  of	  acceptance	  not	  witnessed	  during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.175	  	  	   Creditor	  governments’	  consistent	  adherence	  to	  the	  ongoing	  ad	  hoc	  regime	  has	  not	  been	  without	  its	  fluctuations,	  however.	  G-­‐7	  financial	  architects	  played	  a	  very	  active	  part	  in	  creating	  Bank	  Advisory	  Committees	  and	  bolstering	  the	  London	  Club	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  loans	  crisis,	  taking	  deliberate	  measures	  to	  sustain	  noninflationary	  growth	  in	  developed	  countries	  while	  pushing	  the	  IMF	  and	  other	  international	  financial	  institutions	  to	  provide	  financing	  for	  buybacks,	  bond	  collateral,	  and	  other	  enhancements.176	  Brady	  Bonds	  thus	  constitute	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  very	  hands-­‐on	  period	  for	  creditor	  governments,	  all	  of	  which	  recognized	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  refinancing	  alone	  and	  encouraged	  the	  IMF	  to	  develop	  cooperative	  procedures	  involving	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  private	  creditor	  institutions,	  and	  official	  agencies.177	  However,	  the	  involvement	  of	  creditor	  governments	  in	  such	  “contingent	  strategies”	  did	  not	  survive	  the	  1990s,	  as	  G-­‐7	  leaders	  sought	  to	  incorporate	  bondholders	  into	  rescue	  operations	  to	  help	  indebted	  sovereigns	  avoid	  default.	  Instead,	  this	  hard-­‐line	  policy	  on	  private	  sector	  involvement	  resulted	  in	  poor	  communications	  between	  the	  G-­‐7,	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  creditor	  banks,	  and	  bondholders,	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especially	  since	  the	  latter	  were	  routinely	  left	  out	  of	  consultations,	  and,	  unlike	  the	  more	  experienced	  private	  financial	  institutions,	  did	  not	  take	  kindly	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “forced	  restructuring”	  mandated	  by	  a	  small	  collection	  of	  governing	  mechanisms.178	  Argentina’s	  collapse	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  final	  straw:	  nothing	  illustrates	  the	  death	  knell	  of	  the	  G-­‐7’s	  heavy-­‐handed	  strategy	  better	  than	  bondholders	  exiting	  on	  a	  mass	  scale	  despite	  the	  IMF’s	  continued	  commitment	  to	  pump	  money	  into	  the	  struggling	  debtor.	  	  	   From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  G-­‐7’s	  frustration	  with	  the	  IMF’s	  failures	  in	  Argentina	  and	  other	  middle-­‐income	  developing	  countries	  also	  stemmed	  from	  the	  Fund’s	  lack	  of	  a	  coherent	  debt	  management	  strategy	  in	  the	  2001	  –	  2002	  Argentine	  aftermath.	  The	  IMF’s	  Anne	  Krueger	  took	  the	  wrong	  lessons	  from	  the	  G-­‐7’s	  pressure,	  since	  despite	  creditor	  governments’	  acknowledgements	  that	  debt	  workouts	  required	  reform,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  any	  political	  willpower	  existed	  to	  throw	  off	  decades	  of	  ad	  hoc	  policies	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  permanent	  mechanism.	  Brad	  Setser	  is	  therefore	  correct	  when	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  SDRM’s	  collapse	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  technical	  complexities	  as	  it	  was	  a	  failure	  to	  translate	  general	  principles	  among	  stakeholder	  governments	  into	  a	  palatable	  political	  arrangement.179	  Additionally,	  the	  SDRM	  put	  the	  G-­‐7	  in	  a	  bind	  between	  their	  commitments	  to	  protect	  private	  creditor	  interests	  and	  their	  fears	  that	  domestic	  taxpayers	  would	  have	  to	  cover	  foreign	  countries’	  economic	  rescue	  packages,	  converting	  disinterest	  in	  a	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sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  into	  an	  outright	  aversion.180	  It	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  creditor	  governments’	  post-­‐SDRM	  dispositions	  remain	  reliant	  on	  the	  market	  principle,	  since	  an	  ad	  hoc	  system	  based	  predominantly	  on	  private	  contracts	  and	  generalized	  institutional	  guidance	  prevents	  developed	  countries	  from	  having	  to	  choose	  between	  their	  financial	  centers	  and	  their	  taxpaying	  citizenry.	  	  	   If	  the	  SDRM	  startled	  creditor	  governments,	  it	  also	  upended	  their	  roles	  as	  agenda-­‐setters.	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  restructuring	  proposal,	  the	  G-­‐7	  thought	  of	  the	  SDRM	  as	  a	  benign,	  if	  not	  entirely	  necessary,	  attempt	  to	  “scale	  back	  large	  IMF	  rescue	  loans	  and	  to	  force	  the	  IMF	  to	  return	  to	  its	  original	  limits”	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  mechanism	  for	  correcting	  the	  moral	  hazard	  dilemma	  made	  clear	  by	  Argentina’s	  collapse	  and	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  1990s.181	  By	  2003,	  the	  consensus	  on	  the	  SDRM’s	  structure	  was	  much	  less	  pronounced.	  While	  some	  creditor	  countries,	  including	  France,	  continued	  to	  discuss	  the	  merits	  of	  an	  international	  regime	  that	  reduced	  aggregate	  litigation	  costs	  and	  utilized	  supermajority	  voting	  to	  approve	  debtor	  countries’	  debt	  restructuring	  plans,	  the	  United	  States	  Treasury	  noted	  that	  the	  SDRM	  had	  achieved	  its	  desired	  effect	  by	  proposing	  to	  override	  existing	  bond	  documentation.182	  Mexico’s	  shift	  to	  preferred	  clauses,	  along	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury’s	  own	  prioritization	  of	  enhanced	  bond	  contracts,	  highlighted	  the	  “new	  market	  standard”	  of	  aggregated	  voting	  and	  CACs	  even	  as	  it	  undermined	  years	  of	  creditor	  government-­‐influenced	  precedent.183	  Uruguay’s	  successful	  post-­‐SDRM	  restructuring,	  for	  example,	  undermined	  the	  IMF’s	  case	  for	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	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Fund’s	  Articles	  but	  also	  demonstrated	  how	  creditors	  could	  act,	  without	  public	  backing,	  to	  present	  a	  coherent	  representation	  to	  a	  debtor	  sovereign	  at	  the	  bargaining	  table.184	  U.S.	  leadership	  may	  have	  pointed	  to	  these	  more	  recent	  market	  norms	  as	  indicators	  that	  Krueger’s	  holdout	  fears	  were	  overblown;	  the	  Bush	  administration	  may	  as	  well	  have	  proclaimed	  the	  era	  of	  creditor	  government	  intervention,	  embodied	  by	  the	  IMF’s	  bank-­‐herding	  role	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis,	  to	  be	  in	  its	  twilight	  years.	  	  	   The	  legal	  Gordion’s	  Knot	  leading	  up	  to	  Argentina’s	  2014	  default	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  counterfactuals	  to	  developed	  countries’	  market	  complacency.	  Although	  the	  premature	  failure	  of	  the	  “market	  system	  with	  IMF	  assistance”	  framework	  stemmed	  from	  Argentina’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  economic	  programs,	  the	  2005	  and	  2010	  restructurings	  blew	  the	  lid	  off	  creditor	  governments’	  assumptions	  that	  contract	  innovation	  would	  incentivize	  bargaining	  behavior	  among	  retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds.	  Instead,	  the	  preponderance	  of	  new	  clauses	  and	  legal	  devices,	  including	  Elliott	  Management’s	  unusual	  use	  of	  inter-­‐creditor	  equity	  arrangements	  to	  extract	  the	  face	  value	  of	  Argentine	  bonds,	  has	  actually	  reinforced	  holdout	  scenarios	  at	  a	  time	  when	  governments	  are	  largely	  unwilling	  to	  reorganize	  the	  debt	  market.	  The	  potential	  for	  further	  hiccups	  in	  future	  debt	  deals	  has	  led	  scholars	  of	  the	  financial	  world’s	  political	  economy,	  such	  as	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania’s	  William	  Bratton	  and	  Duke	  University’s	  G.	  Mitu	  Gulati,	  to	  suggest	  that	  “strengthened”	  contracts	  enable	  creditors	  and	  savvy	  debtor	  sovereigns	  alike	  to	  use	  newly	  introduced	  provisions	  as	  smoke	  screens	  for	  rejecting	  or	  violating	  established	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agreements.185	  Weaknesses	  in	  an	  improved	  ad	  hoc	  system,	  then,	  appear	  to	  stem	  from	  the	  apparently	  self-­‐negating	  aims	  of	  collective	  action	  clauses	  and	  similar	  instruments:	  in	  Greece,	  and	  again	  for	  a	  brief	  period	  during	  the	  Argentine	  restructuring	  process,	  minority	  groups	  of	  shareholders	  were	  able	  to	  short-­‐circuit	  bond	  renegotiations	  by	  either	  using	  enhanced	  contracts	  to	  secure	  haircut	  exemption,	  or,	  more	  successfully,	  overriding	  parts	  of	  a	  restructuring	  deal	  by	  accumulating	  a	  large	  share	  in	  a	  single	  bond	  series.186	  	  	   A	  great	  irony	  of	  creditor	  government’s	  laissez	  faire	  approach	  to	  the	  sovereign	  bond	  market	  is	  that,	  almost	  by	  necessity	  of	  financial	  law,	  New	  York,	  London,	  and	  Paris	  have	  become	  important	  battlegrounds	  over	  litigation	  instead	  of	  policy.	  Creditor	  nations’	  courts	  are	  therefore	  tasked	  with	  ironing	  out	  the	  contradictions	  and	  competing	  interests	  of	  debt	  restructurings	  constituting	  hundreds,	  if	  not	  thousands,	  of	  individual	  bondholders.	  This	  process	  is	  messy,	  and,	  as	  the	  specifics	  of	  Argentina’s	  2014	  default	  highlight,	  it	  is	  also	  much	  less	  predictable	  than	  outcomes	  mediated	  by	  other	  institutional	  routes.	  	  	   The	  role	  of	  creditor	  countries’	  judicial	  systems	  in	  contract	  enforcement	  and	  dispute	  resolution	  has	  expanded	  as	  sovereign	  immunity,	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine,	  and	  international	  comity	  norms	  have	  faded	  away.	  The	  U.S.’s	  evolving	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  definition	  of	  “commercial	  activities”	  as	  undertaken	  by	  sovereign	  states,	  underscores	  the	  emerging	  political	  differences	  between	  debtor	  governments	  and	  a	  contemporary	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vein	  of	  financial	  law.	  Argentina’s	  case	  before	  the	  New	  York	  district	  court	  floundered	  precisely	  because	  the	  country’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act	  failed	  to	  incorporate	  precedent	  established	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  “suspending	  payments	  on	  debt	  contracts	  that	  call	  for	  payment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  entails	  direct	  effects	  within	  the	  United	  States	  sufficient	  to	  satisfy	  the	  U.S.	  nexus	  requirement	  under	  the	  FSIA.”187	  In	  a	  twist	  of	  fate,	  the	  same	  SDRM	  detractors	  who	  feared	  their	  sovereignty	  would	  be	  violated	  by	  an	  international	  bond	  tribunal	  now	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  arguing	  for	  immunity	  privileges	  in	  the	  courts	  of	  their	  long-­‐standing	  debt	  opponents.	  Additionally,	  a	  string	  of	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  court	  cases	  –	  from	  Republic	  of	  Argentina	  v.	  Weltover	  to	  Allied	  Bank	  International	  v.	  Banco	  Credito	  
Agricola	  de	  Cartago	  –	  found	  most	  aspects	  of	  debt	  restructuring	  or	  default	  to	  be	  as	  justiciable	  as	  if	  a	  private	  debtor	  had	  entered	  into	  bankruptcy	  under	  domestic	  law;	  Ugo	  Panniza,	  Federico	  Sturzenegger,	  and	  Jeromin	  Zettelmeyer	  are	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  U.S.	  courts	  in	  particular	  are	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  “defaulting	  on	  debtors	  payable	  in	  international	  jurisdictions	  is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  sovereign	  act	  worthy	  of	  judicial	  deference.”188	  With	  most	  national	  treatment	  procedures	  eroding	  bit	  by	  bit	  in	  each	  court	  case,	  debtors	  and	  some	  public	  creditor	  interests,	  including	  a	  small	  contingent	  of	  beaten-­‐down	  reformists	  in	  the	  IMF,	  are	  sensibly	  concerned	  that	  the	  emerging	  legal	  framework	  is	  encouraging	  holdout	  actors	  by	  reducing	  the	  transaction	  costs	  and	  barriers	  of	  litigation	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  than	  the	  establishment	  of	  collective	  action	  incentives	  across	  bond	  series.	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   Perhaps	  even	  more	  troublingly,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  creditor	  countries’	  courts	  are	  sufficiently	  well	  versed	  in	  the	  application	  of	  bond	  contract	  enhancements	  to	  create	  socially	  efficient	  outcomes	  from	  debt	  controversies.	  At	  the	  very	  outset	  of	  collective	  action	  clauses,	  New	  York	  courts	  focused	  on	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  instruments	  and	  activities	  related	  to	  the	  litigating	  creditor,	  notably	  the	  “Champerty	  Law”	  that	  prohibited	  litigation	  on	  a	  claim	  purchased	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  lawsuit,	  and	  the	  behaviors	  of	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  including	  whether	  it	  appeared	  a	  sovereign	  would	  be	  taking	  a	  free	  ride	  on	  debt	  workouts	  agreed	  to	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  creditors.189	  As	  a	  result,	  despite	  holdout	  successes	  such	  as	  Elliott’s	  1996	  victory	  over	  Peru,190	  attempts	  to	  block	  restructuring	  negotiations	  or	  debt	  exchanges	  through	  legal	  conflicts	  were	  not	  extremely	  common	  or	  fruitful	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  bondholders	  transitioned	  from	  institutional	  investors	  to	  retail	  and	  hedge	  fund	  claimants.	  The	  2012	  Argentine	  affair,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  broadened	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  courts	  by	  focusing	  on	  all	  creditor-­‐debtor	  transactions	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  specialized,	  if	  poorly	  understood,	  clauses:	  Griesa’s	  pari	  passu	  interpretation,	  for	  example,	  rejected	  a	  limited	  vision	  of	  inter-­‐creditor	  equity	  as	  a	  protection	  against	  a	  debtor’s	  attempts	  to	  “legislatively	  subordinate	  the	  claims	  of	  one	  group	  of	  creditors	  relative	  to	  another	  group	  of	  similarly	  situated	  creditors”	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  took	  payment	  activities	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  indicators	  of	  creditor	  favoritism.191	  The	  court’s	  “clarification”	  of	  inter-­‐creditor	  equity	  practices	  disrupted	  not	  just	  debtors’	  faith	  in	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their	  existing	  bond	  covenants,	  but	  also	  creditor	  governments’	  hopes	  that	  ex-­‐ante	  contract	  incentives	  could	  independently	  preclude	  holdout	  situations.	  Critically,	  even	  wealthier	  sovereigns	  (Italy	  among	  them)	  felt	  compelled	  to	  alter	  their	  agreements	  in	  the	  fallout	  from	  Griesa’s	  argument,	  a	  flurry	  of	  revisions	  that	  temporarily	  tipped	  the	  political	  momentum	  toward	  UNCTAD’s	  newfound	  criticism	  of	  market	  solutions.192	  	  	   Post-­‐SDRM	  and	  post-­‐Argentina,	  creditor	  countries	  are	  in	  a	  perfect	  storm	  of	  competing	  headwinds:	  while	  there	  is	  no	  institutional	  willpower	  to	  revisit	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism,	  there	  is	  greater	  market	  uncertainty	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  decade	  over	  whether	  sovereigns	  can	  reliably	  restructure	  their	  debts	  without	  starting	  a	  war	  of	  attrition	  with	  increasingly	  empowered	  retail	  and	  hedge	  fund	  investors.	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  creditor	  governments	  and	  their	  courts	  are	  not	  quite	  in	  step,	  since	  holdouts	  pose	  almost	  as	  significant	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  traditional	  interests	  such	  governments	  have	  supported	  as	  they	  do	  for	  debtors.	  In	  this	  environment,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  G-­‐7	  and	  its	  allies,	  while	  welcoming	  of	  a	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  to	  debt	  management,	  may	  not	  have	  fully	  understood	  the	  nuances	  of	  an	  ad	  hoc	  system	  that	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  dominant	  public	  sector	  involvement	  in	  crisis	  resolution.	  Setser	  and	  Roubini’s	  observation	  that	  the	  official	  sector	  may	  have	  abdicated	  its	  assumed	  responsibilities	  during	  the	  Argentine	  crisis	  may	  also	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  developed	  countries’	  struggle	  to	  anticipate	  complex	  (and	  potentially	  court-­‐influenced)	  market	  conditions.193	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IV.	  Private	  Creditors:	  Banks,	  Investors,	  and	  Hedge	  Funds	  	   What	  (and	  who)	  private	  creditors	  actually	  represent	  has	  changed	  remarkably	  since	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.	  At	  the	  height	  of	  the	  1970s	  debate,	  a	  majority	  of	  debtor	  sovereigns	  had	  little	  access	  to	  international	  capital	  markets	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  most	  inflows	  were	  from	  public	  sources.	  The	  exceptions	  to	  public	  financing	  were	  the	  major	  banks	  of	  creditor	  nations,	  which	  from	  World	  War	  II	  until	  the	  appearance	  of	  Brady	  Bonds	  were	  the	  stars	  of	  private	  sector	  lending	  in	  the	  form	  of	  loans.	  Commercial	  bank	  lending	  increased	  sharply	  during	  the	  1970s	  through	  the	  process	  of	  petrodollar	  recycling,	  leading	  to	  ballooning	  debts	  among	  oil-­‐importing	  countries	  as	  the	  oil	  squeeze	  took	  its	  toll	  on	  the	  global	  economy.194	  Despite	  acting	  as	  catalysts	  for	  the	  UNCTAD	  debt	  fight,	  however,	  commercial	  banks	  did	  not	  register	  as	  significant	  participants	  in	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  framework,	  instead	  playing	  second	  fiddle	  to	  the	  Paris	  Club	  and	  its	  official	  backers	  during	  negotiations	  over	  debt	  relief	  and	  retroactive	  terms	  adjustment.	  	  	   The	  London	  Club	  remains	  creditor	  banks’	  most	  visible	  ad	  hoc	  mechanism	  for	  debt	  workouts,	  although	  the	  Club’s	  current	  iteration	  is	  far	  less	  important	  than	  the	  advisory	  and	  restructuring	  enforcement	  role	  it	  fulfilled	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis.	  Its	  weakened	  stature	  is	  a	  function	  of	  Brady	  Bonds	  themselves:	  the	  write-­‐offs	  associated	  with	  converting	  loans	  to	  bonds,	  even	  with	  an	  end	  result	  of	  financial	  stability	  for	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  increased	  banks’	  risk	  assessments	  of	  emerging	  market	  governments	  and	  made	  large	  institutions,	  such	  as	  Citibank	  and	  Bank	  of	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America,	  increasingly	  reticent	  to	  reenter	  public	  finance	  in	  developing	  countries.195	  As	  Rieffel	  writes,	  “commercial	  bank	  lending	  is	  more	  naturally	  directed	  to	  private	  sector	  borrowers,”	  with	  the	  London	  Club	  acting	  as	  a	  legacy	  institution	  for	  unresolved	  or	  ongoing	  private	  loan	  programs	  instead	  of	  its	  former	  position	  as	  a	  private	  sector	  executor	  of	  IMF	  or	  Paris	  Club-­‐mediated	  restructuring	  initiatives.196	  	  	   Commercial	  banks	  made	  a	  short	  comeback	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  the	  SDRM	  debate	  demonstrates	  that	  by	  the	  time	  a	  revision	  to	  the	  existing	  IMF	  mandate	  was	  conceived,	  individual	  bondholders	  and	  investors	  had	  superseded	  banks	  as	  debtor	  sovereigns’	  most	  involved	  claimants.	  Aside	  from	  feeling	  the	  effects	  of	  augmented	  risk,	  banks	  were	  also	  burned	  by	  the	  G-­‐7’s	  emphasis	  on	  debt	  forgiveness	  as	  a	  viable	  avenue	  for	  several	  Latin	  American	  countries;	  Nicaragua’s	  1995	  program,	  for	  instance,	  required	  that	  commercial	  banks	  absorb	  a	  90	  percent	  reduction	  in	  the	  debtor’s	  payments	  even	  though	  a	  corresponding	  Paris	  Club	  deal	  had	  only	  axed	  55	  percent	  of	  public	  creditors’	  bond	  values.197	  The	  sovereign	  debt	  market	  was	  therefore	  too	  fraught	  with	  political	  externalities	  for	  banks	  to	  continue	  participating,	  although	  the	  same	  uncertainty,	  along	  with	  the	  prevalence	  of	  high-­‐interest	  and	  junk	  bonds,	  made	  the	  debt	  market	  a	  desirable	  playground	  for	  hedge	  funds	  as	  well	  as	  an	  intriguing	  sector	  for	  mutual	  funds	  to	  increase	  portfolio	  earnings.	  	  	   Retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds	  currently	  carry	  the	  most	  private	  sector	  weight	  in	  debt	  discussions,	  but,	  unlike	  creditor	  banks,	  they	  consist	  of	  multiple	  voices	  with	  differing	  intentions	  broken	  along	  jurisdictional	  and	  regional	  lines	  as	  well	  as	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broader	  political	  and	  economic	  goals.	  The	  IMF’s	  SDRM	  constituted	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  private	  bondholders,	  since	  many	  investors	  understood	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  moral	  hazard	  but	  failed	  to	  see	  why	  a	  permanent	  resolution	  forum	  would	  do	  the	  trick.	  Instead,	  bondholders	  argued	  that	  the	  IMF	  had	  opened	  a	  Pandora’s	  box	  by	  “bailing	  out”	  countries	  with	  geostrategic	  significance,	  hence	  developing	  countries’	  fears	  that	  private	  investors	  would	  drop	  their	  holdings	  if	  the	  SDRM’s	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Forum	  or	  majority	  shareholder	  provisions	  smacked	  of	  too	  much	  tolerance	  for	  outright	  debt	  repudiation.198	  Furthermore,	  unlike	  conservative	  economists	  within	  the	  IMF	  and	  most	  G-­‐7	  countries’	  official	  stances,	  private	  investors’	  organizations	  were	  reluctant	  to	  institute	  CACs	  in	  new	  bond	  contracts	  for	  fear	  of	  “signaling	  that	  they	  contemplate	  or	  countenance	  an	  eventual	  default.”199	  While	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury’s	  support	  for	  CACs,	  combined	  with	  Brazil	  and	  Mexico’s	  contract	  innovations	  in	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  atmosphere,	  effectively	  forced	  private	  bondholders	  to	  fall	  in	  line,	  Arturo	  Porzecanski	  notes	  that	  a	  contingent	  of	  investors	  remain	  philosophically	  opposed	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “smooth	  restructuring.”200	  Their	  argument,	  which	  interprets	  ad	  hoc	  reform	  efforts	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  slippery	  slope	  toward	  “reform	  fatigue”	  and	  fiscal	  indiscipline	  among	  debtor	  sovereigns,	  not	  only	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Kruegerian	  efforts	  to	  address	  creditor	  coordination	  difficulties,	  but	  has	  also	  been	  invoked	  by	  holdouts,	  notably	  Paul	  Singer,	  who	  justify	  their	  litigation	  on	  disciplinary	  grounds.	  This	  cadre	  of	  debt	  holders	  ends	  up	  creating	  a	  headache	  for	  creditor	  governments	  as	  well	  as	  negotiating	  debtors.	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   Argentina’s	  recent	  debt	  conundrum	  illustrates	  two	  additional	  components	  of	  private	  investors’	  activities.	  First,	  investors	  are	  incredulous	  that	  the	  nightmare	  2001-­‐2002	  Argentine	  scenario,	  with	  IMF	  lending	  occurring	  beyond	  any	  economic	  rationale,	  can	  be	  resolved	  through	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  or	  contract	  enhancements.	  Bondholders’	  alternate	  directive,	  represented	  by	  the	  viewpoints	  of	  ABN	  AMRO’s	  Emerging	  Markets	  Sovereign	  Research	  division,	  is	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  G-­‐7	  should	  “scale	  back	  the	  official	  financial	  support	  made	  available	  to	  errant	  [debtor]	  nations.”201	  In	  effect,	  even	  though	  private	  investors	  remain	  skeptical	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  creditor	  governments’	  support	  for	  contract	  innovations,	  they	  find	  themselves	  in	  close	  alliance	  with	  the	  G-­‐7	  over	  a	  shared	  distaste	  for	  IMF-­‐sponsored	  rescues.	  	   Second,	  the	  Argentine	  holdout	  scenario	  has	  diminished	  investor	  confidence	  in	  the	  application	  of	  New	  York	  bond	  contracts	  and	  widened	  the	  cleavages	  among	  retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds.	  	  Elliott’s	  pari	  passu	  upset	  stranded	  close	  to	  93%	  of	  all	  of	  Argentina’s	  creditors,	  giving	  rise	  to	  an	  unusual	  circumstance	  in	  which	  the	  Argentine	  state,	  despite	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  its	  interest	  payments	  on	  restructured	  debts,	  was	  unable	  to	  convince	  its	  trustee	  bank	  to	  release	  the	  country’s	  funds	  to	  creditors	  in	  time	  to	  avoid	  a	  selective	  default.202	  For	  investors	  lacking	  the	  financial	  or	  legal	  backing	  to	  engage	  in	  long-­‐term	  litigation,	  the	  Argentine	  case	  is	  a	  scary	  precedent	  for	  bonds	  issued	  under	  New	  York	  law.	  Even	  the	  American	  Bankers	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Association,	  an	  original	  proponent	  of	  earlier	  pro-­‐bondholder	  Champerty	  Law	  rulings	  and	  creditor	  rights	  enforcement,	  has	  warned	  that	  Griesa’s	  revised	  implementation	  of	  the	  equal	  terms	  provision	  could	  enable	  a	  single	  creditor	  to	  “undermine	  the	  decades	  of	  effort	  the	  United	  States	  has	  expended	  to	  encourage	  a	  system	  of	  cooperative	  resolution	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  crises.”203	  	  In	  the	  post-­‐Argentina	  environment,	  creditors	  can	  be	  reliably	  grouped	  into	  two	  broad	  factions:	  the	  first,	  composed	  of	  larger	  hedge	  funds,	  is	  opposed	  to	  bond	  write-­‐downs,	  especially	  for	  countries	  (including	  Argentina)	  that	  exhibited	  strong	  economic	  growth	  and	  increased	  bond	  values	  almost	  concurrently	  with	  supposedly	  necessary	  restructuring	  processes.	  This	  group	  of	  “vulture	  funds”	  has	  found	  its	  most	  prominent	  ally	  in	  the	  American	  court	  system,	  embodied	  by	  the	  New	  York	  Second	  Court’s	  admonishment	  that	  “the	  interest	  –	  one	  widely	  shared	  in	  the	  financial	  community	  –	  in	  maintaining	  New	  York’s	  status	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  financial	  centers	  is	  advanced	  by	  requiring	  debtors,	  including	  foreign	  debtors,	  to	  repay	  their	  debts.”204	  The	  second	  loose	  coalition,	  constituting	  a	  numerical	  majority	  of	  bondholders	  if	  not	  always	  a	  proportionally	  large	  amount	  of	  financial	  holdings,	  is	  much	  more	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  restructuring	  negotiations	  with	  debtor	  sovereigns.	  These	  creditors	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  hindsight	  when	  advocating	  for	  restructurings	  free	  of	  litigation:	  those	  who	  held	  their	  noses	  and	  went	  through	  the	  2005	  and	  2010	  restructurings	  received	  a	  135	  percent	  return	  on	  their	  bonds	  in	  2015,	  a	  performance	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far	  exceeding	  the	  realized	  returns	  on	  litigating	  hedge	  funds’	  holdings.205	  For	  what	  it	  is	  worth,	  the	  anti-­‐litigation	  crowd	  also	  has	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  creditor	  banks	  on	  their	  side,	  providing	  a	  much-­‐needed	  political	  element	  of	  support	  as	  well	  as	  an	  economic	  rationale	  for	  participating	  in	  debt	  management	  procedures.	  	   In	  this	  respect,	  continued	  New	  York	  court	  deference	  to	  holdouts’	  appeals	  threatens	  to	  stall	  repayment	  to	  most	  creditors,	  especially	  if	  further	  rulings	  draw	  from	  the	  broadest	  interpretation	  of	  pari	  passu	  and	  Rights	  Upon	  Future	  Offers	  (RUFO)	  clauses.206	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  potentially	  disadvantaged	  investors	  have	  fought	  back	  against	  potential	  holdouts,	  however,	  most	  proposals	  mirror	  the	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  debtor	  countries	  in	  creating	  “workarounds”	  to	  block	  future	  injunctions.	  Fordham	  University’s	  Natalie	  Turchi	  recently	  argued	  that	  “a	  contractual	  solution	  targeted	  at	  preventing	  vulture	  fund	  investors	  from	  access	  to	  pari	  passu	  injunctive	  relief	  coupled	  with	  creative	  restructuring	  strategies	  for	  outstanding	  bonds	  awaiting	  maturity”	  can	  help	  diminish	  holdout	  leverage	  while	  preserving	  creditor	  rights	  against	  coercive	  exchange	  terms	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  debtor	  sovereign.207	  Similarly,	  the	  International	  Capital	  Market	  Association	  used	  the	  Argentine	  default	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  disavow	  ratable	  payment,	  ensuring	  that	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anticipated	  creditor	  equity	  disputes	  would	  not	  treat	  engaged	  bondholders	  and	  holdouts	  under	  the	  same	  legal	  conditions.208	  	  	   Non-­‐holdouts’	  responses	  to	  the	  Argentine	  debt	  debacle	  demonstrate	  just	  how	  entrenched	  the	  ad	  hoc	  model	  remains	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	  private	  bondholders.	  Although	  sovereign	  debt	  bears	  somewhat	  higher	  political	  and	  market	  risks	  than	  it	  did	  under	  a	  cohesive	  system	  of	  financial	  institutions	  guided	  by	  Banking	  Advisory	  Committees,	  the	  creditors	  who	  supposedly	  gain	  the	  most	  from	  an	  SDRM	  –	  retail	  investors	  without	  the	  means	  or	  knowledge	  to	  avoid	  coercion	  from	  other	  players	  at	  the	  bargaining	  table	  –	  do	  not	  consider	  a	  permanent	  restructuring	  regime,	  or	  even	  an	  official	  sector	  review	  of	  existing	  debt	  practices,	  to	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  their	  needs.	  This	  much	  is	  illustrated	  by	  UNCTAD’s	  complete	  failure	  to	  pique	  private	  creditor	  interest	  in	  its	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Processes,	  as	  the	  UN’s	  overt	  declarations	  that	  “no	  creditor	  or	  creditor	  groups	  should	  be	  excluded	  ex	  ante	  from	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  process”	  or	  “sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  agreements	  that	  are	  approved	  by	  a	  qualified	  majority	  of	  the	  creditors	  of	  a	  State	  are	  not	  to	  be	  affected,	  jeopardized	  or	  otherwise	  impeded	  by	  other	  States	  or	  a	  non-­‐representative	  minority	  of	  creditors”	  only	  managed	  to	  confirm	  the	  status	  quo	  that	  had	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  Argentine	  holdout	  crisis.209	  	  	   Retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  collection	  of	  actors,	  are	  keen	  on	  letting	  the	  market	  determine	  winners	  and	  losers	  in	  the	  sovereign	  debt	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sector,	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  creditor	  governments	  to	  hesitate	  at	  restructurings	  and	  enhanced	  contractual	  arrangements	  for	  indebted	  sovereigns	  with	  a	  spotty	  debt	  record.	  Nevertheless,	  most	  private	  creditors	  have	  tacitly	  played	  along	  with	  developed	  countries’	  push	  for	  strengthened	  contract	  enforcement,	  if	  only	  to	  present	  a	  united	  front	  when	  arguing	  for	  creditors’	  rights	  against	  unilateral	  debtor	  actions	  like	  Argentina’s	  2005	  and	  2010	  restructurings.210	  Whether	  the	  same	  cohesion	  exists	  for	  enhanced	  clauses	  affecting	  creditor	  interaction	  is	  a	  function	  of	  ongoing	  litigation	  incentives	  for	  holdouts,	  the	  dispositions	  of	  American	  courts	  toward	  noncompliant	  bondholders,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  other	  private	  investors	  to	  balance	  their	  conservative	  support	  for	  an	  ad	  hoc	  restructuring	  system	  with	  the	  need	  to	  occasionally	  anticipate	  and	  resolve	  contractual	  loopholes.	  	  
	  
V.	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  The	  Group	  of	  77	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  and	  Trade	  and	  Development	  lost	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  political	  clout	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  as	  their	  eventual	  compromise	  codifying	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  debt	  workout	  procedures	  in	  a	  UN	  resolution	  dismantled	  a	  brewing	  revolt	  among	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries.	  The	  Basic	  Principles’	  fate	  poetically	  replicates	  the	  same	  process,	  down	  to	  the	  codification	  of	  already-­‐established	  norms,	  and	  hints	  at	  the	  UN’s	  struggles	  to	  attain	  long-­‐standing	  relevance	  in	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  debate.	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  Cruces,	  Juan	  and	  Tim	  Samples.	  “Time	  to	  Settle	  Sovereign	  Debt’s	  ‘Trial	  of	  the	  Century’?”	  The	  
Columbia	  Law	  School	  Blue	  Sky	  Blog,	  26	  Jan.	  2016.	  Web.	  24	  Feb.	  2016.	  http://clsbluesky.law.	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G-­‐77	  countries	  and	  their	  supporters	  may	  rank	  among	  the	  original	  proponents	  of	  a	  UN-­‐mediated	  permanent	  restructuring	  mechanism,	  but	  shared	  convictions	  among	  G-­‐77	  membership	  have	  faded	  over	  time.	  In	  particular,	  emerging	  economies	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  East	  Asia,	  including	  Brazil	  and	  China,	  are	  sensitive	  to	  how	  creditor	  banks	  and	  bondholders	  perceive	  a	  political	  willingness	  to	  repay	  debts,	  especially	  since	  their	  economies	  are	  significantly	  exposed	  to	  international	  capital	  flows.	  These	  countries’	  emerging	  caution	  has	  led	  them	  to	  implicitly	  side	  with	  private	  creditors	  on	  a	  number	  of	  enforcement	  issues,	  from	  disapproval	  of	  a	  “debtors’	  cartel”	  to	  skepticism	  regarding	  the	  practical	  applications	  of	  CACs.211	  The	  contemporary	  G-­‐77	  is	  thus	  split	  between	  a	  more	  “extreme”	  segment	  of	  governments	  and	  economists,	  some	  of	  whom	  continue	  to	  favor	  the	  prospect	  of	  outright	  debt	  repudiation	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  within	  the	  UN,	  and	  a	  growing	  assortment	  of	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  that	  either	  fret	  about	  private	  investors’	  market	  confidence	  or	  worry	  about	  losing	  access	  to	  IMF	  funds	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  debtor-­‐initiated	  restructuring	  regime	  (although	  the	  latter	  concern	  is	  less	  pronounced	  than	  in	  the	  recent	  past).	  Tellingly,	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Conferences	  for	  Financing	  for	  Development,	  held	  by	  the	  UN	  in	  2002	  and	  2008,	  resulted	  in	  several	  abortive	  sovereign	  debt	  frameworks	  as	  the	  G-­‐77	  quickly	  moved	  from	  widespread	  disillusionment	  with	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  to	  unsuccessful	  efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  compromise	  mechanism.212	  The	  Basic	  Principles’	  efforts	  to	  enshrine	  accomplished	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  Panniza,	  U.,	  F.	  Sturzenegger,	  and	  J.	  Zettelmeyer.	  “The	  Economics	  and	  Law	  of	  Sovereign	  Debt	  and	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  “UNCTAD	  Statement	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  the	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  the	  outcome	  document	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  Third	  International	  Conference	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  UNCTAD,	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facts	  within	  the	  debt	  workout	  regime	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  inability	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  another	  comprehensive	  proposal	  to	  replace	  the	  ad	  hoc	  regime,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  European	  interests	  had	  little	  involvement	  with	  the	  Principles’	  drafting	  to	  begin	  with!213	  Perhaps	  owing	  to	  its	  specific	  charge	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  promoting	  developing	  countries’	  development,	  UNCTAD	  has	  largely	  preserved	  its	  pro-­‐debtor	  policy	  stances	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Part	  of	  the	  organization’s	  consistency	  stems	  from	  its	  relative	  lack	  of	  engagement	  in	  the	  debt	  debates	  occurring	  between	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  and	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  Argentine	  meltdown.	  Like	  the	  G-­‐77	  governments	  themselves,	  UNCTAD	  had	  not	  anticipated	  the	  replacement	  of	  loans	  with	  bonds	  over	  a	  period	  as	  short	  of	  a	  decade;	  the	  IMF’s	  coordination	  with	  the	  London	  and	  Paris	  Clubs,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  muscular	  policy	  assumed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  left	  UNCTAD	  with	  a	  bit	  role	  as	  a	  watchdog	  for	  Paris	  Club	  restructurings	  and	  ongoing	  debtors’	  development	  initiatives.214	  In	  the	  world	  of	  Brady	  Bonds,	  the	  UN	  often	  found	  itself	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  bond	  agreements,	  as	  in	  its	  1993	  dispute	  over	  IMF	  numbers	  on	  Argentina’s	  economic	  performance	  and	  outstanding	  obligations.215	  	  A	  more	  substantial	  factor	  contributing	  to	  UNCTAD’s	  immovability	  is	  the	  persistent,	  shared	  belief	  of	  its	  most	  outspoken	  members	  that	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  uniquely	  advantages	  creditors.	  Both	  the	  policy	  battle	  over	  the	  G-­‐77’s	  concept	  of	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  Third	  World	  Network,	  “UN	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  landmark	  resolution	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  principles	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  debt	  restructuring.”	  Committee	  for	  the	  Abolition	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  World	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  http://cadtm.org/UN-­‐adopts-­‐landmark-­‐debt-­‐resolution.	  214	  Griffith-­‐Jones,	  Stephany.	  “The	  Paris	  Club	  and	  the	  Poorer	  Countries.”	  Savings	  and	  Development,	  Vol.	  11	  (2),	  1987.	  Print.	  pp.	  137-­‐139.	  215	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  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  “UNCTAD	  at	  50:	  A	  Short	  History.”	  pp.	  14-­‐15.	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International	  Debt	  Commission	  –	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  “independent	  of	  any	  particular	  country	  or	  group	  of	  countries”	  that	  “must	  enjoy	  impartiality	  and	  the	  confidence	  of	  all	  for…	  its	  inclination	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  developing	  countries”216	  –	  and	  the	  Basic	  Principles’	  emphasis	  on	  “sustained	  and	  inclusive	  economic	  growth”	  reveal	  UNCTAD’s	  deep-­‐seated	  fears	  of	  creditors	  gaining	  the	  ability	  to	  “frustrate”	  or	  “impede”	  the	  macroeconomic	  policies	  of	  debtor	  nations.217	  Second	  to	  none	  in	  its	  traditional	  advocacy	  for	  debtors’	  sovereign	  immunity,	  UNCTAD’s	  distrust	  of	  creditor	  arrangements	  made	  it	  a	  perfect	  forum	  for	  Argentina’s	  Kirchner	  regime	  to	  transform	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  loss	  into	  a	  rallying	  cry	  for	  better	  debtor	  protections,	  even	  if	  the	  ostensible	  aggressors	  were	  private	  hedge	  funds	  and	  not	  the	  typical	  international	  financial	  institution	  “imperialists.”	  It	  therefore	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  a	  flash	  in	  the	  pan	  rather	  than	  a	  catalyst	  for	  policy	  discussions,	  since	  Argentina’s	  case	  dug	  up	  old,	  path-­‐dependent	  rhetoric	  instead	  of	  a	  new	  institutional	  understanding	  for	  recent	  holdout	  phenomena.	  	  While	  the	  G-­‐77	  and	  UNCTAD	  may	  have	  struggled	  to	  convert	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  into	  a	  further	  rehash	  of	  the	  1970s,	  they	  have	  at	  least	  witnessed	  one	  desired	  effect	  of	  the	  debt	  battles	  between	  1980	  and	  2003.	  With	  the	  IMF	  at	  its	  political	  nadir	  following	  its	  SDRM	  failure,	  developing	  countries’	  Stiglitz-­‐infused	  assertions	  that	  the	  Fund	  is	  a	  compromised	  candidate	  for	  a	  permanent	  restructuring	  mechanism	  are	  now	  complemented	  by	  the	  G-­‐7’s	  attempts	  to	  replace	  Fund	  mediation	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  Conference	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  Trade	  and	  Development.	  Report	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  Group	  of	  
Experts	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  Development	  Problems	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  Developing	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  pp.	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  217	  United	  Nations	  Res.	  A/69/L.84,	  “Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	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with	  incremental	  contract	  improvements.	  Argentina’s	  2004	  repudiation	  of	  an	  IMF	  program	  was	  not	  only	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  existing	  agency	  as	  a	  lender	  and	  economic	  advisor,	  but	  also	  mirrored	  UNCTAD’s	  own	  attempts	  to	  sideline	  the	  Fund	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.218	  Likewise,	  Argentina’s	  surprise	  Paris	  Club	  restructuring	  demonstrated	  how	  a	  determined	  debtor	  could	  decouple	  Fund	  conditions	  from	  a	  potential	  workout	  as	  part	  of	  a	  negotiating	  process,	  providing	  a	  rare	  (and	  since,	  unrepeated)	  example	  of	  the	  Lima	  Declaration’s	  vision	  for	  a	  debt	  regime	  that	  “does	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  orderly	  process	  of	  development	  planning	  in	  debtor	  countries.”219	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  story	  for	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  G-­‐77	  is	  a	  laundry	  list	  of	  bad	  news.	  First,	  the	  divide	  between	  creditor	  governments	  and	  their	  courts	  over	  bond	  contract	  clauses	  suggests	  that	  standard	  diplomatic	  avenues	  for	  debt	  management	  are	  less	  consequential	  than	  during	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue.	  Much	  of	  this	  transition	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  public	  financing	  to	  creditor	  banks	  to	  small	  private	  investors,	  although	  litigation,	  once	  the	  “nuclear	  option”	  for	  aggrieved	  creditors,	  now	  looks	  likely	  to	  play	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  setting	  future	  bond	  arrangements.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  international	  code	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring,	  debtors	  may	  see	  the	  prospect	  of	  issuing	  bonds	  under	  another	  country’s	  national	  legal	  system	  to	  be	  much	  riskier	  than	  adopting	  local	  law,	  even	  if	  such	  laws	  are	  insufficiently	  robust	  to	  instill	  confidence	  in	  investors.220	  Argentina’s	  desperate	  attempt	  to	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  Conference	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  136.	  220	  “The	  Pari	  Passu	  Clause	  and	  the	  Argentine	  Case.”	  Allen	  &	  Overy	  Global	  Law	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  27	  Dec.	  2012.	  Print.	  pp.	  6.	  	  
	   McConnell	  91	  
reorganize	  its	  debts	  in	  the	  weeks	  before	  its	  technical	  default	  represents	  one	  type	  of	  nightmare	  for	  other	  debtor	  sovereigns.	  Second,	  UNCTAD’s	  Basic	  Principles	  were	  a	  non-­‐event.	  The	  most	  contentious	  responses	  to	  the	  resolution	  have	  come	  from	  U.S.	  government	  sources	  and	  largely	  concern	  the	  idea	  that	  debtors	  have	  a	  “right”	  to	  smooth	  restructuring	  agreements,	  language	  that	  creditor	  governments	  equate	  with	  unilateral	  restructurings	  and	  sudden	  debt	  repudiation.221	  The	  fact	  that	  UNCTAD’s	  most	  visible	  sovereign	  debt	  efforts	  since	  the	  1970s	  have	  produced	  a	  dud	  –	  again	  –	  undermines	  the	  forum’s	  claim	  that	  it	  can	  adequately	  host	  a	  debt	  dispute	  mechanism	  capable	  of	  meeting	  debtor	  needs	  precisely	  because	  UNCTAD	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  central	  platform	  for	  constructing	  debt	  management	  policies	  (nor	  has	  it	  ever	  been	  for	  the	  legal	  structures	  governing	  bonds).	  While	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  another	  crisis	  will	  boost	  UNCTAD’s	  involvement	  in	  sovereign	  debt	  workouts,	  the	  Basic	  Principles’	  effective	  capitulation	  to	  creditor	  countries’	  contractual	  reform	  policies	  is	  likely	  to	  deflate	  debtor	  sovereigns’	  criticisms	  of	  ad	  hoc	  restructurings.	  This	  is	  true	  even	  if	  the	  United	  States	  remains	  isolated	  “as	  the	  most	  serious	  obstacle	  to	  ensuring	  the	  minimum	  political	  space	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  intergovernmental	  discussions	  to	  actually	  take	  place	  within	  the	  UN,”	  since	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  hint	  that	  even	  the	  expulsion	  of	  strong	  creditor	  interests	  from	  resolution	  drafting	  procedures	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  move	  past	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  status	  quo.222	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Third,	  developing	  countries	  have	  ignored	  UNCTAD’s	  distrust	  of	  contract	  enhancements.	  Despite	  UNCTAD	  Secretary-­‐General	  Supachai	  Panitchpakdi’s	  April	  2013	  speech	  railing	  against	  an	  “ad	  hoc	  collection	  of	  arrangements”	  that	  “hinders	  the	  ability	  of	  countries	  to	  quickly	  address	  debt	  difficulties	  when	  they	  arise,”	  emerging	  market	  economies	  generally	  readjusted	  their	  existing	  contracts	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  2012	  Argentine	  pari	  passu	  ruling	  without	  protracted	  negotiation.223	  In	  a	  February	  2015	  Centre	  for	  International	  Governance	  Innovation	  report,	  Gregory	  Makoff	  and	  Robert	  Kahn	  reported	  that	  Mexico,	  Kazakhstan,	  and	  Vietnam	  had	  all	  implemented	  the	  ICMA’s	  proposed	  pari	  passu	  ratable	  payment	  revisions,	  and,	  far	  from	  establishing	  an	  international	  baseline	  for	  future	  adjustments,	  had	  cherry-­‐picked	  the	  trust	  indenture	  or	  fiscal	  agency	  agreement	  structures	  to	  comply	  with	  creditors’	  country-­‐specific	  investment	  concerns.224	  This	  fairly	  quick	  implementation	  of	  a	  “corrected”	  contractual	  mechanism,	  even	  during	  the	  height	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  efforts	  to	  vindicate	  Argentina’s	  selective	  default,	  reflects	  that	  debtor	  governments	  may	  have	  less	  qualms	  about	  a	  market-­‐heavy	  ad	  hoc	  system	  than	  UNCTAD	  leadership.	  A	  cynic	  may	  also	  note	  that	  debtors’	  quiet	  acceptance	  of	  new	  ICMA	  terms	  signals	  a	  curious	  disconnect	  between	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  permanent	  restructuring	  regime	  proponents	  and	  the	  economic	  necessities	  of	  reliable,	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  relationships	  with	  private	  creditors.	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The	  great	  battle	  for	  the	  G-­‐77	  and	  UNCTAD	  going	  forward	  is	  a	  struggle	  to	  stay	  politically	  relevant	  as	  private,	  single-­‐investor	  inflows	  become	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market.225	  In	  some	  respects,	  these	  ad	  hoc	  skeptics	  are	  suffering	  the	  same	  fate	  as	  the	  “creditor-­‐dominated”	  organizations	  they	  oppose:	  with	  international	  financial	  institutions	  transitioning	  to	  an	  advisory	  role	  and	  scaling	  back	  lending	  commitments,	  debtor	  sovereigns	  are	  much	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  haggle	  with	  bondholders	  to	  ensure	  financial	  sustainability.	  In	  turn,	  the	  political	  appetite	  for	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  has	  waned	  –	  after	  all,	  how	  can	  numerous	  bond	  series	  with	  different	  contractual	  legacies	  and	  expectations	  fall	  under	  a	  single,	  impartial	  arbitration	  body?	  Therefore,	  while	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  hiccups	  in	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system	  will	  continue	  to	  fuel	  a	  need	  for	  declarations,	  resolutions,	  and	  other	  diplomatic	  devices	  used	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  creditor	  interests,	  UNCTAD	  and	  G-­‐77	  activities	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  diminished	  corollaries	  to	  an	  evolving	  system	  of	  bond	  governance	  that	  accounts	  for	  economic	  expedience	  and	  private	  sector	  willpower	  over	  official	  sector	  debates.	  	  	  
VI.	  Conclusions	  	  
I.	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Debate	  
	   While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  directly	  compare	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  existing	  ad	  hoc	  system	  with	  a	  series	  of	  intellectual	  or	  aspirational	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  proposals,	  the	  IMF’s	  trepidation	  that	  “chaos”	  could	  result	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  a	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  restructuring	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basis	  for	  the	  post-­‐SDRM	  environment.	  Argentina’s	  creditor	  holdout	  situation	  offers	  one	  way	  in	  which	  the	  market	  for	  sovereign	  debt	  has	  become	  less	  stable	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  codified	  machinery,	  as	  presaged	  in	  Anne	  Krueger’s	  belief	  that	  national	  courts	  could	  replace	  the	  Fund	  and	  the	  Paris	  Club	  as	  the	  principal	  agenda-­‐setters	  for	  bond	  contract	  development.226	  At	  least	  from	  a	  rhetorical	  vantage	  point,	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  State	  Department	  contention	  that	  the	  Argentine	  debt	  ruling	  was	  “impermissibly	  broad”	  and	  “could	  undermine	  the	  decades	  of	  effort	  the	  United	  States	  has	  expended	  to	  encourage	  a	  system	  of	  cooperative	  resolution	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  crises”	  mirrors	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenarios	  played	  out	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  several	  dedicated	  groups	  of	  economists	  at	  think	  tanks	  and	  international	  financial	  institutions	  around	  the	  world.227	  Brookings’	  return	  to	  an	  SDRM	  discussion,	  in	  particular,	  highlights	  how	  even	  developed	  countries’	  civil	  societies	  have	  become	  more	  skittish	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  workouts	  toward	  ex-­‐ante	  clauses	  and	  national	  court	  arbitration.228	  	   Aside	  from	  the	  Argentine	  crisis,	  however,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  read	  chaos	  into	  the	  metamorphosis	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  processes.	  Ad	  hoc	  solutions	  weathered	  the	  joint	  shocks	  of	  the	  jump	  from	  loans	  to	  bonds	  and	  the	  IMF’s	  slide	  from	  chief	  debt	  strategist	  to	  relative	  ignominy	  fairly	  well;	  as	  Anna	  Gelpern	  asserts,	  whereas	  UN	  debates	  have	  often	  “turned	  into…	  endless	  and	  fruitless	  contest[s]	  between	  ‘statute’	  and	  ‘contract,’”	  institution-­‐driven	  norms	  and	  contract	  templates	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have	  been	  much	  more	  effective	  at	  addressing	  lingering	  questions	  regarding	  enforcement	  needs,	  debt	  repudiation,	  and	  collective	  enforcement.229	  It	  is	  unclear,	  in	  fact,	  that	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  mechanism	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  any	  better	  outcomes	  than	  the	  existing	  regime	  established	  through	  bondholder	  interactions.	  Just	  as	  Paris	  Club	  creditors	  organized	  around	  and	  defended	  a	  series	  of	  restructuring	  practices	  in	  the	  1970s,	  or	  commercial	  banks	  organized	  around	  the	  London	  Club	  and	  IMF-­‐supported	  Bank	  Advisory	  Committees	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  bondholders	  are	  uniquely	  incapable	  of	  aggregating	  their	  interests	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  risk	  reduction.	  The	  formation	  of	  bondholder	  committees	  during	  the	  fallout	  of	  Argentina’s	  2001-­‐2002	  economic	  collapse,	  for	  example,	  proves	  that	  private	  investors	  have	  significant	  incentives	  to	  avoid	  inter-­‐creditor	  disputes.230	  Additionally,	  private	  creditors’	  associations,	  most	  visibly	  the	  ICMA,	  have	  successfully	  counteracted	  the	  “disruptive”	  rulings	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Second	  Court	  and	  have	  even	  assumed	  an	  IMF-­‐like	  role	  in	  providing	  guidance	  and	  recommendations	  for	  retail	  investors	  and	  debtor	  sovereigns	  alike.	  Testament	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  observation	  that,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  brief	  holdout	  scare	  among	  Ecuador’s	  bondholders,	  “vulture	  funds”	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  translate	  Griesa’s	  2012	  rulings	  to	  other	  debtors.231	  Elliott	  and	  NML,	  always	  exceptions	  to	  bondholder	  comity,	  have	  come	  away	  from	  the	  Argentine	  litigation	  saga	  with	  a	  significant,	  but	  case-­‐limited,	  payday:	  as	  of	  February	  2016,	  Argentina’s	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  pp.	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  Restructuring	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four	  largest	  holdout	  creditors	  expect	  to	  receive	  a	  25	  percent	  haircut	  in	  exchange	  for	  an	  end	  to	  their	  multi-­‐year	  legal	  blockade,	  terms	  remarkably	  better	  than	  the	  70	  percent	  reductions	  encountered	  by	  other	  investors.232	  Yet	  Gelpern	  contends	  that	  this	  outcome	  is	  “bloody	  for	  everyone	  involved,”	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  intractability	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  disputes	  limits	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  holdout	  strategies.233	  It	  appears	  that,	  at	  least	  for	  now,	  ad	  hoc	  skeptics	  must	  still	  contend	  with	  hypotheticals	  in	  a	  bond	  landscape	  characterized	  by	  messy,	  but	  still	  predictable,	  crisis	  resolution.	  	   Adding	  to	  institutional	  and	  investor	  biases	  toward	  ad	  hoc	  solutions,	  developing	  countries	  and	  their	  allies	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  convert	  alternate	  permanent	  regime	  proposals	  into	  political	  action.	  To	  date,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  palatable	  alterations	  proposed	  by	  debtor	  sovereigns	  remain	  the	  UNCTAD	  Ad	  Hoc	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts’	  recommendations	  for	  an	  enhanced	  Paris	  Club	  process	  complemented	  by	  parallel	  UN	  meetings.234	  This	  effort,	  at	  least,	  managed	  to	  secure	  UNCTAD	  a	  tacit	  seat	  at	  the	  Paris	  Club	  negotiating	  table,	  although	  it	  did	  so	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Club’s	  relative	  importance	  was	  giving	  way	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  banks	  and	  private	  investors.	  If	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  Practices	  are	  any	  indication	  of	  developing	  countries’	  policy	  stances	  in	  the	  post-­‐Argentina	  bond	  market,	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  G-­‐77	  are	  on	  a	  far	  different	  trajectory	  than	  most	  creditor	  groups,	  developed	  country	  governments,	  and	  even	  middle-­‐income	  nations	  with	  stable	  access	  to	  international	  credit.	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   Although	  debt	  markets	  have	  drastically	  evolved	  since	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  a	  reflection	  of	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  requirements	  to	  balance	  flexibility	  with	  certainty	  that	  Rieffel’s	  “ad	  hoc	  machinery”	  has	  stayed	  in	  place	  for	  the	  past	  four	  decades.	  While	  the	  progression	  from	  public	  financing	  to	  banks,	  and	  from	  banks	  to	  retail	  investors	  and	  hedge	  funds,	  has	  encouraged	  developed	  countries	  and	  international	  financial	  institutions	  to	  hand	  the	  reins	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  management	  over	  to	  bondholders	  and	  lawyers,	  even	  the	  Argentine	  holdout	  scenario	  has	  failed	  to	  provoke	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system.	  Absent	  a	  legal	  practice,	  political	  circumstance,	  or	  economic	  contagion	  capable	  of	  challenging	  multiple	  restructurings	  and	  debt	  relief	  efforts	  across	  bond	  series	  and	  countries,	  the	  debate	  over	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  will	  persist	  in	  academic	  circles	  and	  debtor-­‐friendly	  forums	  without	  making	  much	  of	  an	  impact	  on	  restructuring	  practices.	  	  
	  
II.	  The	  Future	  of	  Ad	  Hoc	  Machinery	  	   Dim	  prospects	  for	  a	  permanent	  sovereign	  debt	  regime	  do	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  that	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market	  will	  witness	  a	  “settled”	  ad	  hoc	  arrangement	  of	  institutions	  and	  norms.	  Any	  number	  of	  fault	  lines	  within	  the	  ad	  hoc	  framework	  can	  lead	  to	  another	  evolution	  in	  debt	  management	  practices:	  creditor	  governments	  must	  contend	  with	  a	  disparity	  between	  official	  positions	  and	  the	  decisions	  of	  their	  judicial	  branches,	  private	  creditors	  and	  banking	  interests	  must	  preempt	  or	  work	  around	  minority	  opposition	  to	  restructuring	  agreements,	  debtor	  sovereigns	  find	  themselves	  increasingly	  torn	  between	  political	  calls	  for	  favorable	  treatment	  and	  the	  widespread	  implementation	  of	  bond	  contract	  enhancements,	  and	  the	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“old	  guard”	  mechanisms	  –	  namely	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Paris	  Club	  –	  have	  relinquished	  their	  central	  roles	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  private	  investors.	  	  	   One	  implication	  of	  Argentina’s	  fifteen-­‐year	  battle	  is	  that,	  unlike	  the	  1980s,	  G-­‐7	  architects	  will	  continue	  to	  harbor	  biases	  against	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  sticks	  and	  carrots	  to	  motivate	  stable	  restructurings.	  Setting	  aside	  questions	  of	  whether	  creditor	  government	  or	  IMF-­‐led	  groupings	  of	  bondholders	  are	  even	  feasible,	  developed	  countries	  are	  only	  likely	  to	  return	  to	  their	  previous	  regulatory	  positions	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  systemic	  threat	  on	  par	  with	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis.235	  Fortunately,	  by	  virtue	  of	  private	  investors’	  decentralized	  activities,	  any	  potential	  contagion	  can	  be	  nipped	  in	  the	  bud	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  available	  to	  overexposed	  commercial	  banks.	  As	  alarming	  as	  the	  2012	  Argentine	  ruling	  may	  have	  been,	  its	  inability	  to	  provoke	  the	  development	  of	  “a	  bolder	  mechanism	  that	  is	  more	  driven	  by	  the	  public	  sector”	  hints	  at	  just	  how	  much	  future	  restructuring	  activities	  will	  remain	  embedded	  in	  private	  investors’	  decisions	  rather	  than	  creditor	  government	  oversight.236	  	  	   While	  the	  continued	  evolution	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market	  toward	  more	  complex	  frameworks,	  legal	  templates,	  and	  lender-­‐debtor	  relationships	  is	  employed	  as	  a	  strong	  argument	  for	  devolving	  coordination	  and	  governance	  responsibilities	  to	  bondholders	  themselves,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true	  that	  this	  pattern	  will	  disadvantage	  the	  Paris	  Club	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  At	  a	  2013	  presentation	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  Geneva,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State’s	  Andrew	  Haviland	  reported	  that	  sovereign-­‐to-­‐sovereign	  lending,	  although	  reduced	  in	  importance	  through	  a	  combination	  of	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increased	  private	  investor	  participation	  and	  official	  sector	  loan-­‐to-­‐grant	  programs,	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  radically	  alter	  the	  Paris	  Club’s	  internal	  makeup	  and	  existing	  debt	  management	  principles.	  Haviland’s	  line	  of	  thinking	  reflects	  on	  “the	  emergence	  of	  non-­‐Paris	  Club	  creditors	  such	  as	  China,	  Brazil,	  India,	  Venezuela,	  and	  others	  as	  significant	  providers	  of	  credit	  to	  developing	  countries,”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  Paris	  Club	  can	  boost	  its	  relevance	  to	  a	  broader	  swath	  of	  creditor	  interests	  by	  opening	  up	  its	  membership	  to	  new	  official	  lenders.237	  This	  possibility	  may	  be	  the	  silver	  lining	  around	  UNCTAD’s	  stalled	  efforts	  to	  reconsider	  the	  ad	  hoc	  system:	  an	  expanded	  Paris	  Club	  would	  incorporate	  many	  of	  the	  prominent	  signatories	  involved	  in	  the	  Basic	  Principles’	  presentation	  to	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly.	  Augmented	  Paris	  Club	  membership	  may	  also	  reduce	  the	  political	  impetus	  for	  an	  SDRM-­‐like	  proposal,	  effectively	  preserving	  the	  balance	  between	  official	  loans	  and	  private	  bonds	  while	  reassuring	  developing	  countries	  of	  their	  continued	  influence	  in	  debt	  negotiations.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  however,	  whether	  this	  expansion	  is	  likely	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  consequences	  such	  a	  transition	  would	  elicit.	  	   The	  path	  forward	  for	  the	  IMF	  is	  much	  narrower.	  The	  Fund	  itself	  has	  engaged	  in	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  soul-­‐searching	  since	  its	  2004	  Argentine	  rebuke,	  writing	  in	  an	  April	  2013	  paper	  that	  a	  “reprofiling”	  of	  debt,	  in	  which	  sovereign	  debtors	  would	  “extend	  maturities	  on	  all	  private	  sector	  bonds	  and	  loans	  falling	  due	  within	  the	  life	  of	  the	  [IMF]	  programme,”	  could	  potentially	  reduce	  the	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  troubling	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creditor	  governments.238	  Despite	  these	  sincere	  attempts	  to	  resolve	  the	  Fund’s	  past	  mistakes,	  however,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  private	  bondholders	  and	  ratings	  agencies	  will	  play	  along.	  Instead,	  just	  as	  developing	  countries	  once	  fretted	  that	  submitting	  debt	  negotiations	  to	  an	  SDRM	  would	  scare	  off	  investors,	  the	  IMF’s	  proposals	  to	  disentangle	  public	  funds	  from	  private	  creditors	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  preludes	  to	  sovereign	  default.	  If	  the	  Fund’s	  introspection	  is	  any	  indicator	  of	  its	  evolving	  policy	  stances,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  probable	  that	  debtor	  governments	  will	  strive	  to	  disintermediate	  the	  IMF	  and	  turn	  to	  alternative	  crisis	  lending	  sources	  in	  the	  near	  future.239	  	   Finally,	  the	  language	  of	  bond	  contracts	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  even	  more	  fluid	  as	  private	  creditors	  adopt	  more	  sophisticated	  outlooks	  on	  debt	  management.	  Reactions	  to	  New	  York	  bond	  frameworks	  are	  a	  toss-­‐up:	  the	  judicial	  system’s	  willingness	  to	  rule	  on	  hedge	  fund	  suits	  brought	  against	  debtor	  sovereigns	  ups	  the	  ante	  for	  retail	  investors	  and	  other	  small	  creditors	  looking	  to	  promote	  market	  stability,	  but	  the	  rise	  of	  New	  York-­‐constructed	  “trust	  structures”	  offers	  a	  viable	  alternative	  template	  for	  investors	  looking	  to	  deter	  disruptive	  litigation.240	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  bondholders	  are	  becoming	  more	  cognizant	  of	  how	  enhanced	  contractual	  provisions	  affect	  the	  fungibility	  of	  bond	  issuances;	  despite	  developed	  countries’	  support	  for	  widespread	  adoption	  of	  CACs	  and	  related	  components,	  a	  “menu	  option,”	  by	  which	  bondholders	  pick	  and	  choose	  amendments	  to	  an	  existing	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